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INTRODUCTION
This research paper is an evaluation of the effec­
tiveness and the implications of amended Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act. The evaluation considers the following 
points: (l) A brief background of events leading to the
1950 amendment to the Clayton Act. (2) Initial applica­
tion of amended Section 7 by the Federal Trade Commission 
and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
(3) Complexities and problems in the application of the 
law. (4) Public reaction through Congress as debated in 
congressional hearings. (5) Problems with appropriations 
as experienced by the Federal Trade Commission as opposed 
to the Department of Justice. (6) The gradual emergence 
of Section 7 law during the period I936-I96O. (7 ) The
gradual assumption of more Section 7 responsibilities by 
the Department of Justice and a concurrent decline in such 
actions initiated by the Federal Trade Commission during 
1961-1965» (8) The emergence of a definitive body of
anti-merger law. (9) Views of that body of law by scholars 
and others. (lO) A brief summary and conclusions.
The evidence used in supporting or negating the 
present anti-merger policy, or parts thereof, is derived
X
from an examination of 50 Section 7 case actions which 
were prosecuted by either the Federal Trade Commission or 
the Department of Justice during the period I92I-I965 with 
emphasis on the period I956-I965. Court decisions subse­
quent to 1965 also are analyzed if the complaints were 
filed in the period under examination.
Congressional hearings on the efficacy of Sec­
tion 7 as an anti-merger weapon are discussed. The majority 
and minority views of congressional leaders and others are 
outlined.
Published texts and articles by persons considered 
expert in the field of anti-merger work were examined and 
several are used as source materials for the observations 
made.
Unpublished dissertations relating to previous 
studies of Section 7 matters were examined and considered 
in this writing. One major conclusion was common, i. e., 
that Section 7 actions had no appreciable effect upon the 
number of mergers consummated.
Two Commerce Clearing House publications--Trade 
Cases and Trade Regulation Reporter--were used extensively. 
Legal files in six cases discussed in this paper were 
examined. Information in the two source publications were 
either in the form of a verbatim transcript of a hearing, 
or in the form of a summarization of the significant repre­
sentations .
xi
AMENDED SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT:
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND FOR THE CLAYTON ACT
Public sentiment against trusts and monopolies 
crystallized in the l880's. In I888, the four leading 
parties in the presidential campaign had specific planks 
in their platforms which related to monopoly, combina­
tions, and trusts. Several bills were introduced into 
both houses of Congress in I888 and I889, and the most 
lucid was presented by Senator John Sherman of Ohio.
The bill was entitled "A Bill to Declare Unlawful,
Trusts and Combinations in Restraint of Trade and Pro­
duction.’* After extensive debate, a revised substitute 
emerged which was signed into law by President Harrison 
on July 2, I89O. The law has since been known as the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.^
Administration of the law from the time of 
enactment until 1914 was sporadic and it did not have
^Dudley F . Pegrum, Public Regulation of Business, 
rev. ed. (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 19^5),
pp. 78-80.
2the effect of curbing big business as the framers of 
the law had apparently intended. A Senate Committee on 
Interstate Commerce was appointed in I9II to make in­
quiries into the subject of business concentration that 
had been "sweeping the country for two decades." The 
most significant recommendation was that the Committee 
was "unwilling to repose in any court the vast undefined
power that the court must administer, and under a rule
2
which the court promulgated."
Professor Pegrum in his book pointed out three 
fundamental difficulties in the administration of the 
Sherman Act. First, an inadequacy of an enforcement 
procedure which relied solely on the courts who placed 
emphasis on punitive rather than preventive measures 
was apparent. Second, a difficulty in securing reason­
able consistency in policy regarding restraint df trade 
and monopoly was evident since there had been varying 
degrees of enthusiasm for the objectives in the different 
administrations. Third, the successful prosecution of
some practices led to the use of others which proved
3
less vulnerable under the law.
On January 20, 1914, President Wilson addressed 
a joint session of Congress and requested new antitrust
2
H. R. Seager and C. A. Gulick, Jr., Trust and 




3legislation in accord with his campaign promises. His 
recommendations were placed in two bills--the Trade Com­
mission Bill and Clayton Bill. Congressman Clayton, 
for whom the latter bill was named, was Chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee; his committee considered substantive 
changes in the antitrust laws,. Four sections of the bill 
as reported by the House Judiciary Committee proposed 
substantive changes in the antitrust laws, and several 
sections dealt with the administration of the proposed 
law. The four sections proposed certain circumstances 
under which price discriminations, exclusive dealing and 
tying contracts, holding companies, and interlocking 
directorates would be illegal. The holding company
section was to eventually become Section 7 of the Clayton 
4
Act. It is that section with which this paper is con­
cerned.
An acceptable bill was enacted after some eight
months of hearings. The first two paragraphs of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act--the most pertinent for
this writing--state:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, 
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the 
stock or other share capital of another corporation 
engaged also in commerce where the effect may be to 
substantially lessen competition between the corpora­
tion whose stock is so acquired and the corporation 
making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce
4
David D, Martin, Mergers and the Clavton Act 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959),
pp. 29-31.
in any section of the community, or tend to create 
a monopoly in any line of commerce.
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, 
the whole or any part or other share capital of two 
or more corporations engaged in commerce where the 
effect of such acquisition, or the use of such stock 
by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, 
may be to substantially lessen competition between 
such corporations, or any of them, whose stock or 
other share capital is so acquired, or to restrain 
such commerce in any section or community, or tend 
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.5
During the debates on the Clayton Act, Senator 
Walsh of Montana made one of the more lucid statements 
concerning the purposes of the Act. The Senator described 
the purpose of the legislation as preserving competition 
where it existed and restoring competition where it had 
been destroyed.^
Professor Martin in discussing the lack of agree­
ment in Congress about the Act ascribes some of the 
difficulties to the political environment in which the 
bill was passed. Each party had a common objective but 
with different approaches and different degrees of 
emphasis. In addition, Martin pointed out the inherent 
difficulties in trying to assess the effect upon the 
welfare of the public, especially with the analytical 
tools available at the time. He was of the opinion that 
the legislation was tailored to satisfy the demands of
^U,S. Statutes at Large, v. 33, Public Law 
No. 212 (1914),
^UoS. Congressional Record, October 5, 1914, 
Vo 51, Po l6, 145»
7
the major political parties. With reference to the lat­
ter, Allyn Young said:
. . . For many members of Congress the casting of a
favorable vote was a matter of political exigency. 
Administrative pressure, party discipline, the 
political power of organized labor, the undoubted 
fact that a majority of the voters at home would 
interpret a Congressman's vote against an antitrust 
statute as a vote for monopoly were the dominant 
factors in the situation. . . .°
Professor Narver described the Clayton Act as 
the new anti-merger act that established a basic though 
incomplete philosophy regarding the consolidation of 
economic power. He explained that because corporate 
acquisitions were typically in the form of stock acqui­
sitions, little need was necessary in 1914 for Section 7 
to deal with asset acquisitions. He pointed out however 
that the matter had been debated in Congress and was 
generally agreed that the Sherman Act was adequate to 
meet any problems that would arise in connection with 
asset acquisitions. Accordingly, Section 7 was designed 
to prevent the acquisitions of one corporation of the
stock of a competing corporation where the result would
g
be to substantially lessen competition.
^Martin, pp. 48-49.
g
Allyn A. Young, "The Sherman Act and the New 
Anti-trust Legislation," Journal of Political Economv, 
Part II (April 1915), p. 326.
g
John C. Narver, Conglomerate Mergers and Market 
Competition (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1967), p p . 28-37.
6Section 11 of the Clayton Act gave the Federal 
Trade Commission the authority to enforce Sections 2, 3,
7) and 8 of the Act, except that the Interstate Commerce 
Commission would use the same authority in the event of 
violations by a common carrier. The Federal Reserve 
Board would also exercise the same authority in the 
event of a violation by a member institution. Section 15 
of the Act gave jurisdiction of Clayton Act violations 
to the Department of Justice, concurrently with the 
Federal Trade Commission. The Department of Justice 
was likewise empowered to institute suits in equity to 
prevent and restrain violations, but that power was not 
given the C o m m i s s i o n . T h e  concurrent jurisdiction in 
the handling of Section 7 violations remains in effect, 
and Supreme Court decisions in which each agency has 
represented the government will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters.
The formation of the Federal Trade Commission 
was accomplished with less debate than the companion 
Clayton Act. The agency was formed about a month before 
the Clayton Act which it was to administer had been 
enacted. Creation of the agency is contained in Public 
Law No. 203, 63d Congress, September 26, 1914. Pertinent 
portions are Sections 1, 3, 5, and 11. Section 1 created
^^U.S. Statutes at Large.
7the agency. Section 3 made the agency the successor to
the Bureau of Corporations. Section 5 designated the
Commission as the agency to deal with unfair business
practices. Section 11 stated briefly that nothing in
the act would be construed to prevent or interfere with
the enforcement of the antitrust acts, or the acts to
regulate commerce. Section 11 also contained a statement
that nothing in the act would be construed as a modifica-
11tion or repeal of the antitrust acts.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was established 
as an independent agency and removed from the direct con­
trol of the Executive Department. The independency was 
important since the commission was supposedly freed from 
political influence. The agency was permitted to employ 
attorneys, examiners, and economists to assist in the 
conduct of authorized powers. The Commission was opera­
tional on March l 6 , 1915»^^
Of specific note, there was no bar against mergers 
resulting from acquisition of assets. This loophole 
presented a major stumbling block to the FTC in its 
attempts to successfully apply Section 7 criteria in
Federal Trade Commission, Acts from which the 
Commission Derives Its Powers (Washington: U.S. Govern­





Administration of Section 7i Clayton Act
A particularly significant decision concerning
merger by acquisition occurred in the 1920 case U.S. v.
United States Steel Corporation (25I US 4l?). Briefly,
the Court pointed out that the Corporation, though large,
had not engaged in predatory practices associated with
an attempt to monopolize and restrain competition and
was therefore a reasonable combination which should not
be dissolved. The majority opinion stated that mere
size, especially if size resulted from growth, was no
offense; and neither was the existence of unused power
l4a violation since overt acts were required.
The FTC issued the first cease and desist order 
to include divestiture, against the Aluminum Company of 
America in 1921. The Commission ordered the firm to 
divest itself of the acquired capital stock of the Alumi­
num Rolling Mills Company. The order was upheld in 
District Court; however in 1924 the Court of Appeals 
permitted the Aluminum Company of America to purchase 
the physical properties of the rolling mill at a sheriff's
13Asher Isaacs and Reuben Slesinger, Business, 
Government, and Public Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Van
Nostrand Company, Inc. , 1964) , p. l4l.
14
Ibid. , p. 123.
9sale. (Aluminum Company of America v. FTC (299 Fed Rep
361.
In 1926, another FTC order directing the divesti­
ture of stock was upheld in the case Federal Trade 
Commission v. Western Meat Company (272 US 55^)» Western 
Meat had acquired all the stock of the Nevada Packing 
Company, a competitor, but none of the physical assets. 
Divestment of stock was proper according to the Court 
which also ruled that the FTC had the power to prevent 
Western from using control of the stock to dissolve the 
packing company and acquire its assets.
Possibilities for evasion of the law were brought 
out clearly in two other 1926 cases ruled upon concurrently 
with the Western case. The additional cases were FTC v. 
Thatcher Manufacturing Company and FTC v. Swift Packing 
Company. Each of the two firms had acquired a controlling 
interest in a competitor. Each allegedly used that con­
trol to obtain the properties and assets of the respective 
competitors and dissolved the subsidiaries before the 
Commission instituted proceedings. In the latter two 
cases, the Supreme Court ruled that Thatcher and Swift 
were within their rights and the Commission had no 
authority to order divestiture of assets even though the 
assets had been obtained through an initial control of 
stock illegally obtained (272 US 334).
^^Pegrum, p. 353.
10
Thus in the first twelve years after enactment 
of the Clayton Act, four of"the Commission's decisions 
had been subjected to Supreme Court interpretation, and 
three had been unfavorable to the government. The 
feeling was fairly general that Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act was ineffective.^^
After three unfavorable decisions in the 1920's, 
the FTC suffered another reversal of a different nature.
In the case of International Shoe Company v. FTC (280 
US 291) the Supreme Court in 1930 set aside an order of 
the Commission requiring International to divest itself 
of the stock of the McElwain Company. First, the Court 
ruled that there had been no substantial competition 
between the two in some 95 per cent of the shoe business 
since they manufactured different grades of shoes and 
sold in different markets. The Court also concluded 
that McElwain probably would have disappeared since it 
had been in dire financial straits at the time Inter­
national acquired its stock. The FTC later asserted that 
the Court had interpreted the phrase "substantially lessen 
competition" so narrowly as to practically limit its 
application to pure competition. The decision also opened
another avenue for evasion of the law by introducing the
17"failing business" doctrine•
^^Ibid., pp. 353-354. l?Ibid.
11
Professor Martin has dwelt at length on the 
International Shoe decision and considers the Court's 
decision as having had more implications than even the 
inability of Section 7 to cope with asset acquisitions.
He said:
The opinion of the Supreme Court said, in effect, 
that, if two firms have previously achieved suf­
ficient monopoly power by a location advantage or by 
differentiation of product, then substantial competi­
tion did not exist between them and therefore cannot 
be substantially lessened, nor can commerce be 
restrained in the sections in which they operate.
If the two firms had been selling the bulk of their 
products in the same geographical areas and if their 
products were homogeneous, then the test becomes that 
of whether the acquisition has had the effect of 
injuring the public--that is, by unreasonable restraint 
of trade. The Sherman Act test would thus be applied. 
If many other firms sell a considerable proportion 
of the same homogeneous product, then the acquisitions 
would be deemed not to injure the public, even though 
competition between the firms would have been estab­
lished as having existed prior to the acquisition and 
would have been completely eliminated.
With this interpretation of the standard of illegality, 
the only condemned acquisition would be an acquisition 
by a relatively large firm where there were few other 
firms in the industry and where the firms sold com­
pletely homogeneous products in the same geographical 
areas to the same customers. If such an acquisition 
were to take place, however, the test applied under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act would be the same as 
that applied if a violation of the Sherman Act had 
been charged.
If any effectiveness remained in Section 7, the 
final emasculation occurred in the Supreme Court's 1934 
decision in the case Arrow-Hart and Hegeman Electric 




company had been formed to acquire the stocks of two
competing firms. After the FTC had instituted proceedings,
the holding company was dissolved and the assets of the
competitors were merged into a new firm. The FTC ordered
dissolution of the new firm. The Supreme Court held that
the physical assets merger was not within the purview of
the Clayton Act, and further that the Commission did not
have the authority to include the newly formed firm in
19its complaint since it was the result of a merger.
A Need to Amend Section 7, Clayton Act
The FTC was powerless to enforce Section 7 where
the acquisitions of assets were involved. Martin and
others are strongly of the opinion that the standard of
illegality as interpreted by the Courts, i.e., the Sherman
Act standard, did more to remove the effectiveness than
did the limitations imposed by any failure to uphold the
20divestment of assets.
In support of his contention that the assets 
loophole may have been overemphasized, Martin determined 
that between 1927 and 1950, the FTC issued only 31 com­
plaints, and 27 of those were later dismissed. Twelve 
were dismissed on the grounds that the testimony would 
not support a finding that the effect of the acquisitions




might be to substantially lessen competition, restrain
commerce, ~6r tend to create a monopoly within the meaning
of the Court's interpretation in the International Shoe
decision. Three were dismissed on the grounds that the
acquisition of assets had nullified the jurisdiction of
the Commission. The other twelve were dismissed with no 
21reason given. Surely had the jurisdiction of the FTC 
been nullified because of asset acquisitions in those 
latter instances, the number would have been included in 
that category of dismissals. Of the initial twelve dis­
missals, all were based on the International Shoe case.
It was that reasoning that tended to crystallize Martin's 
opinion that "standards of illegality rather than assets 
acquisitions" appeared to have been a major factor in the 
lack of success in administering Section 7*
Regardless of the reasoning, statistics from 
Annual Reports of the FTC reflect that from 1929 to 1935, 
over 500 inquiries were instituted, but only 15 complaints 
were forthcoming, and only four cases resulted in the 
issuance of cease and desist orders. From 1935 to 19^1, 
only 137 inquiries were instituted, and only 8 complaints
were filed with no cease and desist orders having been 
2 2issued. The latter period is noteworthy, being subsequent
1940.
^^Ibid., pp. 158-159.
22Federal Trade Commission, Annual Reports, 1929-
l4
to the Arrow-Hart case which involved asset acquisitions.
In an effort to better define the policies of the 
FTC and to evaluate the adequacy of the statute, Martin 
examined the available facts concerning 121 dismissals 
after preliminary investigations during the period 1932 
to 1938. He concluded from this review that the FTC 
accepted the interpretation given the law in the Inter­
national Show case. According to Martin, such interpre­
tation of the law regarding the standard of illegality
precluded the FTC from preventing acquisitions even if
2 3it had had the power to order a divestment of assets.
A report made by the Temporary National Economic Committee
noted that 57 of the dismissals were due to a "purchase 
24
of assets."
The Federal Trade Commission first expressed an
interest in having Section 7 amended to include asset
acquisitions as early as 1921. The FTC stressed the
omission in its annual report and reported that the matter
2 5had been brought to the attention of Congress.
After the Arrow-Hart decision in 1934, the FTC 
began determined efforts to "plug" the assets loophole.
^^Martin, pp. 163-179»
24Federal Trade Commission Report on Monopolistic 
Practices in Industries, 1939, Temporary National Economic 
Committee, Hearings, Part 5-A, p. 2377»
p . 6.
2 ?Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report, 1921,
15
and mention was made in one form or another in over three- 
fourths of the succeeding annual reports. In a 1937 
report to Congress, the FTC recommended amendment to 
Section 7 which would remove the necessity of ascertain­
ing the effects of an acquisition. The agency further 
suggested that the criterion should be the percentage 
of total assets in an industry controlled by a firm 
after the acquisition. The FTC further suggested that 
Congress specify the percentage. The 1937 Annual Report 
included a recommendation for changing the illegality 
criterion but added that the chief concern was to have 
"assets" included in the list of prohibitions.^^
The Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) 
in its preliminary report to Congress in 1939 recommended
the asset amendment but did not recommend any change in
2 7the wording of the standard of illegality.
In its final report to Congress in 1941, the Tem­
porary National Economic Committee renewed the asset 
recommendation. TNEC additionally recommended a provision 
which would require that advance notification of mergers 
be made to the FTC, and that prior approval by that agency 
would be a prerequisite to final m e r g e r . ^8
^^Ibid., 1937, p. 15.
2 7U.S. Congress, Preliminary Report of the Tem­
porary National Economic Committee, 1939, Senate Document 
95, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. , pp. 21-32.
28Ibid., Senate Document No, 35, 77th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1941, pp. 38-39.
l6
The Commission, was primarily interested in having 
the law amended to care for asset acquisitions, and while 
some mention was made of the standard of illegality in 
a few annual reports, very little attention was focused 
on the damage which was caused by the court interpreta­
tions of "illegality" in the International Shoe case.
A strong possibility existed that Professor Martin was 
correct in his assertion that the problem of asset acquisi­
tions had been overemphasized. Certainly some action to 
correct the standard of illegality as interpreted by the 
Court in the International Shoe case should have received 
more specific attention. If the legality of a merger 
were to continue with Sherman Act guide lines as in that 
case, then Section 7 of the Clayton Act demanded some 
revision.
Section 7 activity by the FTC was dormant during
the war years. From 19^1 to 1946, only 7 preliminary
inquiries were instituted. Only one complaint was filed
and no orders of divestiture were issued. Annual reports
made by the Commission during those years merely concurred
in the recommendations of the Temporary National Economic
Committee, one being that asset acquisitions be included
29in the prohibitions of Section 7«
In outlining the legal history of the ineffectiveness
1946.
29
Federal Trade Commission, Annual Reports, 1941-
17
of Section 7, the FTC in its 1948 report on the merger 
movement again pointed out the travesty on justice in 
the Arrow-Hart case. The majority opinion in that case 
conceded that the stock had been acquired in violation 
of the act, but that the stock at the time of the Com­
mission's order was no longer owned by the defendant 
firm. The FTC in the 1948 report reiterated that it had 
called attention to the ruling; had characterized it as 
a virtual nullity of Section 7 as early as 1934; and had
pointed out that by the ruling it was a simple matter for
30corporations to avoid the intent of the law.
In the same report, the Commission stated that 
time and time again in cases involving the acquisition 
of stock, the defendant had quickly purchased the assets. 
The Commission pointed out a 1945 procedure against P. 
Ballantine and Sons as one example. Ballantine had 
acquired the stock of a competitor and during the hearing, 
the counsel for the firm announced that the assets of 
the acquired firm had been purchased. The Commission 
then dismissed the complaint. Another case in point 
concerned the Consolidated Grocers Corporation, which 
as a result of a series of stock acquisitions had become 
the largest wholesale grocer in the nation. While the 
case was being tried. Consolidated took title to the
30Federal Trade Commission, Report on the Merger
Movement: A Summary Report, 1948, p. 5*
18
assets of the acquired firms and dissolved the subsidiaries.
The Commission dismissed the complaint in 19^7* In the
two cases cited, the Commission was convinced that if the
stock first, assets later, were to be declared illegal,
firms would merely substitute an initial purchase of
assets which would be legal at the time. The Commission
speculated that possibly 90 per cent of all acquisitions
31could be handled in that manner.
The report also emphasizes that the supposed 
strength of the Clayton Act had been affected by judicial 
interpretation of the tests of competition. The courts 
had not accepted the Section 7 connotation that the test 
of competition should be between the acquiring and the 
acquired; but the judicial bodies had utilized the Sherman 
Act connotation in which the legality depended upon the 
effect on competition generally. Small individual 
accretions of power, according to the FTC, made it dif­
ficult to use Sherman Act standards even though there 
would be a steady increase in concentration of power. 
According to the agency's interpretation, the Clayton Act
was designed to check these minute accretions which would
32likely lessen competition.
To stress the trend of the merger movement, the 
Commission reported that more than 2450 formerly inde­
pendent manufacturing and mining companies had disappeared
^^Ibid., pp. 5-6. ^^Ibid., pp. 6-7.
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as a result of mergers and acquisitions during the period 
1940-1947. In appraising the overall effects of mergers 
on economic concentration, the Commission said that over 
time, each year's mergers had been superimposed upon a 
structure of economic concentration which had been built 
up over the years. For example, more than 7,000 independent 
firms disappeared from mining and manufacturing competi­
tion in the period 1919-1929, over 2,000 during the 
depressed 1930's; and 2450 in the 1940-1947 period. Even 
in 1939 the Temporary National Economic Committee reported 
that one-third of the total value of all manufactured 
goods was produced under conditions where the four leading 
producers of each individual product turned out from 75 
to 100 per cent of the value of the product; and about 
57 per cent of the value of the product was produced under 
conditions where the largest four producers of each 
product turned out more than half the total. Concentra­
tion ratios at the time were even higher in terms of 
number of products than in terms of value. In three- 
fourths of the total number of products, concentration 
ratios exceeded 50 per cent. In other words, four manu­
facturers produced at least half of the total output of
3 3a particular product.
In lobbying for legislation to "plug" the assets 
loophole, the Commission claimed that such action was in
^^Ibid. , pp. 17-19.
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the public interest. The agency further stated that under 
our theory of free, competitive capitalism, it was assumed 
the public was protected by the force of competition. In 
actuality however free enterprise had resulted in a 
growth in concentration. As a consequence much of the 
total production was controlled by a few firms , and 
vigorous price competition was a rarity. The Commission 
also argued that the need to find some effective means 
of preventing giant corporations from steadily increasing 
their economic power at the expense of small business was
• • 3‘ia crucial issue.
The Commission further stated that it had urged 
Congress for 22 years to amend Section 7 in order to pre­
vent corporations from buying the assets of competing 
firms. By the purchase of assets, huge corporations 
evaded the original intent of the Act--to arrest the 
creation of monopolies in their incipiency. A portion 
of the foreword to the 1948 Commission report outlines 
the legislative attempts to amend Section ?•
Since 19^5 companion bills designed to remedy this 
outstanding defect in the law have regularly been 
introduced in the Senate and House of Representa­
tives by Senator Joseph C. 0 'Mahoney and Representa­
tive Estes Kefauver; twice, that is, in both the 
Seventy-ninth (Democratic) and the Eightieth (Repub­
lican) Congresses, the House bill has received the 
approval of a subcommittee of the House Judiciary 
Committee; and twice it has failed to emerge from 
the House Rules Committee. In the Eightieth Congress 
the Senate Bill was approved on May 17, 1948, by a
^^Ibid., pp. 66-69.
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subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, headed 
by Senator William Langer. But like the House Bill, 
the Senate Bill has never reached the floor for debate.
The Commission recognized that the Courts were interpreting 
the effects of competition by Sherman Act standards yet 
that feature received only cursory comments by the agency. 
Emphasis was placed on the assets problem, and the Com­
mission expressed confidence in its ability to arrest eco­
nomic concentration in its incipiency if this loop hole 
were "plugged."
The Federal Trade Commission was not alone in its 
failure to arrest monopoly and concentration. In the case 
of the Commission it was before the fact, and after the 
fact in the case of the Antitrust Division of the Depart­
ment of Justice. The failure of the Justice Department to 
win the case U.S. v Columbia Steel Corporation, et al 
(334 US 495) was of paramount importance in convincing 
Congress that something should be done about the problem 
of economic concentration. This case probably did more to 
trigger legislation to strengthen the antitrust laws than 
a quarter century of recommendations by the Federal Trade 
Commission. These recommendations did not reach a point 
of insistency until after the Arrow-Hart case in 1934.
Under the Sherman Act, the Department of Justice 
had been unable to obtain an injunction against Columbia 
Steel, a subsidiary of the United States Steel Corporation. 
In that instance, Columbia had acquired the assets of
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Consolidated Steel Corporation, its largest independent 
competitor on the Pacific coast. In the 1948 decision, 
the majority of the Court concluded that the acquisition 
did not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade--the 
competition between Consolidated and the United States 
Steel subsidiaries in the relevant market had not been 
substantial. The Supreme Court also agreed with the lower 
court that a purchase agreement had been entered into for 
sound business reasons with no intent to monopolize the 
production and sale of fabricated steel products. The 
Court also stated that in its evaluation of a possible 
violation of the Sherman Act, it had looked at the fol­
lowing points: (l) the percentage of business controlled;
(2) the strength of the remaining competition; (3 ) whether 
the action sprang from business requirements; (4) the 
probable development of the industry; (5) consumer demands; 
and (6 ) other characteristics of the market. Pegrum says 
it was clearly implied that there was no directive in 
public policy at the time that forbade, per se, an expan­
sion to meet new markets whatever the area. Suit under 
the Clayton Act as it was worded was not possible since 
Columbia Steel had acquired the assets of Consolidated but 
had left the corporate structure of the acquired company 
intact.
It was mentioned earlier that Congressman Estes
^^Pegrum, pp. 342-343.
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Kefauver had sponsored a bill in the 80th Congress to 
strengthen the Clayton Act. The bill received the approval 
of the Subcommittee of the House Judiciary but failed to 
emerge from the House Rules Committee. The impact of the 
hearings, however, had an effect on the 8lst Congress when 
three similar bills were introduced. House Bill 2734 
sponsored by Congressman Emanuel Celler was the bill 
accepted and the one on which hearings were held. Con­
gressman Kefauver at the opening of the hearings said:
. . . if our democracy is going to survive in this
country, we must keep competition and we must see 
to it that the basic materials and resources of the 
country are available to any little fellow who 
wants to go into business. , . . When people lose
their economic freedom they lose their political 
freedom. I do want to urge while there is still 
time to save our free economy, before we reach the 
point of concentration where we are going to have 
a demand for state control of these basic industries 
in order to preserve our free enterprise system 
where every person and small corporation can have 
an opportunity of competing, that this committee 
exercise its good judgment and plug this loop hole 
in Section 7 of the Clayton Act and carry out the 
intent of Congress when it passed the Act in 1914.
. . . Actually this is protection for the very big
business as well because if we do not have this, big 
businesses are not going to be privately owned in the 
years to c o m e . 36
Opponents of the previous bills introduced in 
Congress had successfully based their position on the 
argument that the Sherman Act was adequate to handle 
asset acquisitions. It was recognized that such action
U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of 
the Judiciary, Hearings on HR 2734, A Bill to Amend the 
Clayton Act, 8lst Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, pp. 1-11.
24
would be after the fact, and not before, as was argued by 
the proponents for an amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act.
Even though opponents to any change in antitrust
laws were still present, the Celler bill was reported
favorably by the House Committee on the Judiciary in
August of 1949. An interesting aspect of the favorable
report is that five of the nine members who supported the
bill had submitted a strong minority dissent on a similar
37bill two years earlier. The Columbia Steel case had 
been decided by the Supreme Court in the meantime, and 
may have caused this reversal of opinion.
Congressman Celler led the floor debate in the 
House which lasted only one day, August 1$, 1949. Celler 
pointed out that of the 3 million business units in the 
United States, 31 per cent of all gross assets were con­
centrated in 445 corporations. He asked for support of 
an amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Celler 
said that because of the asset loop hole, over 25OO inde­
pendent businesses had disappeared through mergers during 
the period 1940-1947- In furtherance of this argument, 
Celler stated that four firms handled 64 per cent of all 
steel production; four firms accounted for 82 per cent of 




of the aluminum production. The House Judiciary Com­
mittee had made it clear that it intended to reach acqui­
sitions that could not be touched by the Sherman Act and 
rejected all arguments that the Sherman Act was adequate
to prevent mergers considered to be contrary to public
un (
40
39interest. With a minimum of opposition, the House
passed the bill 223 to 92.
A bill, identical to the Celler bill, was intro­
duced in the Senate by Senators Kefauver and O'Mahoney; 
however, hearings were not held on that bill in order 
that the House approved bill could be considered. The
hearings on the latter bill were held in September 1949
4l
and February 1950»
On June 2, 1950, the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary reported the bill favorably and Senator Donnell 
reported the minority views. Donnell argued that Sec­
tion 2 of the Sherman Act was adequate to prevent mergers 
which would substantially lessen competition. He also 
argued that the Columbia Steel case clearly indicated 
that asset acquisitions would be considered as a contract 
in restraint of trade. As such, according to Donnell, a
^®Narver, pp. 50-51. ^^Martin, p. 251.
40Narver, p. 51.
41U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on 
the Judiciary, Hearings on HR 2734, A Bill to Amend the 
Clayton Act, 8lst Cong., 1st and 2d Sessions (1949-1950),
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violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act could be charged
if an unreasonable lessening of competition could be 
42proved. Only minor changes were recommended by the
Senate Committee and the bill was passed on December 13,
431950 by a 55 to 22 vote. The amendment to Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, now familiarly known as the Celler-
Kefauver bill, was signed by President Truman on Decem- 
44ber 29, 1950.
The 1950 amendment was the last in a series of 
bills which had been considered by Congress subsequent 
to the recommendations made by the Temporary National 
Economic Committee. The bill as finally adopted not only 
covered asset acquisitions but also clarified the standard
4sof illegality. The Federal Trade Commission after 
nearly 25 years of frustration had succeeded in having 
the assets loop hole plugged and with the standards of 
illegality having been changed, the enforcement problems 
should have been easier.
An examination of amended Section 7, as well as 
some of the procedural changes in the Clayton Act are 
important in light of developments and problems in adminis­
tration during the ensuing years.
4a
Martin, p. 251i
43^Congressional Record, v. 96, p. 16,573.
44 _ 4 ^
^^Ibid., p. 17,138. ^^Martin, p. 252.
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1950 Amendment to the Clayton Act 
The most important changes made in the wording 
of Section ? occurred in the first two paragraphs which 
follow:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, 
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the 
stock or other share capital and no corporation sub­
ject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commis­
sion shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets 
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where 
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, 
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to 
lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, 
the whole or any part of the stock or other share 
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdic­
tion of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire 
the whole or any part of the assets of one or more 
corporations engaged in commerce, where in any line 
of commerce in any section of the country, the effect 
of such acquisition, of such stock or assets, or of 
the use of such stock by the voting or granting of 
proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen 
competition or to tend to create a monopoly.’®
A new paragraph was added to amended Section 7 
which stated that the bill would not apply to corporations 
coming under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Communica­
tions Commission, Federal Power Commission, Securities and
Exchange Commission, United States Maritime Commission, or
47Secretary of Agriculture. Martin's comment was that he 
believed the Department of Justice could take necessary
^^U.S. Statutes at Large (1950), p. 1125. 
^^Ibid., pp. 1125-1127.
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action in these areas in the event of a violation of the 
48Clayton Act.
In that regard, Section 11 of the Act was amended
to require that any complaint issued by an administrative
agency under Sections 2, 3» 7, or 8 of the Clayton Act
would be acted upon by the Attorney General. Better
coordination between the enforcement agencies and the
administrative bodies was the intent. Section 11 was
further amended to authorize the Federal Trade Commission
to order divestment of assets, as well as stock which had
49been acquired in violation of Section 7*
Comments on the new statutory standards of the 
amended Act were set forth by the Federal Trade Commission 
in its Report on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions. The 
FTC compared amended Section 7 and original Section 7»
The comparisons were: (l) acquisitions of assets as well
as stocks were covered; (2) lessening of competition 
between the acquiring and acquired corporation was no 
longer necessary in finding a violation; (3) the elimina­
tion of the test of effect on competition between the 
acquiring and the acquired firm, made it clear that the 
1950 legislation was not intended to prohibit all acquisi­
tions among competitors; (4) the new bill made it clear 
that it applied to all types of mergers and acquisitions
48 - 4q
Martin, pp. 255-256. Statuteà at Large.,
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which indicated the specified effect; (5 ) the law applied 
in any section of the country rather than in any section 
or community; and (6 ) the 1950 Act applied uniformly, in 
any line of commerce in any section of the country where 
there "may be a substantial lessening of competition." In 
the report, the Commission stated that the intent of the 
1950 amendment was to cope with monopolistic tendencies 
well before they reached a stage for Sherman Act pro­
ceedings. The report also explained that the Commission 
could intercede in the cumulative accretions of small 
firms by larger firms which reduced the vigor of compe­
tition; however, its efforts would not be as far reaching 
as Sherman Act prohibitions such as a monopoly in restraint 
of trade.
In the report, the Commission stressed its 
observations and interpretations of the term "relevant 
markets." They were: (l) Since the 1950 Act applied to
acquisitions where in any line of commerce in any section 
of the country--it would appear not to be limited to any 
specific set of product relations between the acquiring 
and the acquired companies, to any particular set of sup­
pliers or competitors of either company, or to any geo­
graphic area in which they may trade. (2) Scrutiny of the 
competitive effects is not confined to product lines which
^^Federal Trade Commission, Report on Corporate 
Mergers and Acquisitions (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1955), PP- I5O-I7O.
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constitute a major portion of the business of either the 
acquiring or the acquired company. The Commission con­
cluded that the foregoing would mean that market facts 
define the meaning of the relevant line of commerce and 
section of the country; and that the actual and potential 
competitive consequences are to be tested in (a) any 
product line, in (b) any geographic area, and (c) at 
whatever market levels they may occur. The Commission 
also said that a corporation in a failing or bankrupt con­
dition would not be precluded from merging; and neither 
would the merger of small companies be prohibited since 
generally a merger of that nature would be incapable of 
producing the proscribed effects.
Since amended Section 7 would be concerned with a 
prevention of a substantial lessening of competition, and 
in its incipiency, Martin commented that the "new" section 
would be interested in both economic issues and market 
consequences. He said that the proof would necessarily be 
in the domain of legal evidence; however, the facts which 
would be considered would be both economic and statistical, 
and that would obligate the economist to analyze the data
CO
in a form that would meet legal standards.
When the original Section 7 was enacted, the Con­
gressional intent was to supplement the Sherman Act to
^^Ibid. ^^Martin, p. l43.
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allow it to cope with the "evils" of intercorporate stock­
holding. The 1950 amendment marked a major change in anti­
trust policy on mergers and acquisitions of all kinds. It 
was in effect an amendment to both the Clayton and the 
Sherman Acts since the latter had been the policy statute 
regarding asset acquisitions which was now covered in the 
new Act. Martin has summarized the intent as follows:
. . . The legislative history of the 1950 amendment 
indicates that Congress intended to change the law 
on corporate acquisitions of all types so as to make 
illegal all acquisitions manifesting a reasonable 
probability of the effect of a substantial lessening 
of competition or a tendency toward the creation of 
a monopoly in the market for any commodity irrespec­
tive of the existence of a conspiracy or of an intent 
to monopolize or restrain trade.53
On first examination the amendment conformed to 
the desires of the Federal Trade Commission. The next 
chapter will be focused on the interpretation given the 
amendment and specific handlings of proceedings initiated 
by the Federal Tradt Commission.
53lbid., p. 267.
CHAPTER II
EFFECT OF AMENDED SECTION 7, CLAYTON ACT 
ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, I95I-I955
In the 10 year period prior to the enactment of 
the Celler-Kefauver amendment, mergers and acquisitions 
averaged about 300 annually according to records of the 
Federal Trade Commission, and about 80 per cent occurred 
in the mining-manufacturing segment of the economy. In 
the immediate 5 year period preceding the amendment, 
mergers and acquisitions totaled about 1 ,130, or an aver­
age of approximately 225 annually. In 1951, the first 
year amended Section 7 was operative, about 290 mergers- 
acquisitions were reported. In 1952, about the same num­
ber were recorded, but in 1953 the recorded number rose 
to about 385. There were about 700 in 195^ and about the 
same number in 1955* In summary, during the first five 
year period after the amendment the number of mergers- 
acquisitions rose to about 2,400, or more than double the 
number in the five year period preceding the Celler-Kefauver
32
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amendment.^ If only a number comparison was used, the 
strengthened statute had a reverse effect from that which 
was intended.
For example, less than one per cent of all mergers 
and acquisitions were challenged, which will be discussed 
later. Briefly, of the 2,400 mergers between 1951-1956, 
only 24 were challenged and less than that number resulted 
in the issuance of a complaint. In 1951» the first year 
that amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act was in effect, 
there were no formal complaints issued. In 1952, one 
formal complaint was issued against Pillsbury Mills. 
Ironically, that case was still in litigation as of late 
1966, and some of the problems in that case will be dis­
cussed later in this chapter. There were no complaints 
issued in 1953, and only two in 1954. The case against 
Crown Zellerbach initiated in 1954 will also be discussed 
in this chapter. Eight complaints were filed in 1955*
Thus during the first five years after enactment of the
Celler-Kefauver amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
2
only 11 cases were initiated by the enforcement agencies.
Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report, Fiscal 
Year I966 (Washington: United States Government Printing
Office, 1966), pp. 38-39. Above information partially 
extrapolated from Chart 1, Chapter Vlll.
2
Betty Bock, Mergers and Markets: An Economic
Analysis of the First I3 Years under the Merger Act of 
1950, The Conference Board Studies in Business Economics, 
No. 93 (New York: National Industrial Conference Board,
Inc., 1966), 3-9 .
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Several reasons can be given for the paucity of 
challenges to mergers and acquisitions initiated by the 
Federal Trade Commission. First, there was, and still is 
no legal requirement that an enforcement agency be furnished 
advance information on business planning and expectations.
To obtain a list of mergers-acquisitions, the FTC and the 
Department of Justice compile such data from news media 
and other sources such as Moody's Investor's Service and 
the Standard Corporation Report. That is the list of 
mergers and acquisitions which was, and is still used by 
the enforcement agencies.
Second, a review of such sources would be tedious 
and time consuming. The selection of a merger or acquisi­
tion for a detailed inquiry could be a decision that would 
not be welcomed by an agency that had been on the losing 
side for years.
Third, because of limited personnel and funds, it 
would have been impossible to give detailed attention to 
more than a select few mergers and acquisitions. Those 
would have normally been confined to a per se violation, 
or to a corporation which had been under suspicion at an 
earlier date.
Fourth, the Commission was attempting to enforce 
amended Section 7 without established guide lines, and 
none that could be attributed to judicial review. The act 
itself was allegedly ambiguous and that would lead to a
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cautious approach.
Fifth, during the 1951-1956 period, a national 
administration traditionally business oriented could have 
influenced the cautious approach. The Commission could 
have rationalized that any efforts by a regulatory body 
which would disturb the status quo of the economy, regard­
less of its objective, would have been viewed with disfavor.
The Federal Trade Commission initiated its first 
formal proceeding under the new anti-merger statute on 
June 16, 1952. Despite its apparent reluctance, a com­
plaint was issued against Pillsbury Mills, Inc., the 
nation's second largest flour milling company. The FTC 
charged that Pillsbury acquired the assets of two impor­
tant competitors in the southeastern area of the United 
States. Ballard and Ballard, producers of flour, flour 
base mixes, and animal feeds, was acquired on June 12,
1951 ; and the Duff Baking Mix division of American Home 
Foods, Inc., was acquired on March 10, 1952. The com­
plaint alleged that prior to the acquisitions, the three 
firms were each engaged in the sale of family flour, 
bakery flour, prepared flour mixes, and other flour pro­
ducts. During the 12 month period prior to 1950, it was 
alleged that eight firms including Pillsbury were respon­
sible for about 70 per cent of the national sales of flour 
base mixes. Pillsbury ranked as the nation's second 
largest seller of flour base mixes with about I6 per cent
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of total sales, and Duff ranked fourth with about 6 per cent 
of total sales.
In the southeastern market, it was alleged that 
Pillsbury had ranked first in sales of prepared mixes, 
Ballard ranked third, and Duff ranked fifth. According to 
the complaint, it was estimated that after the acquisi­
tions, and using the 19^9 market shares as the measure, 
the combined companies sold nearly per cent of all pre­
pared flour base mixes in the southeast.
The complaint also charged that the acquisitions 
were but a part of general tendency toward concentration 
of control in the flour milling industry. Statistics were 
cited which reflected an increased share of the market
3
over a period of time for the nine leading companies.
As in all complaints, the Commission charged the 
acquisitions were substantial factors in the industry and 
their effect would be to substantially lessen competition. 
The Commission's attorneys emphasized in the hearings that 
a distinction should be made between the Sherman Act test 
for illegality of mergers and the new Clayton Act test.
The attorneys explained that Congress had declared that 
amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act was to bar piecemeal 
acquisitions not forbidden by the Sherman Act. That 
statute had been the basis for tests previously adopted by
3
In the Matter of Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Federal 
Trade Commission Decisions, Docket 6000, v. 57» 1274-1415■
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the courts. The Hearing Examiner gave an initial decision 
on April 22, 1953 in which he dismissed the complaint. It 
was stated that the Federal Trade Commission did not prove 
a substantial lessening of competition in the total market 
for flour.^ (Underlining mine) The hearing examiner 
interpreted the language of Section 7 "substantially to 
lessen competition" to mean the acquisition of an over­
whelming control of the total market. By that construc­
tion, he interpreted Section 7 with a Sherman Act connota­
tion--" to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade.
The maiden effort by the Commission into the anti­
merger field had been rebuffed by its own family who had 
presumably seen no change in the merger law as it had been 
interpreted in the courts the previous 20 years. The dis­
missal order was appealed to the Federal Trade Commission. 
In supporting their appeal, the attorneys argued that the 
"substantiality test" should be used in deciding whether 
or not the effect of a given acquisition may be substan­
tially to lessen competition. (Underlining mine) It was 
also argued that where a leading firm in an industry in a 
particular market in a section of the country acquires 
another firm in the same line of commerce in the same 
section of the country as Pillsbury did in its acquisition
^Ibid., p. 1277.
^Vernon A. Mund, Government and Business, 4th ed, 
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 19&5), p . I5I.
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of Ballard, then there should be a reasonable basis for 
the Commission to find that such an acquisition "may be 
substantially to lessen competition."^ In ruling on the 
appeal, the Commission pointed out that the appellant had 
established a prima facie case to further show (l) the 
relevant products involved were competitive; (2) a rele­
vant market had been delineated; (3) Pillsbury had a sub­
stantial share of the market and was one of the leading 
factors in that market; and (4) Ballard and Duff had had 
a substantial amount of business and were important fac­
tors in the relevant market. On December 23, 1953, the 
Federal Trade Commission vacated the dismissal order and 
remanded the matter of the Hearing Examiner for further
7
consideration.
Some of the points brought out by the Commission 
in its deliberations prior to sending the case back for 
further consideration are interesting, especially in 
attempting to delineate between Sherman Act and Clayton 
Act standards of illegality. While the Commission 
declined to utilize a quantitative substantiality test as 
proposed by the appellant, the reasoning did not mean a 
return to the Sherman Act test of illegality. The standard 
of illegality as expressed by the Commission was:
^Ibid.
n
Federal Trade Commission Decisions, p. 1278.
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As we see it, amended Section 7 sought to reach 
mergers embraced within its sphere in their incipi- 
ency, and to determine their illegality by tests of 
its own. These are not the rule of reason of the 
Sherman Act, that is, unreasonable restraint of trade, 
nor are Section 7 prohibitions to be added to the list 
of per se violations. Somewhere in between is Sec­
tion 7 , which prohibits acts that 'may* happen in a 
particular market, that looks to a 'reasonable proba­
bility,' to 'substantial' economic consequences, to 
acts that 'tend' to a result. Over all it is the 
broad purpose to supplement the Sherman Act eind reach 
incipient restraints.
While these are far from specific standards--speci- 
ficity would in any event be inconsistent with the 
'convenient vagueness' of antitrust prohibitions--they 
can, we believe, be applied on a case-by-case basis.
We think the present case is the type that Congress 
had in mind--one that presents a set of facts which 
would be insufficient under the Sherman Act but none­
theless established, prima facie, a violation of Sec­
tion 7 of the Clayton Act.°
The Federal Trade Commission, at least, believed 
that its attorneys had made a case against Pillsbury; how­
ever litigation was to continue for years. In the rehear­
ings, an interesting point was brought out by the Commis­
sion in its Findings. Pillsbury utilized the services of 
an economist, Mr. Wroe Alderson, who testified as to the 
type of structural tests which should be constructed in 
arriving at the competitive effects of the acquisitions.
The Commission disregarded the testimony, and preferred to 
accept the theory of another economist used by the prosecu- 
tion--one who was widely recognized as an expert on competi­
tion from an economic standpoint and an authority on anti­
trust matters. (Actually the differences were the standards
®Ibid.
4o
of measurement and the Commission chose to accept those 
of the more widely known authority.) An order of divesti­
ture was issued on December l6, i960, in which the Commis­
sion agreed with the findings in the rehearing commenced
g
several years before.
The Pillsbury case was not ended since the Federal 
Trade Commission order was appealed to the Circuit Court 
of Appeals, and on January 7 5 1966 that body ordered the 
divestiture vacated and again remanded the case to the 
Federal Trade Commission. The Court in its remand sug­
gested that the Commission as "now constituted" should, in 
view of the lapse of time, reevaluate the case in light of 
the present state of case law applying to Section ?• (The 
implication would seem to be that the membership of the 
Commission had changed subsequent to most of the hearings, 
and the new members might not be as dogmatic in their 
opposition to the merger.)
During the years of litigation, the business opera­
tions of Ballard and Duff were completely merged with 
Pillsbury. Even if divestiture is finally ordered, the 
restoration of Ballard and Duff as separate entities may 
be difficult. Even if an order of divestiture were again 
issued by the Commission, the case could well go to the
9
Trade Regulation Reports, Transfer Binder, FTC, 
Complaints, Orders, Stipulations, 1959-1960, par. 27,845
*^^ Trade Cases, 1966, par. 71,646.
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Supreme Court along with more years of litigation.
Other points of interest in the appeal by Pills­
bury to the Circuit Court were that theoretically "pure 
and perfect competition" existed in the sale of flour in 
the southeastern market. It was also claimed that the 
acquisitions made Pillsbury more able to compete with 
General Mills, their primary competitor in the relevant 
market. It was also stressed that the acquisition of 
Ballard did not violate Section 7 since Ballard was a 
failing firm. (The latter point had been totally rejected 
by the Commission.) In the brief filed by the Federal 
Trade Commission, it was contended that the acquisitions 
had the effect of substantially increasing concentration 
in the relevant market with a probable detrimental effect 
on competition.^^
What initially appeared to be an excellent test 
of the effectiveness of amended Section 7 may still be an 
excellent test, but if so, the Commission's success in 
that pilot case (Pillsbury) has not been noteworthy. 
Problems can be foreseen in any divestiture at this late 
date. After nearly 20 years, Ballard and Duff have lost 
their identity in the southeastern market and it may well 
be economically unfeasible to attempt to reestablish them 
as competitive firms in any market. The mere renaming of
^^Ibid,
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the former physical assets of Ballard and Duff would not 
suffice in an area where the image of Pillsbury is so 
prominent--there could well be two "failing firms" in the 
area, rather than only Ballard as contended by Pillsbury.
The Commission was also of the opinion that further
litigation would be unproductive. On March 28, I966, the
Federal Trade Commission issued a final order of dismissal
in the Pillsbury case. That final order stated briefly
that it would not be in the public interest to proceed
12further in its case against Pillsbury Mills.
Of the 6 complaints filed by the Commission in the 
1951-1956 period, all did not meet with the same opposi­
tion as in Pillsbury. On February 15» 1954, the Commis­
sion issued a complaint against Crown Zellerbach Corpora­
tion of San Francisco charging that its acquisition of the 
assets of St. Helen's Pulp and Paper Company violated Sec­
tion 7 of the Clayton Act. Both corporations were fully 
integrated concerns engaged in the manufacture and sale 
of paper and paper products throughout much of the western 
part of the United States. The complaint further alleged 
that the sale of such products by the two firms accounted 
for 85 per cent of the sales in western states; and the 
effect of the acquisition might be to create a monopoly in
12Trade Regulation Reporter, Transfer Binder, 
Federal Trade Commission Complaints, Orders, I967, par, 
17,484.
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pulp wood sales. The complaint also alleged that the 
acquisition would increase the market dominance of Crown, 
and would eliminate the opportunity for independent market 
behavior by converters of paper products, and jobbers.
The complaint also stated that Crown was the largest seller 
of pulp and paper in the west, and was a price leader in 
that market; and that St. Helen's was one of the three 
major suppliers of paper and paper products in the Pacific 
Coast states. Both the hearing examiner and the Commis­
sion found that the acquisition had the effect of substan­
tially lessening competition and a final order of divesti-
13ture was issued on December 26, 1957»
Crown did not accept that order and appealed to 
the Court of Appeals. On June 5i 1961, the Court sustained 
the order of the Commission. The Court held that the 
results of the merger were (l) to remove as a supplier, an 
important fully integrated competitor, and (2) to signifi­
cantly increase the size of Crown Zellerbach in the rele­
vant classes of goods in which it already had a commanding
14lead. Crown appealed the case to the Supreme Court but 
on December 22, I961, that body declined to review the
15case. ^
13In the Matter of Crown Zellerbach Corporation, 
Federal Trade Commission Decisions, Docket 618O, v. 54,
pp. 769-797»
^^Trade Cases, I96I, par. 70,038.
^^Ibid., par. 70,1?8.
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To illustrate some of the difficulties that arose 
in the administration of the statute in that particular 
case, the Commission shortly after issuing the initial 
complaint against Crown Zellerbach, authorized its Bureau 
of Economics to collect market data from customers of 
St. Helen's. The results were presented in evidence but 
the respondent objected on the grounds that mail question­
naires were hearsay evidence. On appeal from the examiner's 
ruling, the Commission decided that the evidence would be 
admitted but that the respondent should have ample oppor­
tunity to examine the basic materials if that could be 
done without disclosing information about specific firms. 
Accordingly the Commission not only had to satisfy a sound 
economic conclusion, but its presentations had to be 
legally admissable as evidence in a court of law.
Several important factors were proclaimed in the 
Crown case that were to be utilized in future proceedings-- 
but unfortunately no such guide lines were available during 
the 1956-1960 period. For example, the Court of Appeals 
accepted the Commission's finding that Crown and St. Helen's 
both produced and sold the broad category of coarse paper 
as distinguished from fine papers and newsprint, shipping 
paper and others. Thus the relevant "line of commerce" 
was pronounced. The Court accepted the Commission's
^^Trade Regulation Reporter, Transfer Binder, FTC 
Complaints, Orders, Stipulations, 195^-19551 par. 25,458.
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findings that in 1953» in the 11 western states, Crown pro­
duced 51*5 per cent of the coarse paper, and St. Helen's,
11 per cent, and that the two would account for 62.5 per 
cent of total production. Thus a relevant "product market"
 ^ 17 was pronounced.
Other important factors which could be used as 
guide lines were also enunciated by the Court. That body 
concurred in the Commission's delineation of the relevant 
geographic market by agreeing that in the states of Cali­
fornia, Oregon, and Washington was where the most active 
competition occurred and the area most subject to common 
economic forces. The Commission was also upheld in its 
allegation that the acquisition of a rival firm by a larger 
one would result in an increased concentration of power by 
the acquiring concern. The reasoning was that the pre­
merger dominance of the acquiring firm would be aggravated 
which would substantially lessen competition, or tend to 
create a monopoly. The respondent's defense that the 
merger would result in economies of scale which would per­
mit lower prices for its products was rejected. The Court 
pointed out that the legislative history of the Act did 
not appear to concern itself with economic efficiency. 
Congress, according to the Court, was concerned with small 
businesses that would be absorbed by its larger competi­
tors; and about those other competitors whose opportunities
^^Trade Cases, I96I, par. 70,038.
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to compete might be diminished by a merger which increased
18the concentration of power in the larger corporation.
Even though the Federal Trade Commission was even­
tually successful in the Crown Zellerbach case, there was 
over 7 years of litigation before a final order of divesti­
ture was approved. Much like the Pillsbury case, if the 
acquiring-acquired firms had fully integrated during that 
period, the re-establishment of St. Helen's with its previ­
ous market share would have presented an unenviable problem 
for both firms.
While the Pillsbury and Crown cases were the most 
notable of the Commission's attempts to enforce amended 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act during the first five years 
after enactment, some minor success was achieved without 
the legal delays. The Commission filed a complaint on 
June 30, 1955 alleging that Farm Journal, Inc., had acquired 
Better Farming, formerly Country Gentleman from the Curtis 
Publishing Co., and had thereby violated the law by elimi­
nating one of the two large nation-wide farm magazines.
Farm Journal was ordered to divest itself of the names 
Better Farming and Country Gentleman and of the lists of 
subscribers and advertisers. The Commission was unable 
to establish the two magazines as competitors to Farm 
Journal. The order of limited divestiture was issued only
18
Trade Cases, I961, par. 70,038.
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19one year after the initial complaint.
Of the six cases filed by the Commission in the
I95I-I956 period, only the Crown Zellerbach case was given 
a court interpretation, and that about seven years after 
the initial complaint. The Pillsbury case was in litiga­
tion for l4 years. A 1954 action was filed in the case
Federal Trade Commission v Luria Bros., Inc., FTC Docket 
No. 6156, in which the responder was charged with a viola­
tion of Section ?• Litigation also lasted l4 years, but 
the Supreme Court upheld a divestment order in I968. In 
a 1955 complaint against A. G. Spalding and Bros. Co.,
FTC Docket No. 64?8, an order of divestiture was upheld by 
the Court of Appeals in I962 (A. G. Spalding and Bros. Co., 
V Federal Trade Commission). In a sixth complaint filed 
on June 30, 19551 Federal Trade Commission v Union Bag 
and Paper Corp., FTC Docket No. 638I , a consent decree was 
issued in 1956 in which the respondent agreed to limit its 
future acquisitions. Of the six cases filed by the Com­
mission, only one consent order was issued. Of the five 
cases filed by the Department of Justice charging viola­
tion of Section 7, four were settled by consent decrees 
normally within I8 months. That agency sought a divesti­
ture order in the Brown Shoe Case which was eventually
19Trade Regulation Reporter, Transfer Binder, 
Federal Trade Commission Complaints, Orders, Stipulations,
1956-1957, par. 26,127.
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upheld by the Supreme Court in I962. The Brown case is 
considered a landmark case and will receive comment later 
in this paper.
The Federal Trade Commission attempted to com­
pletely dissolve the mergers against which it filed com­
plaints with the exception of the Union Bag case in which 
a consent decree was obtained. Contrariwise, the Depart­
ment of Justice used the consent decree in four of its 
five cases. From the time elements involved it is readily 
apparent that while a consent decree would not normally 
recreate a competitive entity, as many interpreted as the 
congressional intent, it does at the very least estop 
further concentration in a particular area, market, or 
industry. A consent decree, while not always reestablish­
ing a competitive entity, will comply with the halting in 
its "incipiency," of a tendency toward greater concentra­
tion and eventual monopoly. The consent decree is also 
advantageous in that costly litigation and time consuming 
proceedings are eliminated and that will permit the enforce­
ment agencies to devote more of their limited personnel 
and funds to broader areas in the anti-merger field. From 
the standpoint of the respondent, the acquiring company is 
normally left with at least a part of its property acquired 
prior to the date of the complaint. A saving is effected 
in that regard as well as a saving in time and money asso­
ciated with a complex litigation.
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The reactions of Congress and the business community 
regarding the administration and effectiveness of amended 
Section 7 after the first five years of its existence will 
be examined through the medium of Congressional hearings.
The hearings commenced in 195^ and have continued through 
the intervening years. A discussion of the hearings is in 
the next chapter.
CHAPTER III
BUSINESS AND POLITICAL THINKING ON 
ANTI-MERGER LAW, I956-I965
For the first five years after the enactment of 
amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act, there was very little 
concern in legislative circles about the effectiveness of 
the law, or the needs of the enforcement agencies in the 
administration of the statute. The lack of concern is 
supported by the minimal number of complaints filed in 
that period, and the relative insignificance of the actions. 
It was not until 1955» that Congress evinced concern with 
the enforcement of the new anti-merger law. Subcommittees 
of the Judiciary in both the House and the Senate were 
appointed to examine an alleged trend toward concentration 
in industry which reportedly was anti-competitive and pro­
scribed by the Clayton and Sherman Acts.^
During that period the Federal Trade Commission 
had been lobbying, albeit unsuccessfully, to obtain further 
enabling legislation. The FTC had recommended that there




should be a required pre-merger notification which should 
be made on all corporate mergers-acquisitions over a 
certain asset size. In that manner, time would be saved 
by the enforcement agencies which were compelled to labori­
ously compile merger information from a variety of public 
sources. That information according to the Commission 
was frequently incomplete and inaccurate.
The FTC strongly supported legislation to amend 
the Clayton Act that would provide the FTC injunctive 
powers in Section 7 cases. The agency contended that the 
inability to restrain the consunraation of a merger made 
Section 7 proceedings extremely difficult. It was explained 
that if the Commission moved, and if its time-consuming 
hearings eventually resulted in an order of divestiture, 
the assets of the merged firm would have been so inte­
grated, that an unscrambling process would be next to 
impossible.
A third measure strongly supported by the FTC 
consisted of a desired amendment to the Clayton Act to 
provide that the agency's cease and desist orders should 
be final, unless appealed within a specified time limit.
The FTC contended that at the time, only orders issued 
under the unfair practices portion of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (Section 5) had the finality desired.
It was against that background that congressional 
notice was taken of the problems surrounding the agencies
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designated to enforce the anti-merger law. Subsequently 
hearings were to be held which brought out the allegation 
that business concentration had been increasing at a rate 
which threatened the competitive system. The proponents 
of the FTC proposals strongly supported the thesis that 
industrial concentration was the forerunner of monopoly.
On that presumption, the subject of concentration was 
either in the fore or the background of all debates which 
were to follow in the extended hearings on anti-trust and 
anti-monopoly.
At first glance one might have thought that a 
pre-merger notification bill would have been the easiest 
to enact, and possibly less offensive to bi-partisan 
thinking. Either the injunctive or restraint order pro­
posal, or the legal finality of cease and desist order 
proposal would, at least on the surface, have possibly 
posed a more ominous threat to one’s constitutional rights 
In the first instance, notice of an intended merger would 
eventually be published in any event; while the latter two 
proposals, if enacted, could conceivably result in adverse 
business publicity.
By 1956, both houses of Congress had bills before 
them. Each bill embodied the Commission's desires in one 
form or another.
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Congressional Hearings, I956-I965 
Congressman Emmanuel Celler, Chairman of the Anti­
trust Subcommittee held hearings in January 1956. In his 
opening remarks, Celler pointed out the increasing concern 
over the flood of mergers which had reduced competition 
and contributed to a rising tide of the concentration of 
economic power. The pattern, according to Celler, under­
scored the necessity for vigorous enforcement of the anti- 
monopoly laws by the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice. Both agencies, according to Celler, 
were hampered by a lack of enabling legislation, along 
with insufficient funds with which to operate. Celler con­
cluded that the committee would intercede with "appropri­
ations" to secure additional funds to be allotted specifi-
2
cally to anti-merger work.
Congressman Wright Patman remarked that the utter 
failure of the anti-merger law to that date was not due to 
the law's inadequacies, but that the enforcement agencies 
had made but token gestures in their enforcement activi­
ties. Patman suggested that a change in the basic tax
structure would be necessary since at the time, big cor-
3
porations were being given favored treatment. Despite
2
U.S. House of Representatives, Antitrust Sub­
committee of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings, 
84th Cong., 2d Sess., January 1956.
^Ibid., pp. 7-15*
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his expressed dissatisfaction with the efforts of the 
anti-merger agencies, and his feeling that the laws were 
adequate, Patman sponsored a pre-merger notification bill. 
He explained that the existent procedures of compiling 
merger statistics were complex, cumbersome and ineffective. 
Patman stressed that the procedure was costly and that 
it "diluted the effectiveness of the enforcement dollar."
He further stated that the delays attendant to the archaic 
procedure of compiling merger information caused the 
public interest to suffer.
Patman also supported an amendment to the Clayton 
Act which would permit the FTC to seek a restraining order 
to prevent a merger prior to its consummation. In explana­
tion of his support of amendment to make FTC cease and 
desist orders issued in Section 7 cases final, Patman said 
that under the procedures in effect at the time, the agency 
had to prove its case twice. He explained that an order 
to cease and desist would not be final until affirmed by 
the Court of Appeals. Also that the recipient upon 
receiving such an order could choose to ignore it at which 
time the FTC would have to appeal to the Court for affirma­
tion. During the appeal, the FTC would again have to 
prove a violation, and quite frequently that a violation 
had occurred since the issuance of the order.
Patman observed that the FTC had been trying to 
obtain finality for its Section 7 cease and desist orders
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for some time. Patman concluded that such an order of 
finality issued under Section 7 would be the same as the 
power already possessed by the FTC when it issued a cease 
and desist order for violation of the unfair practices 
portion of the Federal Trade Commission Act (Section 5)»^ 
Senator John Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Com­
mittee on Small Business, appearing as a witness before 
the Subcommittee observed that the tide of mergers had 
resulted in increased concentration which caused a lessening 
of competition. Sparkman asserted that he had received 
numbers of complaints from small business which reflected 
the broad anti-competitive effects of most mergers. Spark­
man added that he too was sponsoring a bill in the Senate 
which would provide the necessary relief for the enforce­
ment agencies in their Section 7 work. The senator said 
that his bill also included a proviso that bank mergers be 
specifically proscribed by Section 7 « ^
Senator Joseph C. 0 'Mahoney appeared before the 
Subcommittee and said that the people had seen the economic 
control pass away from them, and that their representatives 
in Congress had not been permitted by circumstances to 
come face-to-face with the effect of the concentration of 
economic power. The Senator used General Motors as a most 
significant example of economic concentration. He pointed 
out that its 50 largest share holders owned 32 per cent of
^Ibid. ^Ibid., pp. 39-51-
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the corporation. He added that it was common knowledge 
that anyone who controlled 30 per cent of the outstanding 
stock ownership, controlled the corporation. In his con­
clusion, O'Mahoney pointed out General Motors' revenue the 
preceding year (1955) was $9.8 billion, three times that 
of the City of New York and nearly equal to the total farm 
income of about $10 billion.^
A cross section of business and government offi­
cials' testimony before the Subcommittee is summarized:
(1) The president of a diversified manufacturing 
concern said that it was less expensive to buy a small com­
pany than build. The executive did not believe that he 
had lessened competition by pursuing that course, but if 
size were to be a criteria of economic power, an arbitrary 
limit could be established by use of a graduated corporate 
income tax.
(2) Two union officials testified in support of 
implementing existent anti-merger legislation.
(3) The Assistant Attorney General in Charge of 
Antitrust, Department of Justice, outlined the complex and 
time consuming procedure by which it was necessary to 
select cases for Section 7 action. That official strongly 
supported pre-merger notification legislation. The offi­
cial also requested Committee support in his requested
25 per cent increase in funds for his agency.
^Ibid., pp. 79-96,
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(4) A law professor and an official of the American 
Bar Association supported proposed legislation which would 
provide the FTC with injunctive powers--if it were based
on a reasonable probability that the merger might lessen 
competition. The professor rejected the proposed pre-merger 
notification bill on the basis that it would "make a man­
date out of reporting to the government, a purely private 
business decision."
(5) The United States Chamber of Commerce submitted 
a letter to the Subcommittee in which it objected to a pre­
merger notification which it characterized as an unwarranted 
form of government regulation under the guise of antitrust 
enforcement.
(6) The American Federation of Labor supported all 
extensions of anti-merger legislation.
(7) The New York State Bar Association supported 
pre-merger notification with a different approach.
(8) The National Association of Manufacturers in
a letter to the Subcommittee observed that all additional
anti-merger legislation was premature since there had been
7
no court interpretation of Section 7-
The House reported favorably on the proposals for strength-
o
ening amended Section 7»
^Ibid., pp. 96-209»
0
U.S. House of Representatives, Report No. I889,
84th Cong., 2d. Session, 1956.
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The Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Anti- 
monopoly not only considered its own versions of supple­
mentary legislation to strengthen Section 7» but also the 
House version. A cross section of business and government 
leaders' testimony is summarized:
(1) An official of the Independent Bankers Associ­
ation testified in favor of the proposed legislation to 
amend Section ?• He believed that it would protect small 
in dependent b ankers.
(2) The Assistant General Counsel for the National 
Association of Manufacturers opposed the proposed legisla­
tion in its entirety. He pointed out the proposals were 
premature since Section 7 had not had the benefit of court 
interpretation.
(3) An official of the American Mining Congress 
supported the legislation as did an official of the Life 
Insurance Association of America.
(4) An official of the American Paper and Pulp 
Association suggested amendments to the proposals other 
than the injunctive power bills which he rejected entirely.
(5 ) The Chamber of Commerce of the United States
opposed the legislation on the grounds of an unwarranted
intervention into private affairs.
. (6) An official of the National Coal Association
opposed the legislation and pointed that the proponents
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9
for pre-merger notification had not justified their case.
A report of the Senate made in the following ses­
sion of Congress contained information on Corporate 
Mergers and Acquisitions.^® The Chairman of the Federal 
Trade Commission outlined the status of the agency's 1956 
Section 7 complaints which had been filed, and submitted 
them as representative of an increasing economic concen­
tration. The report contained the testimony of several 
well known economists, and a summary of their comments 
was :
(1) M. A. Adelman hoped that the courts and the 
FTC would begin a tougher anti-merger policy.
(2) Clare Griffin observed that growth by merger 
had a different economic significance than internal growth. 
He was pleased with the distinction which was made between 
the two in Section ?• He deemed that most mergers had 
been managerial rather than financial.
(3) Jesse W. Markham expressed confidence that the 
statutes had been effective since they had probably pre­
vented some undesirable mergers. Markham urged that 
Congress increase the appropriations of the agencies
9
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Anti- 
monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings,
84th Cong., 2d Sess., May-June 1956.
^®U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, A Staff Study: 
Report on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions, Report No. 
132, 85th Cong., 1st Session, 1957, pp. 1-26.
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charged with the enforcement of Section 7»
(4) J . Fred Weston stated that despite a large 
number of mergers, there had been no clear case of unde­
sirable consequences. To the contrary according to 
Professor Weston, there was evidence of desirable conse­
quences.
(5) Corwin D. Edwards said that the effectiveness 
of Section 7 had been disappointing. He suggested shifting 
the burden of proof in certain cases. Professor Edwards 
commented that while the presumption was strong that a 
merger would have an adverse effect on competition, there 
should be a rebuttable presumption in law for certain 
classes of mergers. The presumption, according to Edwards, 
would permit the enforcement agencies to move faster.
The report concluded with the statement that the Senate 
had adjourned prior to acting upon the proposed legisla­
tion. The staff however, recommended that a selected 
advance notification of mergers be made. The staff con­
cluded that there was a serious lack of data concerning
12the concentration effects of "recent mergers."
Since no action had been taken on the proposed 
Clayton Act amendments, hearings before the House Anti­
trust Subcommittee resumed in the following session of 
Congress. Chairman Celler opened the hearings with a 
recital of the increasing merger trends. He pointed out
11 IP
Ibid., pp. 15-26. Ibid.
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that of 4,686 mergers recorded between 1951 and 1956, over 
2,000 had been in the mining-manufacturing sector of the 
economy, and added that over 1,000 banks had disappeared 
by merger during that period. Celler observed that the 
bills under consideration would combine substantially the 
same provisions as those which had been discussed in the 
previous session. One bill provided for Federal enforce­
ment agencies to have the same authority to move against 
bank mergers accomplished by an asset acquisition preceded 
by a stock acquisition, as with the stock acquisition 
alone. Another bill provided that the parties of a pro­
posed merger, where the capital exceeded $10 million, 
would be required to notify the Attorney General and the 
Federal Trade Commission in advance. A third bill spelled 
out that the authority of the Federal Trade Commission 
would be made similar to that of the Department of Justice 
in the seeking of court orders to prevent consummation of 
a merger pending the issuance of a complaint and the com­
pletion of FTC proceedings. Celler concluded his opening 
remarks by stating that President Eisenhower had recom­
mended legislation embodying those features in his Economic 
Reports of 1956 and 1957-^^
Attorney General Herbert Brownell testified before
13U.S. House of Representatives, Antitrust Com­
mittee, Subcommittee No. 5» of the Committee on the Judi­
ciary, Hearings to Amend the Clayton Act as Amended,
85th Cong., 1st Sess., March 1957, pp. 4-6.
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the Subcommittee and strongly recommended favorable action
on the pending legislation. Brownell recommended that the
subject of bank mergers be either included as an amendment
to Section 7 of the Clayton Act or as an addition to
1A
existent banking legislation.
A cross section of government and private indus­
trial leaders were questioned. The uncertainty concerning 
the inclusion of bank mergers, as an amendment to Sec­
tion 7 of the Clayton Act, was answered. The consensus 
of government monetary officials--and others--was that 
bank mergers-acquisitions could be better handled as an 
amendment to the Financial Institutions Act of 1957»^^
Among those who opposed the pre-merger notifica­
tion bill and the injunctive power bill were: representa­
tives of the National Association of Manufacturers; the 
National Coal Association; the United States Chamber of 
Commerce; the American Mining Congress; and the Inde­
pendent Petroleum Association of America. The character 
of opposition ranged from "no demonstrated need" to an 
"unwarranted governmental invasion into the day to day 
affairs of business." Other than the governmental agen­
cies that supported the bills in one form or another, the 
proponents in private industry were confined to small 
businessmen's organizations such as the National Associ­
ation of Retail Grocers and the National Federation of
^^Ibid., pp. 9-49. ^^Ibid., pp. 120-242.
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Independent Businesses. Letters concerning the bills were 
in the same category--the opposition in general was con­
fined to big business, and the proponents in general, 
small business.
The House reported favorably on the pre-merger 
and injunctive powers portions of the bills, and recom­
mended that the bill "do pass."^^
The Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Anti- 
monopoly considered four bills in the second session of 
the 85th Congress. Three related either to a pre-merger 
notification amendment or an authority for the Federal 
Trade Commission to issue preliminary injunctions in its 
enforcement of Section 7 proceedings. The fourth related 
primarily to the inclusion of bank mergers as an amendment 
to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Senator Estes Kefauver, 
Chairman, opened the hearings. He observed that there was 
a Big Four or Big Eight in most of the basic industries. 
Most of the concentration, according to the Senator, was 
due to mergers. He said that as concentration grew, it 
had been next to impossible for small business ventures to 
enter many of the concentrated fields. Kefauver concluded 
that as concentration had risen, so had the number of
^^Ibid., pp. 263-404.
17U.S. House of Representatives, Report No. 486 
85th Cong., 1st Sess., May 28, 1957j P« 1.
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l8business failures.
Senator John Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate 
Small Business Committee, presented his particular version 
of a bill to amend the Clayton Act. It included not only 
the pre-merger notification requirement and the granting 
of injunctive powers to the FTC, but also an amendment to 
Section 7 which would apply to bank mergers. Sparkman 
concluded that "small business" was satisfied with any-
19one's version, as long as the bill was all encompassing.
John W, Gwynne, Chairman of the Federal Trade Com­
mission presented his views on all the pending legislation. 
He emphasized the virtues of pre-merger notification as 
well as the advantages of legislation which would empower 
the FTC to seek restraining orders prior to the consumma­
tion of a merger. Gwynne also supported a bill then in 
the Senate, which had to do with the finality of Clayton 
Act FTC orders under Section 11 of the Act. He explained 
that it provided for the finality of FTC's Section 7 orders 
just as its orders were final under the unfair business 
practices portion of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com­
mission Act, The Subcommittee counsel, Paul Rand Dixon 
(later to become Chairman of the FTC) pointed out that
l8U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on 
legislation affecting Sections 7, 11, and 15 of the Clay­
ton Actl 85th Cong., 2d Sess., April-May 1958, p. 1.
^^Ibid., pp. 16-20.
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under Section 13 of the Clayton Act, the FTC could ask the 
Department of Justice to seek a restraining order in Sec­
tion 7 cases. Gwynne objected to that possibility on the
grounds that the Commission would lose jurisdiction to an
20agency which had accomplished none of the "spade work."
As in previous hearings before the House, the 
support for amendatory legislation was drawn from govern­
ment officials and small business. The opposition was 
generally from big business. The extractive industries 
strenuously objected to the pre-merger notification bill 
on the grounds that frequently one of its merger-acquisi- 
tions would involve undeveloped mineral properties that in 
their opinion could not be classified as anti-competitive.
A member of the legal profession testified specifically 
in favor of the Senate bill which provided for the finality 
of FTC cease and desist orders for violation of amended 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The attorney explained that 
finality should be given to Clayton Act orders just as the 
Wheeler-Lea amendment in 1938 gave finality to orders
issued under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
21unless appealed before a specified date.
George D. Hagedorn, National Association of Manu­
facturers, added to objections outlined in the previous 
House hearings. Hagedorn said the association supported
20 21
Ibid., pp. 31-74. Ibid., pp. 134-144.
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antitrust policies in general, but vigorously opposed the 
pre-merger notification amendment because pre-merger noti­
fication was but an extension of the police powers of the 
state and delays pending a decision after such a notifica­
tion would likely "kill" any prospect of a merger. Hage­
dorn also stated that a pre-merger notification would 
result in the reporting of highly confidential information.
The counsel for the Subcommittee responded to the
second objection by stating that the FTC was then empowered
under Section 6 of the Clayton Act to obtain "intra-state
transaction information," therefore the proposed bill
added little to existing authority. Hagedorn did not
agree and said that it was an unwarranted invasion in the
22business fields.
Robert A. Bicks, First Assistant to the Assistant 
Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division, 
Department of Justice, testified in support of the pending 
legislation. Bicks said the Department's support was 
based on (1) enforcement effectiveness; and (2) the con­
sideration of a basic equity and fairness to the business 
community. As to enforcement effectiveness, Bicks ex­
plained that a pre-merger notification would enable the 
Department to sue before an illegal merger had occurred 
provided the waiting period were at least 60 days prior
^^Ibid., pp. 134-144.
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to consummation. In regard to the fairness to the busi­
ness community, Bicks related that most respondents in a 
suit would argue that if they had possessed knowledge a 
merger would be challenged, a suit could have been averted. 
Bicks also stated that the Department of Justice strongly 
supported the injunctive proposal amendment which would be 
beneficial to the Federal Trade Commission. Bicks was 
just as strong in his support of additional Section 7
legislation to make FTC cease and desist orders final
23unless appealed.
The Senate prepared a report to accompany its ver­
sion of an amendment to Section 11 of the Clayton Act that 
would provide for finalization of Section 7 orders, just 
as other orders were final under Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. The Senate said that the effec­
tiveness of the Clayton Act had been handicapped by the 
absence of adequate enforcement provisionso The report 
explained that under the procedures then in effect, the 
FTC would first investigate, and after the filing of a 
complaint, it would have to prove on the record that a 
violation existed before a cease and desist order could 
be issued. The report continued that in order to obtain 
a court order commanding obedience to the previously 
issued order, the FTC would be compelled to make another 
investigation to prove that a violation had occurred
2^Ibid., pp. 161-190.
68
subsequent to the issuance of the initial order. Then,
according to the report, if the respondent violated that
order, the FTC would have to make a third investigation
and furnish evidence to the Court at which time the
respondent would be subject to a penalty. The Senate said
that the need for corrective legislation was imperative,
and cited the case FTC v. Ruberoid (3^3 US 470). In that
1952 decision the Supreme Court held that a court was
without authority to issue an order commanding obedience
to an FTC order under the Clayton Act until the agency had
established a violation of its order. The Senate report
concluded that the legislation favorably acted upon by
that body would eliminate triple proof, and put "teeth”
24into the Clayton Act.
The Senate reported on March 5» 1959 that its Sub­
committee on Antitrust and Monopoly had commenced a study 
based on the economic importance of highly concentrated 
industries. In the industry by industry phase, the Subcom­
mittee had concluded that there were high levels of con­
centration; that there was a prevalent price leadership; 
that industries' prices were insensitive to changes in the 
market; and that concentration had an inflationary effect
24
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, Report on 
Finalization of Clayton Act Orders, Report No. 1808, 




In a review of the work accomplished in the pre­
ceding session of Congress, the Subcommittee report con­
cluded that all legislation regarding the amendments to 
the Clayton Act should have been passed; however, Congress 
had adjourned before action was taken.
In a report submitted on the same date, the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary again reported favorably on the
bill to give finality to FTC orders of cease and desist
27issued under the Clayton Act. In a report submitted by
the House, the Senate bill was reported on favorably and
28it was recommended that the bill "do pass."
There were further inconsistencies in the anti­
merger processes as they existed between 1950 and I96O. 
Section 6 of the Clayton Act empowered the FTC to subpoena 
information needed in Section 7 cases. There was no pro­
vision for such demand for documentary evidence to be 
honored when requested by the Department of Justice.
2 5U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, Report on 
Activities of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 
I95Ü , Report No. 77» üBth Cong., 1st Sess., March 5, 1959•
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., Report No. 83, March 5, 1959.
28
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union, Report on Finality 
of Clayton Act Orders, Report No. 38O, 86th Cong., 1st 
Sess., June 26, 1959.
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Hearings were held on legislation to correct that inequity 
29
of the law. No action was taken at the time.
The foregoing inequity was reminiscent of the 
exchange between the FTC and a subcommittee counsel in a 
discussion concerning the necessity for the FTC to have 
injunctive powers in Section 7 cases. In that situation, 
it was the Department of Justice that had the authority 
to obtain an injunction, but had the FTC called upon that 
agency to effect that action, the Department of Justice 
would have assumed jurisdiction of the case. In a like 
manner, the Department of Justice could have called upon 
the FTC to subpoena evidence, but it too would have lost 
jurisdiction. Jurisdictional jealousies were quite appar­
ent .
The House again commenced hearings on bills to
amend Section 11 of the Clayton Act which would provide
for a more expeditious enforcement of cease and desist
orders issued by the Federal Trade Commission in Section 7
proceedings. Three House bills and one Senate bill, each
30with the same general provisions, were considered.
29U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on 
bills to authorize the Attorney General to make demand for 
evidence in civil antitrust investigations, Bbth Cong.,
1st iSess., March 3» 1959*
30U.S. House of Representatives, Antitrust Sub­
committee (Subcommittee No. 5) of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, Hearings: Finality on Clayton Act Orders,
86th Cong,, 1st Sess., May 27-28, 1959»
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Support for the bills came generally from the same 
sources previously, government officials and small busi­
ness executives. Opponents as in the earlier hearings 
were generally classified as big business, or affiliated 
with it in some form.
The General Counsel for the National Association 
of Retail Grocers in support of the amendment, presented 
the results of a four year study of the grocery industry. 
The study disclosed that 2,657 local food stores with an 
estimated sales volume of over $2.8 billion had been 
"swallowed" by chain stores. Each of the chain stores 
had annual sales ranging from $400 million to $1 billion. 
The counsel contended that tbjB serious concentration in 
the grocery industry created a pyramiding effect not con­
ducive to a stable internal development. As an example of 
internal stability, the counsel pointed out that farmers'
markets were fewer since their choices of outlets for farm
31products had declined.
In late 1959s hearings were held before the Joint 
Economic Committee. Fourteen prominent economists and the 
Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice were heard. The 
subject of the hearings concerned the effects of monopo­
listic and quasi-monopolistic practices on employment,
^^Ibid., pp. 47-83.
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growth, and price levels. The Committee Chairman was
Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, also an economist of
national repute; and the Vice-Chairman was Congressman
32Wright Patman of Texas.
Howard Hines, Iowa State University economist, 
said that entry into many markets required large capital 
outlays which would automatically eliminate many small 
firms. He believed, however, that the results would still 
be competitive since firms in the market tended to over­
estimate the number of potential entries and that fact 
alone made them behave competitively. Hines said that the 
public relied upon new entries to perpetuate competition; 
therefore, the entry of well established firms was publicly 
undesirable. Hines concluded that bigness and concentra­
tion are vague concepts but they are socially significant
and, since the antitrust laws are historically social and
33political, the economic results are secondary.
William H. Martin, Penn State University economist, 
concluded that the spread of concentration was not alarming 
but that complacency was not acceptable. Martin pointed 
out that there are many variables in the measurement of 
concentration but that a measurement was at least a
32U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Hearings 
on the Effects of Monopolistic and Quasi-monopolistic 
Practices, dbth Cong., 1st Sess., September 1959»
^^Ibid., pp. 1977-1999=
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starting point in making a determination as to the monopo- 
listic effects.
Senator Douglas, speaking as an economist, explained 
to the non-economic members of the Committee that under 
imperfect competition which was prevalent in a monopolistic 
situation, common in highly concentrated industries, it 
was not possible to have a maximum employment of labor and 
capital. In such a condition Douglas explained, labor not 
employed in monopolistic industries or other imperfectly 
competitive industries would be shunted into the competi­
tive industries. That, according to Douglas, would inevi­
tably result in a lowering of prices and marginal produc­
tivity in those industries. During the ensuing discussion, 
Douglas explained that since entry is blocked from monopo­
listic industries, resources do not respond to demand 
preferences, and thusly, total social product would be 
reduced. The Senator said that he believed that exhaus­
tive industry by industry research would be necessary 
before any answer could be given about the effects of 
concentration. On the basis of his discussion, Douglas 
asked the witnesses whether or not a vigorous antitrust
policy should be pursued. The two previous witnesses,
3 5Hines and Martin, answered in the affirmative.
34 ^ Ibid., pp. 2000-2005.
35lbid., pp. 2008-2018,
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Robert A. Bicks, Antitrust Division, Department 
of Justice, testified that a vigorous enforcement of Sec­
tion 7 in those areas with the greatest growth potential, 
could shape the ultimate competitive structure of those 
sectors. By enforcement in those areas, Bicks explained, 
those sectors would avoid the loss of competitive vigor 
through an excess of concentration. Bicks explained the 
manner that the Antitrust Division selected cases for 
Section 7 action. Briefly, according to Bicks, the legal 
criteria would be the volume of interstate commerce 
affected; legal remedies necessary; and the state of the 
court's interpretation of the principles of law involved. 
Bicks said that he also relied heavily on economic data 
such as market, financial, and geographic concentration 
information in the selection of a case for investigation. 
Lastly, Bicks related, there were certain administrative 
limitations. He explained that the previous commitments 
of his staff and the condition of the court’s calendar 
together with budget considerations were all considered 
in case selection.
Jesse W. Markham, Princeton University economist, 
said that it was generally agreed that prices tend to be 
higher and less flexible, and output lower under imperfect 
competition. With the higher prices, according to Markham,
3^ibid., pp. 2018-2105.
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consumption is reduced and that would call for a reduced
investment with a concurrent reduction in national income.
Markham explained that since monopoly prices tend toward
inflexibility, they are less sensitive to consumer demand
and that aggravates unemployment. Markham asserted that a
monopolist felt no compulsion to innovate and that caused
a lag in autonomous investment which could cause a reduced
economic growth. Markham concluded that the antitrust
laws had been ineffective where applied and said that
Congress should re-examine the statutes and also provide
37a realistic budget for the enforcement agencies.
John P. Miller, Yale University economist, observed 
that the antitrust laws served to keep the channels to 
trade open and that tended to channel entrepreneurial 
talents into competitive efforts rather than into con-
O Q
spiracies designed to reduce risk.
Robert J. Lanzillotti, Washington State University 
economist, said that the inflationary tendencies of the 
mid-1950's were due to a higher level of concentration 
which had tended to perpetuate itself. He explained that 
the type of pricing in effect in the concentrated industries 
was an administered price which was set by management, 




pre-determined rate of return on investment, and according
to Lanzillotti, the prices were inflexible and disregarded
any change in consumer demand. He said that his study
revealed that the preset prices were higher because they
were frequently based on an overliberal estimate of costs.
He believed that concentration should be reduced through
the antitrust laws with action being taken against price
leaders. Lanzillotti proposed that some industries should
be re-structured with government assistance, and that some
39industries could be placed in a quasi-public category.
Abba P. Lerner, Michigan State University econo­
mist, supported a more active anti-monopoly program. He 
proposed that restrictions be removed from foreign competi­
tion and that other devices should be designed which would 
promote competition. In a round table discussion preceding 
the appearance of the next witness, Lerner commented that
he believed that prices could be lower under monopoly
40because of increased efficiencies.
Richard Ruggles, Yale University economist, ex­
plained to the Committee the normal behavior of horizon­
tally and vertically integrated industries. In posing a 
question whether a given product should be produced by a 
single producer or many producers, Ruggles explained that 
the answer would depend upon the demand and cost conditions
3*Ibid., pp. 2257-2262. ^°Ibid., p. 2265.
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prevalent in the particular case. Ruggles in discussing 
vertical integration said that under similar demand and 
cost conditions, a vertically integrated industry would 
never arrive at higher prices and lower output than an 
unintegrated industry. Ruggles explained that whenever 
plants which have a vertical relationship are not selling 
at their marginal costs of production, vertical integra­
tion would yield lower prices and greater output than
4lunder conditions of decentralization.
J. Fred Weston, University of California at Los
Angeles economist, said that he did not believe that a
policy against concentration would have much effect on
price behavior. Weston cited the textile industry where
concentration had increased but prices had declined. He
observed that given the existence of highly concentrated
industries with price policies, and if there were an
incipient decline in demand, it would be irrational to
lower prices if price elasticity were low and income sen-
42sitivity were high.
James L. Dusenberry, Harvard University economist, 
said that competition offered the greater incentives to 
invest, but conversely the larger (concentrated) firm was 
better able to finance research and innovation. Dusen­





demand declines, management tends to avoid price cutting,
or conversely if demand increases, management tends to
avoid increasing prices. According to Dusenberry, if
demand increased and prices remained stable, the union
would probably attempt to secure a larger share--and wage
increases could be granted by concentrated industries with
less fear of loss since they could pass on the additional
costs through higher prices. The latter condition accord-
43ing to Dusenberry, was an "ally of inflation." The 
hearings closed with similar testimony from other econo­
mists, but whether the information would result in any 
change in public policy was a matter for speculation.
In early I96O, the Senate reported that the House 
had acted favorably upon legislation which provided for 
the finality of Clayton Act orders. The result was that 
the legislation became Public Law 86-107 which was briefly 
discussed in a preceding chapter. The law was the first 
concrete result of years of recommendations made by the 
Federal Trade Commission. At the time, there still 
remained the pre-merger notification bill and the injunc­
tive powers bill, both of which had received several years 
attention, but the support had been varied. The Depart­
ment of Justice was deeply interested in pending legisla­
tion that would empower the agency to make subpoena demands
4^Ibid., pp. 2324-2333.
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for evidentiary information necessary in Section 7 investi-
. • 44gâtions.
Hearings on pre-merger notification were resumed 
in the next session of Congress in 196O. Four bills, all 
embodying a pre-merger notification in one form or another 
were discussed. Chairman Celler in his opening remarks 
emphasized the increase in industrial concentration due to 
mergers and acquisitions. Celler cited statistics which 
showed that the I50 largest manufacturing corporations 
controlled over half of the total manufacturing assets.
The data further indicated that the $00 largest manufac­
turing firms also controlled about 2/3 of the nation's 
productive capacity; and that about one-tenth of one per 
cent of all corporations owned over 53 per cent of all 
corporate assets. Celler related that from 1951 to I961, 
over 8,000 formerly independent concerns had disappeared 
through mergers and acquisitions, with over half of them 
being in the manufacturing sector. According to Celler, 
many of the mergers had anti-competitive effects which 
had mushroomed.
Celler said it was in that setting that the Presi­
dent had recommended changes in the anti-merger law based
44U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, Report on 
Clayton Act Legislation Passed, and to Consider-Amendments 
to Sections 7 and I5 of the Clayton Act, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess., March I5 , 19^0.
8o
on FTC and Attorney General experiences in administering
Section 7* The Chairman related that those changes were
embodied in bills relating to pre-merger notification and
injunctive powers, both of which had been discussed in
k3previous congressional sessions.
Assistant Attorney General Lee Loevinger, Anti­
trust Division, Department of Justice, stressed the 
desirability of the legislation for both his department 
and the FTC. Congressman William McCullough, a committee 
member, questioned Loevinger at length to assure himself 
that information furnished in a pre-merger notification 
would remain confidential. McCullough said that the idea 
of advance notification had been operational in the Securi­
ties and Exchange Commission since 1933» and quite likely 
the information could be made available to the antitrust 
enforcement agencies. Loevinger later advised the Com­
mittee that the type of information received by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission would not be applicable 
to mergers and acquisitions. He cited that of 8l memos 
received from that source in I96O, only 9 pertained to 
mergers and in each instance the Department of Justice
^5
U.S. House of Representatives, Antitrust Sub­
committee (Subcommittee No. 5) of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, Hearings on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act as 
Amended, to Require Prior Notification of Mergers, and for 
Other PurposesJ 87th Cong., 1st Session, April-May 1961.
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46already had the information.
FTC Chairman Paul R. Dixon, formerly counsel for 
the Subcommittee, presented his arguments for pre-merger 
notification, and for the grant of injunctive powers to 
the Commission. In commenting about the latter proposal, 
Dixon said that the FTC had been refused injunctive powers 
in a Section 7 proceeding in 1956. The Court of Appeals 
had declined to issue a restraint in FTC v. International 
Paper Company (Docket No. 66?6 ). Other than some suggested 
changes in phraseology, Dixon's presentation was substan­
tially the same as in previous hearings. Dixon's response 
to a question from the minority counsel for the Subcommittee 
advised that of 125 mergers-acquisitions investigated in
i960, about two-thirds had been consummated before they
4?
came to the Commission's attention.
In supporting the injunctive powers bill, Dixon 
described the FTC as an agency composed of experts in the 
anti-merger field, and with that quality it could "do a 
better job with its knowledge of that area." The implica­
tion was apparent that Dixon believed the anti-merger 
experts were in better position to determine whether a 
restraint should be ordered than a federal court with only 
limited knowledge. The fear was expressed by some of the 
Committee members that a grant of injunctive powers to the
4^Ibid., pp. 50-84. ^^Ibid., pp. 84-97.
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FTC would result in two protracted hearings which would 
be but a further delay in litigation. The Committee 
argued that there would be one hearing to secure a tem­
porary injunction, and then a second to determine whether 
a cease and desist order should be issued. Dixon con­
tended that the delay would be no more than if the Com­
mission had to go to Federal Court to obtain the neces­
sary relief. Several of the Committee were quite reluctant 
to repose all the powers in the FTC, and suggested that an 
amendment should be made to apply to the FTC, only if 
proper court channels were utilized. Congressman McCullough, 
half apologetically, said that the lengthy questioning was 
necessary since a majority of the Subcommittee remained to
be convinced, especially on the injunctive powers portion 
48of the bill.
The United States Chamber of Commerce, an opponent 
of both the pre-merger notification and the injunctive por­
tions of the bills, was represented by Richard Wagner, the 
president-elect and an official of the Champlin Oil and 
Refining Company. Statistically, Wagner pointed out that 
the rate of new business starts in the period 1950-1959' 
exceeded the rate of business discontinuances. In further 
support of his contention that concentration had had no 
significant effect on the economy in general, Wagner cited
^®Ibid.
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a 1959 issue of the Survey of Current Business. Statistics 
in that issue reflected that in 1959 the number of firms 
that employed fewer than 100 persons had increased since 
1945. On that basis Wagner deduced that concentration had 
actually decreased. It was further contended that if less 
than 3 per cent of all mergers-acquisitions required 
enforcement attention, then the proposed legislation was 
based on a fear of concentration that was groundless.
Too, according to Wagner, less than one per cent of all 
mergers had been declared illegal. Wagner observed that 
Federal policy failed to take into account that mergers- 
acquisitions were a normal and necessary part of any com­
petitive system, and if the proposed legislation were 
enacted, it would be conceivable that all mergers would 
be illegal. It would be ironic, Wagner pointed out, that 
if in their vigorous efforts to protect competition by 
preventing mergers, it were to stifle the very thing they 
were protecting.
Wagner summarized his testimony by stating that 
the competitive system was not endangered by excessive 
concentration because: (l) the rate at which new firms
were being formed had increased; (2) the number of firms 
operating at any point in time was rising at least as fast 
as the working population; (3) the size distribution of 
firms was not being altered in the direction of more 
powerful aggregates; and (4) the rate at which "small"
84
firms Were being formed was increasing. Wagner concluded
that if there were a forced reduction in the number of
mergers there would be real danger of increased business
49failures and bankruptcies. (Wagner based the latter on 
the significant number of financially insecure firms which 
had been acquired as a result of mergers.)
Opposition to pre-merger notification and the 
granting of injunctive powers to the FTC, as in previous 
hearings, came from the same sources, big business and 
some of the legal fraternity. Proponents were the same, 
i.e., government officials and small business.
In its annual report for I96O, the majority views 
of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly 
described in glowing terms the accomplishments in the anti­
merger field. The majority report was specifically focused 
on the hearings which resulted in proposed legislative 
measures. Senators Everett Dirksen and Roman Hruska sub­
mitted minority views which were quite contradictory.^^
The minority questioned the necessity and the pro­
priety of lengthy interrogatories which occurred in the 
i960 hearings, especially those that occurred in the drug 
industry. It was pointed out that the FTC had covered the 
same ground two years earlier. The minority disputed the
^^Ibid., pp. 117-145. ^°Ibid., pp. 154-260.
^^U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Committee of the Judiciary, Report on 
Antitrust and Monopoly Activities, I960, Report No. 167, 
87th Cong., 1st Sess., April 14, I96I.
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threat of concentration and explained that the alleged 
threat was based on an FTC report which could not be sup­
ported statistically. The idea of concentration, according 
to Dirksen and Hruska, originated in 1930 and was based 
largely on a book by Gardiner Means and Adolph Berle.
Berle in 1954, according to the senators, repudiated his 
earlier ideas, and agreed that while concentration was 
then at its highest level in history, it was a static con­
dition which had varied very little if at all. The minority 
senators also pointed out that even though concentration 
might be considered high in the United States, it was not 
as high as in Britain and Canada.
The minority did not believe that a sweeping denun­
ciation of administered prices in concentrated industries 
was in keeping with the facts. They observed that sta­
tistics indicated that the Consumer Price Index had risen 
less than personal care items, and that the latter prices 
could not be construed as "administered" by a concentrated 
industry. The minority senators also said that the rise 
in the Wholesale Price Index (since 1949) had mostly 
occurred prior to 1952, and increases since that time had 
been insignificant. The senators quoted various economists 
(Means, Norse, and Galbraith) who had appeared in Sub­
committee hearings. All had agreed that administered 
prices were an inevitable consequence of our industrial 
set up. Dirksen and Hruska concluded that the majority
86
report was not based on all the facts. They believed that 
industrial concentration, administered prices, et cetera, 
were not nearly so significant in the economy of the 
country as the majority report would indicate. The two 
senators defended conglomerate mergers on the grounds that 
in the long run, the public would benefit through tech­
nologies developed which would be made applicable in other 
fields.
In 1963, the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly held hearings on administered prices during which
eminent economists presented their views. Walter Adams
and Robert Lanzillotti concluded that the crux of the
problem was concentration and that administered prices
5 3were no more than a symptom.
Jules Backman, an economist, presented a paper 
before the Subcommittee and advised that he had studied 
the price behavior of products from five industries for 
the period 1955-1957 and there were price increases where 
concentration was low as well as where it was high.
Backman asserted that there had been no statistical evi­
dence to prove that a high concentration ratio was respon­
sible for inflationary price increases, or that oligopo­
listic companies maintained prices without regard to
^^Ibid., pp. &J-76.
53U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, Administered 
Prices: A Compendium on Public Policy, 88th Cong., 1st
Session, 19 6 3 , pp. 5-16.
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economic forces. Backman referred to studies which had 
been made by Economists Ruggles, Richard Selden, and Horace 
dePadwin, each of whose studies covered years up to 1959» 
and each reached the same conclusion as Backman. Backman 
concluded that it would be ill advised to enact legisla­
tion to correct an alleged abuse on so tenuous a founda­
tion.
Irston R. Barnes, Columbia University political 
economist, said that there were several conditions condu­
cive to administered pricing in concentrated industries. 
Some were; (l) fewness of competitors; (2) disparate 
size; (3) price leadership; (4) product characteristics; 
and (5 ) increasing rigidities of costs. Barnes contended 
that unwanted consequences would be: (l) inflation since
the prices would not be truly competitive; (2) excesses of 
non-price competition; (3 ) loss of compulsion to cut costs; 
and (4) wage responses to non-competitive administered 
prices. Barnes proposed an industry by industry approach 
to the restoration of more effective competition. He 
believed strongly that a strict application of Section ? 
would have the effect of shifting concentration.
John M. Clark, Professor Emeritus, Columbia Uni­
versity, said that there was a prevalent underlying mis­
conception that American public policy was unequivocally 
devoted to promoting and maintaining competition. Clark
^^Ibid., pp. 25-43. 55Ibid., pp. 44-85.
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cited three exceptions: (l) farm support program; (2) pub­
lic utilities; and (3 ) antitrust exemption of unions in 
their bargaining. Clark observed that unused capacity had 
often been regarded as a consequence or symptom of monopo­
listic control because of a restriction of output. But 
according to Clark, if a firm is driving to increase 
sales, it must have that "unused" capacity to care for the 
hoped for increase in volume.
Joel B. Dirlam, Michigan State University econo­
mist, presented a paper entitled "The Celler-Kefauver Act:
A Review of Enforcement Policy." Dirlam pointed out that 
due to theoretical limitations, Stigler, Kaysen, Turner, 
and Bok had all proposed that mergers be declared illegal 
if the market share exceeded a certain percentage. Dirlam 
favored a related approach but instead of arbitrary per­
centages, he initially suggested that reliance be placed
57on structural tests. In commenting on the administra­
tion of Section 7, Dirlam said that enforcement had not 
dampened the merger trend; that large companies had been 
more active in making acquisitions; and that had resulted 
in the enforcement agencies allocating most of their scarce 
resources to proceeding against the large firms. Dirlam 
was critical of the haphazard manner of case selection by 
both agencies. He suggested that cases with more economic 
connotation be channeled to the FTC; and the cases with
^^Ibid., pp. 86-96. ^^Ibid., pp. 99-104.
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more legal complications be channeled to the Department of 
Justice.
Dirlam surveyed the handling accorded a number of
cases by the FTC between 1952 and I962. It appeared,
according to Dirlam, that from the complaints some courts
had difficulty in distinguishing between Sherman Act
standards and a mere lessening of competition. In carrying
his discussion through the I963 Philadelphia Bank decision
(to be discussed later), Dirlam concluded that there had
been little to show that either the courts or the FTC had
59been close to making a merger a per se violation.
According to Dirlam, data concerning economic con­
sequences of a merger were very limited, especially as it 
related to economies of scale and efficiencies. Census 
data on the distribution of employees, and value of ship­
ments, and size of firm were of limited value according to 
Dirlam since it confined itself to four digit industries.
In commenting upon economic consequences of a merger,
Dirlam observed that the failure to approve the Bethlehem 
merger in 1956 did not dampen the investment of either 
firm; and neither was there any indication that interest 
costs would have risen in the Philadelphia Bank case.^®
Dirlam questioned the economics of a divestiture.
^^Ibid., pp. 107-110. ^^Ibid., pp. 110-121.
G°Ibid., p. 122.
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especially where a firm had been fully integrated. That 
feature according to Dirlam, emphasized the advantage of 
a pre-merger notification as well as the advantage of 
empowering the FTC with injunctive authority. He also 
observed that both the courts and the FTC had recently 
been properly putting major emphasis on the acquisitions 
effect on market structure as measured by rank of the 
absorbing firm, relative size, market share, and impor­
tance of the absorbed firm. Nevertheless Dirlam concluded 
that if Congress desired further statutory revisions aimed 
at concentration, it would have to break sharply with 
Sherman Act policy and specify the percentage or absolute 
limits that existing concentration would be tolerated.
Horace Gray, University of Illinois economist, 
said that the objectives of antitrust must be supported 
by a vigorous attack upon all public policies that would 
tend to promote monopoly. Gray suggested that foreign 
trade barriers be removed as a means to promote competi­
tion along with the removal of subsidies, and a plugging 
of the tax loophole.
Earl Kintner, former Chairman of the Federal Trade 
Commission, commented upon administered prices in an oli­
gopolistic and/or monopolistic market. If there were 
collusion in such pricing, Kintner said the laws in
^^Ibid., pp. 130-131. ^^Ibid., pp. l40-151.
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existence would be effective. He continued, however, that 
there was no certainty as to the extent of such a pricing 
system, or whether such a system even existed. On that 
basis, Kintner said that the enactment of legislation that
would limit or regulate industry pricing policies would
u 63be unwise.
Gardiner Means, Vienna, Virginia economist, who 
brought the idea of administered prices before the public 
in the early 1930's maintained that such pricing policies 
were still in conflict with the public interest. Means 
explained that administered prices were based on a target 
rate of return for capital, with all operational and pro­
duction costs considered. Means contended that if the pre­
determined rate cannot be met, then growth would be slowed 
or a new innovation could be delayed. The target rate of 
return as pointed out by Means would prevent a proper allo­
cation of resources since an industry would naturally 
emphasize a sector of its production where the return would 
harmonize with the target. Means argued that the use of 
administered prices in monopolistic and oligopolistic 
industries would distort the distribution of income since 
there would be higher rates of return than from competitive 
endeavors. Means proposed a complex system which he termed 
"Economic Performance Act" which was based on a restruc­
turing of the tax system. The "act" would establish a
^^Ibid., pp. 175-181
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new legal category which would include only those indus­
tries whose pricing power was vested with public interest. 
Means contended that the provision for a legalized tax 
shelter could result in a voluntary breakup of concen-
64trated industries as each would strive to become eligible.
George Stigler, University of Chicago economist, 
criticized Means' theory of administered prices. Stigler 
described the fallacies in the Bureau of Labor statistics 
which were relied upon by Means to provide concentration 
ratios for industry. Stigler said that the wholesale price 
index as an example, contained about I9OO prices, but that 
over 500 of those prices had been obtained from only 1 or 
2 sellers. Stigler contended that if administered prices 
are prices taken from only one or two sellers, rather than 
from a number of buyers, it would be very flimsy evidence 
to classify prices as either administered, or market
65determined.
On January l4, 1964, Senator Philip A, Hart, Chair­
man of the Subcommittee, addressed a letter to Senator 
James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Committee on the Judi­
ciary. Hart pointed out that as a result of the compendium, 
it had stressed, among other areas, that informed opinion 
seriously questioned the effectiveness of antitrust laws 
that were 50 and 74 years old. A reassessment of those
^^Ibid., pp. 213-239. ^^Ibid., pp. 275-276.
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laws was suggested. Hart also emphasized the importance 
of the problem of concentration of economic power which 
could reach a point where the market place was no longer 
competitive.
Later in 1964, the Senate commenced detailed hear­
ings on the problems attendant to economic concentration 
with emphasis on the overall and conglomerate aspects. 
Testimony was taken from 10 economists, seven from outside 
the government. Senator Hart opened the hearings by 
stating that the economic system was threatened by an ever
6 7
increasing rate of industrial concentration.
Senator Hruska, the ranking minority member of the 
committee, characterized concentration as a phantom danger 
that could not be supported by fact. He interpreted the 
statistics as reflecting a decrease rather than an increase. 
Hruska explained that generally the term "concentration 
ratio" was defined as the share of output in a particular 
market accounted for by the four largest firms. Then, 
according to Hruska, if the four firms accounted for 40 
per cent of the entire output, the concentration ratio
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, Report on 
Investigation of Antitrust and Monopoly, Report No. 84$, 
ddth Cong., 2d Sess., jan. 30, 19^4.
6 7U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Committee of the Judiciary, Hearings on 
Economic Concentration: Overall and Conglomerate Aspects,
88th Cong., 2d Sess., July and September 1964, pp. 1-2.
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would be 40 per cent whether figured in sales or employ­
ment of assets. Hruska said that his set of statistics 
showed the number of firms with concentration ratios 
exceeding 75 per cent had decreased from 40 in 194? to 34 
in 1958. Further, that those with ratios in excess of 
50 per cent were fairly stable but actually decreased from 
114 in 1947 to 113 in 1958. Hruska also asserted that the 
share of industry shipments had decreased. He referred to 
his records which reflected that for the period 1954-1958, 
shipments of 210 industries had decreased and l82 showed 
increases. Of the decreases, Hruska said that 84 of the 
210 showed declines of over 5 per cent. On the other hand, 
only 60 of the l82 whose shipments had increased, showed 
increases over 5 per cent. The Senator concluded that 
measurements of concentration by employment instead of 
value of shipments, showed about the same relationship.^^ 
Gardiner Means testified that the body of economic 
theory which had once provided a reasoned basis for public 
policy was no longer applicable. It was designed for 
small scale enterprise according to Means, at least to the 
extent that the policies rested upon the assumption of a 
price-wage flexibility that was no longer in existence. 
Means contradicted the statistics presented by Senator 
Hruska, and claimed that the statistics actually reflected
^^Ibid., pp. 2-8,
95
an increase in the concentration of net assets. Means 
considered that area to be a most significant measure 
since it was concentration of assets that contributed to 
economic power. Means argued that where there was a 
large body of administered price and wage rates, the auto­
matic corrective mechanism of supply and demand was not 
and could not be operable. Means also said that the 
federal authorities presently employed monetary and fiscal 
tools to maintain aggregate demand and full employment. 
With that policy in effect, Means doubted that there 
would ever be a return to a policy that relied on short 
run changes in the price-wage level to maintain equilib­
rium. Means contended that the policy change in the 
application of economics was the first indication that 
concentration would be a subject in the consideration of
69public policy.
The second implication that concentration should 
be a subject for economic policy making had occurred in 
the 1950's when, according to Means, there had been infla­
tion without an excess of demand. Means argued that the 
concentration in industry had generated a power on the 
part of labor which if arbitrarily used, could have pushed 
up wage rates faster than any increase in productivity 
could have justified. Thus, Means contended, there were
^^Ibid., pp. 16-22,
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justifiable price increases even though there had been no 
increase in demand. Means classified that type of infla­
tion as "administrative inflation" which resulted from the 
concentration of market power in the hands of labor--and
conversely, the same situation would be applicable to
70management's policy of administrative pricing.
In an exchange between Means and Senator Hruska, 
Means agreed with the senator that a certain amount of 
concentration was necessary. Means agreed that the 
existent high standard of living was due largely to big 
business. In regard to the senator's hypothesis that 
possibly big business should be broken into smaller parts, 
Means responded that he did not think such an approach 
would solve the problem. He explained that the crux of 
the matter was whether there was enough competition in a 
four firm dominated industry to give the consumer any­
thing that resembled a classical competitive price. Means 
concluded that an arbitrary break up of big business would 
have to be at the cost of giving up efficiencies. It 
would actually mean, according to Means, of returning to 
"making sheets in the home and pegging shoes in the back 
room as Senator Hruska had previously mentioned.
Corwin Edwards, former Chief Economist, FTC, 
testified that the wave of conglomerate mergers was his
^^Ibid., pp. 22-23. ^^Ibid., pp. 26-36.
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primary concern. He believed that the antitrust laws 
should be applicable to all types of mergers, or to the 
concentration of economic power. The aspects of con­
glomerate mergers as explained by Edwards were subsidiza­
tion, reciprocity, full line selling, and ability to sus­
tain initial losses in a new market. In an exchange with 
Senator Hruska, Edwards explained that when one looked 
at a conglomerate, if there were a reasonable probability 
that competition would be lessened, the merger should be 
prevented.
John Blair, Chief Economist for the Subcommittee, 
observed that concentration ratios for the nation as a 
whole were not entirely satisfactory because the ratios 
for individual industries would show a substantial differ­
ence. (Blair was refuting the statistics referred to by 
Senator Hruska which reflected a decrease in industrial 
concentration from I9OI to 19^7 , and a lesser decrease 
after 1947.) Blair said that he had used a "value added" 
approach in arriving at his concentration ratios, which 
was different than the methodology of Dr. Means; however,
the results were about the same, i.e., an increase in
73concentration in certain markets.
Willard F. Mueller, Bureau of Economics, Federal 
Trade Commission, said that his concentration ratios com­
pared very favorably with those of Blair and Means. In a
^^Ibid. , pp. 36-56. 73lbid., pp. 95-97.
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discussion after his testimony, Mueller agreed that about
84 per cent of asset growth attributed to the 200 largest
corporations had been due to internal growth, and not 
74mergers.
J. Fred Weston testified that there were many 
sides to the "concentration ratio" controversy with dif­
ferent interpretations and different yard sticks used, 
which tended to leave the issue beclouded. Weston strongly 
opposed the protection of inefficient industries as a 
means of policy. He pointed out that large firms should 
grow faster than their smaller counterparts since they 
were financially able to procure the best talent avail­
able. Weston recommended an elimination of all tariffs 
which would expose all industries of both high and low
concentration to the rigors of world competition which
75would permit a survival of the fittest.
Erwin Stelzer, President, National Research Asso­
ciation, New York, in discussing diversification by way 
of conglomerate mergers concluded that there was a danger 
that the conglomerate would progress far outside the range 
of the Clayton Act. The concentration of economic con­
trol, according to Stelzer, could result in a control of
decision making processes which could be inconsistent with
7 6the broad social objectives of antitrust.
T^Tbid., pp. 112-138. 75lbid., pp. 138-146
^^Ibid., pp. 181-200.
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Senator Hruska had a statement inserted in the
records of the Subcommittee. It was pointed out that the
greatest concentration of economic control was in the
federal government. Hruska cited that revenues of the
government in 1940 had been less than corporate profits,
but in. 1963 the corporate profits of $27 billion totaled
77but one-third the government revenue.
M. E. Adelman, Massachusetts Institute of Tech­
nology economist, said that the concentration figures 
cited by Mueller, i.e., 84 per cent of corporate growth 
was due to internal expansion, did not give the whole pic­
ture . Adelman said that those figures did not take into 
account thht some acquisitions were made by cash purchases. 
Adelman believed that internal growth was responsible for 
nearer 90 per cent of the expansion (concentration). The 
economist for the minority pointed out that Adelman had 
departed from the central theme--danger in concentration.
Adelman replied that over the "long pull" concentration
7 8had not increased noticeably.
Additional Senate hearings on economic concentra-
79tion were conducted in the following session of Congress. 
Senator Hruska took issue with Senator Hart, the
7?lbid., pp. 221-222. ^®Ibid., p. 246.
79U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings, 
Hearings; Mergers and other Factors Affecting Industry 
Concentration,Ü9th Cong., 1st Sess., March-April 1965.
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Subcommittee Chairman, on Hart's continued usage of the 
phrase that "our economy is becoming increasingly concen­
trated." Hart had claimed that overall concentration had 
increased since 194?. Hruska contended that the term 
"overall concentration" was a term without meaning in the 
application of the antitrust laws, except as it could be 
applied in a specific industry or market. Hruska also 
argued that in the use of the year 194? as a base year, 
possibly some increase in concentration could be shown, 
but the year 194? was a very "low year" for mergers. To 
show an increase in concentration of any significant 
nature, according to Hruska, the proponents of that thesis 
had to be quite selective in the years to be compared.
The Senator suggested that the year 1931 be used as an 
acceptable base year, since that was the first year that 
the Internal Revenue Service started to publish corporate 
balance sheets by asset size classes. In support of his 
view that there had been no significant trend toward con­
centration, Hruska said that if the year 1931 were used as 
a base year, and then compare it with 196O, there was no
80discernible trend, actually a slight decrease.
Willard F. Mueller testified that the rate of merger 
activity appeared to be closely associated with business 
cycles which had been borne out by a study of merger 
activity since the 1920's. Mueller described the declines
"ibid., p. 505.
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in mergers during depressed periods, and a rapid rise 
during boom periods. Mueller observed that there had been 
a sharp decline in the number of horizontal mergers between 
19^8 and 1964, and the decline was possibly due to anti­
merger enforcement activities. By the same token, Mueller's 
records reflected a corresponding increase in the number 
of product extension, or conglomerate mergers in the same 
period. In the exchange which followed Mueller's testi­
mony, Senator Hiram Fong, a Subcommittee member, elicited 
Mueller's admission that the PTC had been unable to measure 
the precise effect of mergers on industrial performance. 
Subcommittee Attorney Cohen observed that despite "recent 
sympathetic court treatments" in Section 7 cases, there 
had been no lessening of the merger trend. Mueller stated 
that possibly there had been some restriction of concen­
tration as a result of FTC activities, notably in the dairy 
industry where a number of complaints had. been filed. 
Minority Attorney Chumbris cited the oil and steel indus­
tries, both heavily concentrated, in which sharp competi-
81tion continued to exist.
Carl Kaysen, Harvard University economist, made 
the distinction between overall concentration and concen­
tration in particular industries. The first concept, 
according to Kaysen, is the one most easily understood and 
therefore had a wider appeal. The second concept concerns
^^Ibid., pp. 505-533.
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a statistic such as that in "M" industries in manufac­
turing, the largest four produce 50 per cent of total 
value of output. That is the concept, according to Kaysen, 
with which enforcement agencies have had to concern them­
selves, He explained that the agencies would then attempt 
to show the extent to which the degree of concentration 
would function in a more or less competitive manner. 
Briefly, according to Kaysen, one could state that con­
centration measures in particular markets would merely 
serve as an indicator where significantly non-competitive 
markets could exist. "It would be the dominant firm in 
a particular market to which economic power could be 
imputed." Kaysen concluded that recent Supreme Court 
decisions in horizontal merger cases had moved toward 
establishing a presumption of illegality when the acquiring- 
acquired firms had market shares of 20 per cent or more. 
Kaysen said such a rule would be economically defensible, 
in properly defined markets, and in the absence of sub­
stantial economies of scale not achievable by any other 
82means.
Jules Backman asserted that price competition had 
been particularly vigorous in many concentrated industries 
such as chemicals, aluminum products, and electrical equip­
ment. Backman said that concentration ratios in these 




claimed for any "big four" was exaggerated. Backman also 
argued that in the industries which he mentioned, oligopo­
listic theory would not be applicable. In support of that 
statement, Backman said that there had been no concerted 
reactions of competitors to the actions of another. Back­
man claimed that entry of new competitors had not been 
barred, and there was a growing reluctance of firms to 
follow arbitrary price increases announced by a competi­
tor. Backman cited 42 instances of price increases 
announced by a recognized price leader between I96I-I965 
which had not been followed. Backman contended that a 
price leader would announce an increase because of increased 
costs, possibly created by inflationary pressures, and 
would merely act as a barometer for other firms as to when 
the increase should be announced. It would be only then, 
according to Backman, that a price leader would have its 
followers. Backman agreed with Weston in proposing that 
all trade barriers should be removed which could permit
overall competition to increase (despite concentration)
81
rather than diminish.
One of the last witnesses called in the hearings 
was William H. Orrick, Jr., Antitrust Division, Department 
of Justice. Orrick observed that Section 7 as then con­
stituted was adequate to deal with the problem of merger 
created concentration in particular markets where one or
^^Ibido, pp. 561-579.
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the other of the merging firms happened to be a major
84factor in the market.
After a four month pause, the hearings on economic 
concentration reconvened. John M. Blair, Subcommittee 
Economist, presented the majority views on "Concentration 
and Efficiency.
Blair prefaced his testimony with the remark that 
for the majority of concentrated industries, the efficiency 
rationale would have to rest on multi-plant economies.
Blair referred to a 1954 study completed by Professor Joe 
Bain which covered economies of scale and conditions of 
entry in 20 manufacturing industries. In that study, Blair 
stated that the conclusions were that overall, there was 
insufficient support for either the thesis that production 
or distribution economies seriously encouraged concentra­
tion or discouraged entry. Blair said that a cloud had 
been further cast over existence of multi-plant economies 
when one looked at the absence of rising profit rates 
along with increasing size of the plant. Actually, 
according to Blair, when one looked at the so-called multi­
plant operation, it would be observed that frequently 




U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on 
Economic Concentration: Concentration and Efficiency,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., Aug-Sept 1965»
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After a lengthy presentation of economies of scale versus 
diseconomies of scale, Senator Hruska interrupted the dis­
course to remark that he failed to see the legislative 
relevance to all the testimony which had been given. Hruska 
questioned Blair as follows:
I should like to ask your ideas as what relevance the 
type of testimony you gave here today has, conjectural 
as it is, indefinite as it is, suppositional as it is, 
predicated upon many assumptions, and those assump­
tions predicated on certain other assumptions. Could 
you enlighten me a little in that direction?®^
Blair responded that the type of the discussion happened
to be in the program for the year. Hruska wanted to know
"but what can we get hold of and say this is it." Blair
said the subject was so complex that it did not lend
itself to any finally determining test, but that he
believed the information was sufficient to form a basis
for the generalizations that he had given. Blair tended
to accept Bain's conclusion that concentration had not
been significantly identified with economies of scale or
conditions of entry and concluded that:
. . . with the continued rise in the merger movement, 
and with law journals filled with articles speculating 
on the conflict between competition and economies of 
scale, the dilemma has become a matter of growing con­
cern. Since presumably no one is opposed to progress, 
the public policy of promoting competition may have to 
give way to the realities of modern science and tech­
nology.
During the hearings there was quite an amount of 
discussion about large corporations being able to use
®^Ibid,, p. 1557. ®^Ibid., pp. 1555-1571.
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computers as an economy not available to the smaller
operator. Two witnesses testified as to the availability
and growing use of computer services that were then being
88utilized by smaller businesses.
Joel Dean, Columbia University economist, described 
six economic fallacies which had served to perpetuate the 
traditional prejudices against big business. The falla­
cies, according to Dean, are: (l) Competition is declining
and is an untrustworthy control device. Dean contended 
that it was competition that produced cost saving usually 
as a result of technology or the development of radically 
different substitutes. (2) Competition becomes cut-throat 
unless curbed by government. Dean said that competition, 
if it was to be efficient in serving the consumer, must 
injure an individual competitor and even kill some.
(3) Profits are at the expense of the consumer. Dean con­
tended that the consumer really pays less because losses 
that are not "book kept" are not deducted from the profits. 
Profits paid for the use of equity capital are not deducted 
since accounting views equity capital as a free good.
(4) Advertising makes the consumer captive and is an eco­
nomic waste. Dean said that advertising enables a cus­
tomer to pre-shop which economizes his leisure--if that 
meant anything. (5 ) The best way to care for the incompe­




of our anti-trust legislation is directed toward care of 
the incompetent but questioned that such a policy could 
slow down economic growth. (6) Job security for the indi­
vidual is best attained by slowing down economic progress. 
Dean contended that no road block should be placed in the 
path for an individual's short run benefit. He should be 
re-educated to take advantage of technological progress. 
Dean concluded that after 25 years as a college professor
and an economic consultant, by far the toughest competi­
ng
tion occurred where the number of firms were the fewest.
Senator Hart closed the hearings upon a note of 
optimism and said that he believed the Subcommittee hear­
ings had accomplished the purpose of clarifying "economic 
concentration." Senator Hruska disagreed and termed the 
hearings little more than a "symposium of abstract eco­
nomic inquiries into areas quite remote from any con-
90ceivable legislative purpose."
During the conduct of the congressional hearings 
over the approximate 1955-1965 period, the House published 
a report on mergers and concentrations for the period 
1952-1962. Some of the more significant observations in 
the report were: (l) Total number of businesses increased
at a rate of 1.5 per cent per annum but the Gross National 
Product had increased at a rate of 3.1 per cent per annum. 
(2) Acquisitions tended to be viable businesses or a
®^Ibid., pp. 1687-1691. ^°Ibid., pp. 1714-1715.
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valued asset to the acquiring firm. (3) New entrants were 
usually small, marginal firms with the chances of survival 
not good. Most discontinued businesses were in that cate­
gory. (4) Percentages of value added by the 200 largest 
manufacturing firms decreased one percentage point from a 
1954 peak of 37 per cent. The share of the 50 largest 
remained at 23 per cent. (5) Mere numbers of acquisitions 
challenged or cases concluded were not indicative of the 
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement. Many were undoubt­
edly deterred by a threat of action. (6) Most merger 
prone industry during the period was the dairy industry.
The mergers adversely affected small business. Paper and
91chemical industries were the next most merger prone. By 
the use of statistics which related to the number of acqui­
sitions in each industry during the period 1951-1961, it
was concluded that there was a trend toward superconcen- 
92tration.
The thinking on the efficacies of anti-merger 
activities or a need for additional legislation to supple­
ment Section 7 of the Clayton Act was diverse to say the 
least. The proponents advanced their arguments directed 
toward a more effective enforcement policy. The opposition,
91U.S. House of Representatives, Report on Mergers 
and Superconcentration, Staff Report, Select Committee on 
Small Business, 87th Cong., 2d Sess,, Nov. 8 , I962.
^^Ibid., pp. 39-4$.
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for the most part, tended to minimize the concern over an 
alleged phantom danger called concentration.
Comments on the anti-merger subject however were 
not confined to congressional hearings. Some of the more 
significant pronouncements on the subject will be examined 
in a later chapter.
During the congressional hearings concerning 
merger policy as it was or was not intended in amended 
Section 7, the two enforcement agencies were annually 
defending their budget requests.* The views brought out 
in the appropriations hearings will be discussed in the 
next chapter.
*The budget defenses offer an insight into problems 
of securing additional funds from a Congress that has never 
been convinced whether there should be more or less en­
forcement .
CHAPTER IV
APPROPRIATIONS FOR ANTI-MONOPOLY 
ENFORCEMENT, I955-I965
FederaJ Trade Commission Appropriations 
Money appropriated for the FTC increased steadily 
from 1956 to 1966. The appropriation in 1956 was 
$4 ,262,500, and by I965 that figure had been increased to 
$12,875,000.^ Appropriations were increased rather gradu­
ally, averaging about $.5 million yearly from 1956 through 
1961. During that period total personnel increased from 
639 to 838. The gradual increases were based on an 
expanding work load, and the announced acceleration of 
investigations and trials of anti-monopoly matters. Only 
in 1957 was there specific mention made that an increase 
of funds was necessary to provide an expanded anti-merger 
program. In that year, an increase of $1.3 million was 
appropriated which was the only year during that I956-I96I
U.S. The Budget, Independent Offices Appropri­
ations, 1956-1966. Though the budget is set up on a 
fiscal year basis, July 1 through June 30, references are 
made as if they are calendar years, except as otherwise 
noted. Amounts reflect the actual appropriations, not 





period when more than a $1 million increase was provided.
President Eisenhower in his last budget message to 
Congress in I96I, recommended that additional funds be 
appropriated to finance a 40 per cent staff increase for 
the regulatory agencies. The recommendation was based on 
the "increased complexity of the problems involved." The 
President recommended that the antitrust laws be strength­
ened, which he had also recommended in his message the 
preceding year. The appropriations for the Federal Trade 
Commission in fiscal year I962 were increased nearly 
$3 million to a total of $10.3 million.^
Funds for the following year were increased nearly 
$1 million based primarily on the receipt of 56 cases for 
investigation from the Attorney General. Under Section 6c 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC was charged 
with determining whether there had been a compliance with 
court decrees issued in antitrust cases. In this instance,
4
the period of the request spanned 20 years.
The appropriations for the next two years were 
increased about $1 million annually, and an additional 
$.6 million was added for fiscal year I966 (July 1, I965- 
June 30, 1966). The lesser amount was due primarily to a 
reduction in the funds needed to complete the balance of 
the Attorney General investigations which had taken nearly
2Ibid., 1956-1962. ^Ibid., I96I-I962.
^Ibid., 1964.
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three years to complete. The appropriation increases for 
the period I962-I965 reflect a steady increase in the Com­
mission's earmarked funds for the investigation and liti­
gation of cases in the anti-monopoly field. Funds alloted 
in that particular area increased from $3-9 million in 
1962 to S6.5 million in I963. The primary supporting data 
included in the respective budgets to justify its increased 
appropriations was to "expedite trial and litigation of 
anti-monopoly and deceptive practices cases," and "to 
expand 'our' industry guidance program," There was no 
specific mention made of any expansion in the anti-merger 
program as had been done in 1957* Funds alloted to the 
"expanded industry guidance program" amounted to less than 
10 per cent of the requested increases in the anti-monopoly 
area and accounted for only 1 to 2 per cent of the total 
appropriations for the years I962-I965» Industry guidance 
funds appropriated during the periods were in the Sl00-$200 
thousand range each year.^
In each of the budgets submitted by the Federal 
Trade Commission for fiscal years 1956-1966, funds actually 
appropriated were invariably less than requested, and with 
one exception, substantially less. The thoughts of the 
Congress resulting in steady increases, though much less 
than the requests, will be examined.
^Ibid., 1962-1966.
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Independent Offices Appropriations, Hearings 
before the Subcommittee of the Committee 
on Appropriations, 1955-1966
Table 1 contains data which reflects the amounts 
requested by the Federal Trade Commission, and the 
amounts actually appropriated for the agency's yearly 
activities. The appropriations for the 10 year period 
range from $75,000 less than requested in 1958 to $2.1 
million less than requested in I96I. Even though an 
average does obscure variations, the average annual 
amount trimmed from requests for the 10 year period 
amounted to about $1.2 million.
A feature which is interesting but probably not 
too significant concerns the periods I956-I96O and I96I- 
1965. The earlier period was during an alleged pro- 
business administration, and the economy was undergoing 
some recessionary pains. Appropriations during that 
period were about $.75 million less per year than the 
Commission requested. By contrast, the period I96I-I965 
was dominated by an alleged anti-business administration 
and the economy was on a rebound from the recession of 
the late 1950's, yet the appropriations averaged about 
$1.5 million per year less than the Commission requested.
Yet in both periods, the Commission received 
appropriations in excess of the previous year, ranging 
from 25 thousand to $2.8 million. During the 1956-1960 
period, annual increases averaged $.34 million, and in the
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TABLE I












1956 $ 5 ,500,000 $ 4 ,262,500 $1 ,237,500 $ 217,500
1957 6 ,250,000 5 ,550,000 700,000 287,500
1958 6 ,025,000 5 ,950,000 75,000 400,000
1959 6,975,000 5,975,000 1 ,000,000 25,000
i960 7 ,600,000 6,840,000 760,000 865,000
1961 9,640,000 7 ,507,500 2 ,132,500 667,500
1962 11,845,000 10,345,000 1 ,500,000 2 ,837,500
1963 13,028,000 11,282,500 1 ,745,000 937,500
1964 13,270,000 12,214,750 1 ,055,250 932,250
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I96I-I965 period, the annual increases were about #1.2 
million. The most significant increase occurred in I96I. 
In reviewing the hearings, it is indicated that the 
increase was due to President Eisenhower's influence as 
expressed in his budget message to Congress.
The Chairman of the House Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Appropriations was Congressman Albert Thomas, 
a Texas Democrat, and by and large, the committee members 
remained about the same during the 10 year period of this 
discussion. The bi-partisan Federal Trade Commission had 
a Republican Chairman from 195^ to early 1961.^ Conserva­
tism was not apparent in the Commission's annual requests 
for increased appropriations, so it is apparent that party 
affiliations had no significant part in the overall makeup 
of budgets for the years in question. See Table 1.
In each of the hearings during the 10 year span, 
the Chairman of the FTC would first describe the need for 
additional funds based on an expanding work load.
In 1956, John Gwynne, Chairman, pointed out an 
increasing number of mergers and acquisitions, and addi­
tional funds were needed to employ more people in the 
anti-merger field. Congressman Thomas was quite critical 
of the 2 1/2 to 3 year time lag in the Commission's cases
U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of 
the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Independent 
Office Appropriations, 89th Cong.l 1st Sess., 19^5, 
p. 402.
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then in process of litigation. The Executive Director of 
the FTC assured the Subcommittee that the "situation was 
improving." Congressman Yates (R.-Ill.) expressed curi­
osity as to the area in which the Bureau of the Budget had 
cut the FTC request for funds. Gwynne responded that the 
reduction had been in the anti-merger area, but that he 
could operate very well with the reduction. Even though 
the Budget Bureau had cut the original request, the amount 
suggested was still in excess over appropriations the pre­
ceding year. Thomas wanted to know exactly where FTC pro­
posed to use the additional funds, if appropriated. Gwynne
7
said that they would be used in the anti-merger area.
Table 1 will reflect the increase over the preceding year 
that was actually appropriated.
Hearings during the following session (1957) pro­
duced little of particular note from either the FTC or the 
congressional members of the Subcommittee. The Commission 
did point out that the increased appropriation requested
was, in part, due to a pay raise recently enacted by 
8Congress.
Hearings in the following year (1958) produced 
substantial criticism. In his examination of the work 
load statistics presented by FTC Chairman Gwynne, Congress­
man Thomas emphasized that too much of the Commission's
^Ibid., 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956. 
o
Ibid. , 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957.
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resources had been allocated to inconsequentials with a 
notable lack of Section 7 proceedings. Congressman Evins 
(D-Tenn.) stressed that the Commission had issued only 
nine Section 7 complaints the preceding year, yet its 
appropriations had been increased more than $1 million 
over the preceding year. Evins was adamant in his observa­
tions to Chairman Gwynne that more emphasis should be given 
to anti-merger work. Evins supported that view when he 
pointed out that the major portions of the Commission's 
budgets had been allocated to the field of "false adver­
tising," with more important anti-merger work having been 
relegated to a secondary position. During the exchange of 
views between the FTC and the committee, it was revealed 
that the appropriations for the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice were roughly comparable to those 
allocated to the FTC for the same work (discussed later). 
Some brief attention was given to the FTC recommendations 
to Congress that a pre-merger notification proposal should 
be enacted into law; that a law should be enacted author­
izing the finality of FTC Clayton Act orders; and that a 
law should be enacted which would authorize the FTC to
Q
seek preliminary injunctions.
In hearings conducted in the first session of 
Congress (196O), the Commission asked for additional funds
9Ibid., 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958.
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to meet an increasing work load due to an expanding economy; 
and to administer new laws enacted by Congress (Packers 
and Stockyards Act, Wool Act, and Fibers and Textile Act). 
Congressman Boland (R-Mass.) remarked that despite annual 
increases in appropriations, the Commission had been remiss 
in its allotments to anti-merger work; yet had substan­
tially increased its personnel. Congressman Jonas (D-NC.) 
raised a question about the FTC and the Department of 
Justice possibly duplicating efforts in the anti-monopoly 
field. The Commission Chairman assured the Committee that 
such was not the case because of excellent liaison.
The Commission in defending its budget before the 
second session of Congress (i960), based an increased 
appropriation request as usual, on an increased work load 
plus the initiation of a 3 year program to build up its 
staff. The Commission pointed out that since the "payola 
scandal" (rigged TV give away shows) that it had commenced 
to receive about 1,000 complaints monthly (primarily false 
advertising and deceptive practices). The Commission said 
that its work in deceptive practices far exceeded anti- 
monopoly work. It was explained that the cases were easier 
to handle, were less time consuming, and were normally 
settled by a consent order. Congressmen Thomas and Evins 
were critical of the time devoted to "penny ante" affairs, 
and stressed that time and money should have been devoted
^^Ibid., 86th Cong., 1st Sess., I96O.
119
to the larger things such as price fixing and mergers.
The FTC assured the committee that historically 60 per cent 
of the budget had been devoted to anti-monopoly work, but 
the results were slower due to the complexities. Thomas 
questioned the necessity of annual budget increases and 
pointed out that questionable competition would normally 
be expected to occur in times of stress. But, he con­
tinued, 'times' had been reasonably good for several 
years, yet the FTC, year by year, invariably pointed out 
that the work was increasing. Congressmen Yates and Jonas 
were concerned with the lengthy FTC litigations in the 
"few cases they had filed." Yates remarked that each year 
the previous Chairman (Gwynne had been succeeded by Earl 
Kintner) would state that FTC operations would continue 
on whatever appropriations were granted, yet the work 
backlog had continued to increase. Chairman Kintner 
stated that he could reduce the backlog if the increased 
funds were appropriated. Evins expressed his continued 
and repeated concern over the FTC's devotion to "penny 
ante" problems--and he hoped that funds were not being 
diverted from anti-monopoly work, Thomas observed that 
the Department of Justice could possibly handle all liti­
gated cases; however Kintner replied that such work in 
the FTC was handled in its office of the General Counsel, 
and "no increase was requested in that area." Jonas 
pointed out that the federal courts completed their cases
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much sooner than the FTC, and it had occurred to him that 
possibly the FTC Hearing Examiners had been too lenient 
with the respondents.^^
In hearings the following year (196I), the Com­
mission again stressed its increased work load in support 
of its annual request for additional funds. According to 
the Commission, the recently enacted legislation which 
would make Clayton Act orders final (PL 86-107) would 
generate more work due to more extended pre-merger confer­
ences. The Commission also pointed out that the budget 
request would also cover increased funds for a 'stepped 
up anti-merger program.' Congressman Thomas remarked that 
of the personnel increase of some 208 people that had been 
requested, all appeared to have been programmed as 'chiefs.' 
Thomas also expressed his concern with the work back log 
of the Hearing Examiners. The Commission Chairman ex­
plained that new procedures had been adopted whereby the 
examiner would no longer be charged with the handling of 
consent order cases, about 70 per cent of the load, since 
it had been transferred to another division within the 
Commission. Thomas again emphasized that the FTC appeared 
to continue "chasing the rabbit and letting the fox 
escape." (Reference to the lack of positive results in 
the anti-merger area.) The Commission countered by
^^Ibid., 86th Cong., 2d Sess., I96O.
121
stating that excellent results had been obtained in its 
drug industry inquiries since the consumer had been saved 
about $16 million yearly due to a decline in drug prices 
of about 15 per cent. (Combined anti-monopoly Section 2,
Clayton Act and unfair practices, Section $, FTC Act pro-
\12 ceedxngs.)
The Commission described a new problem area that 
had arisen and the problem would require a later supple­
mental appropriation. It was explained that under Sec­
tion 6c of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC was 
charged with the responsibility of assuring that court 
decrees in antitrust cases had been complied with. The 
Commission explained that the Department of Justice had 
requested a number of cases (56) be investigated, and that 
the Commission had no alternative but to fulfill the 
request. It was explained that the law then in existence 
did not permit the Department of Justice to obtain the 
desired information, but that Civil Investigative Demand 
legislation, then being considered by the Congress, would 
correct the situation. Congressmen Evins and Thomas 
observed that if Section 6 of the FTC Act had been in 
effect for 50 years, why would it "just now be invoked."
It was implied that it was a new antitrust policy initi­
ated by the new (Kennedy) administration. Evins questioned
^^Ibid., 87th Cong., 1st Sess,, I96I.
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the propriety of the new Commissioner (Paul R. Dixon suc­
ceeded Kintner in March I961) in increasing his prede­
cessor's estimate nearly $3 million. Dixon replied, "We
13need it to get the job done."
The House Subcommittee reduced the Commission's 
request by some $700,000, and the Commission appeared 
before the Senate Appropriations Committee with a request 
for restoration of the cut. The Senate questioned FTC 
Chairman Dixon as to the consequences if the cut were 
allowed to stand. Dixon responded that it would force him 
to eliminate $4 people from regular programs, and 22 from 
those assigned to the "Attorney General" program. In an 
effort to arrive at the individual attorney's work accom­
plishments j Dixon stated that one attorney could handle 
about 12 deceptive practices cases per year as opposed to
about 3 or less in the anti-monopoly field. The Senate
l4restored one-half the cut.
The House hearings the following session (1962) 
were in the same vein. The FTC again requested a substan­
tial increase in funds. Congressman Thomas in particular 
was critical in his remarks to FTC Chairman Dixon. Thomas 
contended that the written presentation prepared by the 
Commission reflected that Dixon had not filled all the
l^Ibid.
l4UoS. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropria­
tions , 87th CongTl 1st Sess., I961.
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approximately 70 additional positions programmed in the 
preceding year's budget, Thomas speculated as to what use 
had been made of the approximately $2.5 million increase 
that had eventually been granted because the FTC had not 
substantially reduced the work back log. Thomas questioned 
the usefulness of Dixon's "reorganization" announced by 
the FTC the preceding year since the work load situation 
had not been bettered. Dixon said that the Attorney General 
investigations had consumed more time than was originally 
thought, even though 35-40 attorneys had been assigned to 
that project. Dixon explained that the reason that the 
70 additional attorneys had not been hired was due to a 
shortage of physical space. Dixon maintained that he 
needed the additional funds "to get the job done."^^
The requested appropriations were again cut sharply 
by the House. The Commission again appealed to the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations. Dixon pointed out that the 
FTC could not operate its new division of Advisory Opinions, 
which had been created as a result of urgings by Congress 
that the Commission "develop new programs to protect the 
consumer." No new programs could be initiated on the funds 
appropriated by the House according to Dixon, and the 
House cuts amounted to the loss of about 150 people. The 
Committee questioned Dixon about the appropriations, some
U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of 
the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Independent 
Offices Appropriations, 87th Cong,, 2d Sess., 19^2.
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of which appeared to be allocated toward "doing the Attor­
ney General's job." Dixon explained the provisions of 
Section 6c of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Senate 
restored about half of the House cut in appropriations.^^
In the budget presentation the following year
(1963), Dixon explained his agency's renewed emphasis on 
industry guidance in anti-monopoly matters, and a faster 
handling of complaints; but admitted the FTC still had a 
2 year backlog of work. In his plea for additional funds, 
Dixon maintained that the industry guidance-advisory 
opinion programs had been highly successful, but that 
neither could be operated without additional funds. Dixon 
described a new study that was then being initiated. He 
explained that the FTC would collect financial and product 
information from 1,000 manufacturing-mining firms for use 
in the agency's anti-merger program. Congressman Thomas 
questioned the propriety of such a project; however Dixon 
read Section 6c of the FTC Act which authorized such a 
procedure. Congressman Rhodes (R-Ariz,) remarked that the 
questionnaire to be utilized in that project was oppres­
sive, and an unwarranted invasion of private property. 
Thomas described the annual increases in FTC personnel 
over a several year period; but the anti-monopoly case
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Appropriations, 
Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 87th Cong., 
2d Sess., 1962.
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load had not been reduced to where it had been over four
years ago. Thomas also remarked that over $1 million had
been spent in a 2 year period on the Attorney General
cases, yet the initial assignment of the 56 cases had not
been completed at that time. Evins critically remarked
to Dixon that if the 70 attorneys previously alloted to
the Attorney General work had been utilized, the work
would have been completed, instead of only half done.
Jonas pointed out that the Hearing Examiner case load had
not been reduced as Dixon had announced. Dixon responded
to Jonas, that the case load reflected "old work" still
under the old procedure, which had progressed too far for
him to feasibly reassign cases to a new division. Dixon
maintained that the new reassignment procedure would begin
17to show its effects in a short time.
Commission Chairman Dixon presented his annual 
request for an increased appropriation the following year
(1964). He explained that while the increase amounted to 
nearly $1 million, about three-fourths was due to a pay 
increase which had been enacted by Congress. The Subcom­
mittee vigorously attacked the propriety of the business 
questionnaire (mentioned in the hearings of the preceding 
year). Dixon responded by again quoting from Section 6c
17U.S. House of ..Representatives, Subcommittee of 
the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Independent 
Offices Appropriations, 88th Cong,, 1st Sess., 1963o
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of the FTC Act. Dixon again emphasized FTC’s increased 
emphasis on industry guidance, and deceptive advertising-- 
both very favorably received by the business community and 
the public.
In the following year (1963) Chairman Dixon pre­
sented the FTC budget with the announcement that it re­
flected a long overdue emphasis by the Commission to obtain 
compliance with the trade laws. Congressman Thomas 
remarked to Dixon that "you have been flirting with that 
concept for 8 or 9 years, and there is no reason to think 
it will work at this time." Dixon explained that he was 
taking positive action, and not just giving lip service 
to the concept, Dixon emphasized that the new procedures 
he had initiated were becoming effective since the Com­
mission was beginning to have fewer complaints and fewer 
orders to cease and desist. (Reference was made to the 
renewed emphasis on industry guidance and advisory opinions 
previously mentioned by Dixon in other hearings.
Congressman Evins questioned Dixon about the status 
of the 56 Attorney General cases which had been received 
two or three years before. Dixon reported that 55 had 
been completed, and the last was then in the process of 
being closed. Dixon added that about 12 of the 56 indicated
18
Ibid. , 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1964.
^^Ibid., 89th Cong., 1st Sess., I965
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20violations of previously issued court decrees.
Congressman Jonas queried Dixon as to why the FTC
had been able to loan three Hearing Examiners to the
National Labor Relations Board despite an increased work
load. (Described in the FTC written presentation.) Dixon
said that the budget had already been prepared, and it had
21been too late to "turn the positions back."
Congressman Evins remarked that a news report 
reflected that mergers and acquisitions had continued to 
increase, but he had noted no particular step up in the 
Commission's activities. Dixon said that he was unable to 
further emphasize anti-merger work with the existing staff 
of attorneys. Evins described a recently publicized 
merger of two tire companies in which the news article had 
stated that 200 tire manufacturers had existed in 1920, 
but only 12 were manufacturing tires at that time (1965). 
That type of situation, according to Evins, was of increas­
ing concern to the Subcommittee, and such instances should 
have the increased attention of the anti-merger agencies. 
Dixon said that the Commission had issued six Section 7 
complaints, and had issued six Section 7 orders to cease 
and desist in 1964. Evins again evinced his concern over 
the possibility of a duplication of effort in the anti­
merger area by the FTC and the Department of Justice.
^°Ibid. 2^Ibid,
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Dixon explained that "if we see something, we notify them, 
and if they don't object within 24 hours, we proceed."
If there were to be an objection, Dixon explained, the 
agencies would then agree as which had the expertise, then 
the selected agency would proceed, Dixon did say that if 
during an FTC investigation, evidence of a criminal viola­
tion were developed, the case would then be transferred
22to the Department of Justice for grand jury action.
The Commission has obtained an increase of funds 
yearly, but not without thorough and penetrating ques­
tioning by congressional members of appropriations com­
mittees. The House Subcommittee members in particular 
have not been convinced that the Federal Trade Commission 
has always operated in consonance with the laws or within 
the framework of good management principles. During the 
10 year period examined, the principal areas of criticism 
and concern were: (l) Length of litigations; (2) Too much
time devoted to work other than anti-merger; and (3) Failure 
to reduce the backlog of work despite annual increases in 
personnel and funds. (The number of personnel increased 
progressively from 639 in 1956 to 1175 in 1965.)^^
Criticism of the Commission was not confined to
minority members of the committees; on the contrary, the
Democratic Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Appropri­
ations was the most persistent of all members in the
^^Ibid. 2^Ibid.
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penetrating questioning. In perusing the hearings in 
detail, it was not surprising that the appropriations were 
always less than requested. First, there is a strong 
implication that at least congressional members of various 
committees were not convinced that the FTC was accomplish­
ing its mission. And second, it has been traditional for 
government budgets to reflect a request for more funds 
than were actually needed. That fact was brought out in 
two of the hearings during the period 1956-1965*
The appropriations to the FTC compared to those 
granted the Department of Justice are interesting.
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, 
Appropriations
The most significant fact appearing in Table 2 is 
that Congress appropriated the amount requested by the 
Department of Justice in each year except 1957* Even in 
that year, the amount appropriated was nearly one-half 
million more than in the preceding year. By contrast, 
the FTC appropriations were substantially reduced each year 
from the amount requested. A possible explanation could 
be that the Department of Justice has traditionally been 
in the public favor, primarily because of the well publi­
cized Federal Bureau of Investigation. With public 
favoritism, there would be an obvious reluctance to reduce 
any request made by the Department.
Chairman Dixon of the FTC testified during an
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TABLE 2
APPROPRIATIONS, ANTITRUST DIVISION DEPARTMENT













1956 #3 ,100,000 #3 ,100,000 # -- — # ---—
1957 4 ,265,000 3 ,568,650 696,350 468,650
1958 3 ,785,000 3 ,785,000 same 116,350
1959 3 ,800,000 3 ,800,000 same 15,000
i960 4 ,500,000 4 ,500,000 same 1 ,300,000
1961 4 ,760,000 4 ,760,000 same 260,000
1962 5 ,873,000 5 ,873,000 same 1 ,113,000
1963 6 ,218,000 6 ,218,000 same 345,000
1964 6 ,600,000 6 ,600,000 same 382,000
1965 6 ,854,000 6 ,854,000 same 254,000
*U.S. The Budget (Department of Justice Appropri­
ation), Fiscal Years I936-I966. The foregoing table com­
piled in same manner as FTC appropriations in Table 1.
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appropriations hearing that his agency traditionally alloted
60 per cent of its total funds to anti-monopoly work. Çven
though anti-monopoly work as characterized by the FTC
covers enforcement of sections other than Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 60 per cent of the annual FTC appropriations
would closely approximate Justice's funds.
If the same 60 per cent criteria is used in regard
to personnel, the same close approximation will result.
Personnel assigned to anti-monopoly work in the FTC would
have increased from 383 in 1956 to 705 in 196$. Personnel
in the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department in-
0 4
creased from 4$1 in 1956 to 6l4 in 1965*
A comparison of the number of Section 7 proceed­
ings initiated by each agency will be discussed in other 
parts of this writing. However for the period being empha­
sized, i.e., 1956-1965, the total number of actions have 
been about equal despite annual variations.
In light of the foregoing observations, the enforce­
ment of Section 7 during the period I956-I96O will be dis­
cussed in the next chapter.
24
The Budget (Fiscal Years I956-I966)
CHAPTER V
EFFECTS OF AMENDED SECTION 7, CLAYTON ACT 
ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, I956-I96O
Mund says that the very small impact of amended 
Section 7 on mergers during the first five years was the 
result in part by the apathetic attitude taken by the anti­
trust agencies. He says it was not until the second five 
year period, after years of prodding by congressional com­
mittees that the agencies decided to step up their enforce­
ment activities.^ In support of Mund's contention, there 
were 18 enforcement agency complaints in 1956, nearly 
twice the number initiated in the preceding five year 
period. A total of 69 complaints were filed in the period
1956-1960, or over six times the number initiated in the
2preceding five year period.
It was additionally pointed out by Mund that:
The number of merger complaints filed by the anti­
trust agencies touches only a very small percentage 
of the actual mergers--only about one per cent of 
the mergers and acquisitions actually being consum­
mated. In selecting the cases filed, the antitrust 
agencies are influenced by complaints received on 
particular mergers, by their judgment of the public
^Mund, p. 157» ^Bock, No. 99, p. 3
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interest involved, by the impact of the merger on 
concentration, by the available staff and funds, and 
in some instances by the personal opinions eind ambi­
tions of the persons charged with enforcement of the 
law.
In studying the cases brought, it is difficult to 
understand why some cases have been brought and some 
actual mergers not attacked. The facts are that the 
antitrust agencies do not scrutinize all acquisitions 
in terms of their probable impact on competition. 
Rather their method is the hit-or-miss method of read­
ing newspapers and trade periodicals. Upon learning 
that certain mergers have been effected, they select 
some for prosecution, depending upon the factors men­
tioned above. The remedy for this haphazard procedure 
is the adoption of a pre-merger notification law 
requiring that all acquisitions of a certain size must 
first be cleared with the Department of Justice and 
the Federal Trade Commission.^
In the 1956-1960 period, the Federal Trade Commis- 
tion recorded about 31900 mergers in the mining-manufac-
4;turing segment of the economy. It has been mentioned 
that about 2,400 mergers occurred in the same segment in 
the I95I-I955 period. The annual average increased from 
about 480 in the earlier period to about 790 in the latter. 
This comparison would further support a statement made in 
Chapter II that amended Section 7 had had no effect on the 
merger trend.
Mention has been made that less than 1 per cent of 
the merger activity is challenged by the antitrust agen­
cies. Records of the Federal Trade Commission reflect
^Mund, p. 157.
4
Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report, Fiscal
Year 1966, p. 39»
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that about 65O mergers-acquisitions occurred in calendar 
year 1956,^ and in its 1956 Annual Report, the agency 
showed that 65 inquiries had been conducted, but only 12 
were of the Section 7 type investigations.^ Challenges to 
mergers-acquisitions for that isolated year will exceed 
the "less than 1 percent" but over the years, that figure 
will hold reasonably well. For the period I956-I96O it is 
nearer to 2 per cent.
In Chapter II several reasons were given to explain 
the apparent lack of initiative by the Federal Trade Com­
mission in challenging mergers and acquisitions that could 
have been proscribed by Section ?• An examination of each 
reason would add little at this late date, but to further 
pursue those obvious shortcomings, the personnel staffing 
of the FTC might bear a closer scrutiny.
The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction over 
all alleged violations of Sections 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the 
Clayton Act. Notable exceptions are violations committed 
by businesses which are under the jurisdiction of other 
regulatory agencies such as the Federal Communications 
Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, et al. In addi­
tion the Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction over 
alleged violations of the unfair practices portion of 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
^Ibid., Extrapolation from Chart 1, p. 39* 
^Bock, pp. 232-243.
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In 1956, the Bureau of Investigation of the Federal 
Trade Commission, conducted all the investigations of 
alleged violations of the statutes administered by the Com­
mission. During that fiscal year, the Bureau of Investi­
gations was assigned the full responsibility for examining 
all reported corporate mergers and acquisitions, and to 
identify those which would appear to have economic signifi­
cance. The latter would be subjected to a more complete
investigation by the legal staff to determine whether there
7
could be a contravention of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
The personnel strength of the Bureau of Investigations in
g
1956 was 3 investigative supervisors and 9 investigators. 
Thus 9 investigators had to review the approximately 65O 
mergers and acquisitions in that year. In addition to 
preparing the initial listing for review, the one division 
had other duties connected with other sections of the 
Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. Because of 
inadequate staffing only a cursory examination of a cor­
porate merger or acquisition could be made. Mund said it 
would be quite probable that unless a per se violation or 
some other significant feature were noted, some violations 
could have been passed over.
n
Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report, 1956,
pp. 20-22.
g
Appendix: The Budget of the United States Govern­
ment for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1958 (Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 36.
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After the investigative division had prepared an 
initial information sheet on a probable violation, legal 
investigative work would then have been conducted under 
guidance of a chief project attorney out of a staff of 28 
project attorneys. The initial information sheet could 
be assigned to any attorney on the staff, who after con­
sultation with economists, statisticians, and other experts 
in the antitrust area, would make a decision as to whether 
the merger or acquisition would likely have adverse effects 
as proscribed by the statute. If it were decided that 
there would be proscribed effects, a more time consuming 
investigation would be conducted in which both economic
9
and marketing research would be employed. Sixty-five 
complete investigations were undertaken in 1956 despite a 
shortage of personnel.
It must be recognized that all of the 65 inquiries 
did not involve Section 7 violations even though 12 such 
complaints were filed. Some of the inquiries made by the 
legal staff were based on information sheets from the 
investigative division relating to specific violations of 
other applicable antimonopoly sections of the Clayton Act. 
In fact of the 42 cases filed, 30 were complaints of viola­
tions of sections other than Section
pp. 20-22.
10
^Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report, 1956
Ibid., p. 29.
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That being the case, the Federal Trade Commission 
did a commendable job in the 1954-1956 period with the 
personnel available. Management principles would dictate 
that the 28 man legal staff would have included at least 
five supervisors.^^ The effective number of attorneys 
available for investigations and litigation would have 
been further reduced when earned annual and sick leave for 
those Civil Service employees is considered— probably a 
loss of three to four men annually or the full time use of 
about 19 attorneys who made 65 complete investigations, 
and filed 42 complaints of which 12 were the very complex 
Section 7 type cases. Necessary appearances in court and 
at hearings would have further reduced their time for legal 
investigations. In retrospect, it is no mystery as to why 
more new complaint type cases were not filed.
Analysis of Section 7 Type Cases Filed by the 
Federal Trade Commission, I956-I96O
An examination of the 37 Section 7 type cases 
filed by the Federal Trade Commission in the second five 
year period after enactment of the Celler-Kefauver amend­
ment, shows more of an industry wide approach to violations 
as opposed to the isolated or random approach "emphasized" 
in the first five year period. For example, of the 37
Michael J. Jucius, Personnel Management, rev. ed. 
(Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1953); and
course in Personnel Management, USAF, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, 
1946.
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cases filed, 4 were in the dairy industry; and 4 were
12filed in the paper (pulp-timber-paper products) industry.
Another feature of significance is a change from 
a total dissolution policy which characterized the earlier 
five year period. The Commission made a more frequent use 
of the consent decree which was used freely by the Depart­
ment of Justice in their 1951-1955 cases. For example, 1? 
of the 37 cases were settled by consent decrees ranging 
from partial to total divestiture. Of the remaining 20 
cases, 5 were dismissed by the Commission; 6 were either 
pending in the Commission, or the Courts ; and 9 were
either appealed to the Commission, or to the Courts, where
13initial orders of divestiture were upheld.
Two of the above cases reached the Supreme Court 
and each resulted in a decision favorable to the Commis­
sion. They will be discussed since each of the decisions 
have furnished definitive guide lines for future action.
On December l8 , 1957, the Commission filed a com­
plaint against Consolidated Foods Corporation of Chicago, 
Illinois, one of the nation’s larger integrated processors 
and distributors of a broad line of food products. The 
complaint alleged that the acquisition of Gentry, Incor­
porated, a Los Angeles, California, manufacturer and dis­
tributor of onion and garlic dehydrated seasoning, in
12Bock, Mergers and Markets, No. 93, pp. 231-243 
^^Ibid.
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April 1951 caused a lessening of horizontal competition; 
and secondly, because of Consolidated's buying power, it 
was in a position to coerce its suppliers to purchase from 
Gentry. The complaint further cited that net sales of 
Consolidated increased from $1/4 million in 1951 to over 
$268 million in 1956; and that assets of the Gentry Divi­
sion of Consolidated had increased from $60 million to 
$99 million in the same period. It was further stated 
that Gentry had been in a position of dominance in a small, 
four firm industry, and its sales had increased from about 
$2.6 million to over $5 million in the same period of
l4time, or the position which Consolidated then occupied.
The Hearing Examiner recommended an order of 
divestiture on December 29, I96I» He explained his order 
by saying that there was no question but that the line of 
commerce was dried food seasoning. The acquisition was 
designated a conglomerate which implied the absence of 
pre-merger competition or supply relationships between the 
acquiring and the acquired. Although the record showed 
that Gentry had supplied some of the Consolidated affili­
ates, there was insufficient evidence to designate the 
merger as vertical. The examiner however emphasized that 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act as amended applied to con­
glomerate mergers as well as horizontal and vertical; and
14Federal Trade Commission Decisions, In the 
Matter of Consolidated Foods Corp., v. 62, ïïocket No. 7OOO.
pp. 929-931.
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the evidence was clear that the conglomerate had lessened 
competition. The examiner also said the evidence indicated 
Consolidated had placed pressure upon its suppliers to 
purchase from Gentry, or that reciprocal dealings were 
practiced. He added that the joining of Consolidated by 
Gentry had placed Consolidated in a better overall competi­
tive position to the detriment of competition. The ex­
aminer concluded that overall, the acquisition of Gentry
by Consolidated had the effect of substantially lessening
15competition as proscribed by Section 7»
During the litigation in the Consolidated case, 
a significant legislative change was made which would give 
finality to Federal Trade Commission orders. Public Law 
86-107, enacted on July 23, 1959, was an amendment to 
Section 11 of the Clayton Act. The intent was to provide 
a more expeditious enforcement of the cease and desist 
orders issued under that section. Briefly it stated that 
if no petition for review had been filed with the Commis­
sion within the allotted time of 60 days, the initial 
order would become final. If a petition were filed, the 
court would have jurisdiction.^^
Consolidated Foods did appeal the initial examiner's 
finding, and on November 15, 1962, an order of divestiture
^^Ibid., pp. 931-945.
16U.S. Statutes at Large, v. 73, 86th Cong., 1st 
Sess., i960, pp. 243-245.
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accompanied by a modified order was issued by the Commis­
sion. The resultant final order was then issued on 
March 22, I963. The opinion in the final order contained 
several interesting points, all in agreement with, and 
supporting the initial findings. After considering both 
the affirmative and negative arguments concerning reci­
procity, the Commission ruled that the acquisition did 
permit reciprocal powers in violation of Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (unfair practices), but the 
case had been filed only as a violation of Section 7, as 
amended, of the Clayton Act. In rationalizing the situa­
tion it was brought out that a cease and desist order 
would eliminate an overt reliance on reciprocity by Con­
solidated, but it would do nothing to eliminate the anti­
competitive effect inherent in the corporate structure 
created by the merger. Therefore the question resolved 
itself into whether the anti-competitive effects of a
merger in which reciprocity had attained a foothold were
sufficient to constitute a violation of amended Section 7- 
In ruling affirmatively, the Commission brought out several 
points which are summarized :
(1) In both the onion and garlic product line
about one-fourth of the market stood to be influenced by
the possibility that Consolidated would withdraw patronage 
unless Gentry were patronized.
(2) The area of prospective foreclosure was great,
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and potential foreclosures always weigh strongly in 
testing the lawfulness.
(3) Historically5 the respondent had been active 
in a trend toward concentration. In an industry where two 
firms had 85 per cent of the market there was no room for 
a trend.
(4) It was desirable to prevent a trend toward 
further oligopoly in the onion-garlic seasoning market.
It was therefore concluded that the merger-acquisi- 
tion had conferred upon Consolidated, the power to fore­
close a major share of the market for dehydrated onion and 
garlic seasoning. And with that ability, the competitive 
opportunities of its small, relatively undiversified com­
petitors had been jeopardized, thereby "tending to lend 
further rigidity to an already heavily concentrated
industry . . . without producing any countervailing com-
17petitive, economic or social advantages,"
Another segment of anti-merger law had been pro- 
nounced--that the possibilities for reciprocal dealing in 
a conglomerate setting would, under certain circumstances, 
possibly tend to lessen competition which was proscribed 
by amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Consolidated appealed the Commission's decision 
to the Court of Appeals. In setting aside the Commis­
sion's order, the Court said that the Commission failed to
^^Ibid., pp. 946-968.
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consider post-acquisition evidence. That evidence, accord­
ing to the Court, reflected that the onion-garlic producer's 
share increased only 7 per cent over a 10 year period in 
an onion market that had been described as "burgeoning."
The share of the garlic market had declined 12 per cent 
during that period. The Court concluded that the Commis­
sion mistakenly rejected what the record demonstrated as 
to the past in favor of a future possibility based on con­
jecture and speculation. The order setting aside the Com-
X 8mission's decision was dated March 24, 1964.
The Federal Trade Commission appealed to the United 
States•Supreme Court. That body reversed the Court of 
Appeals in a I965 decision and some of the reasoning is 
interesting:
The mixed threat and lure of reciprocal buying is one 
of the anti-competitive practices at which the anti­
trust laws are aimed, and an acquisition which makes 
reciprocity in trading possible, violates Section ? 
of the Clayton Act . . .  if the possibility of a 
lessening of competition is shown . . . however not 
all acquisitions, no matter how small, violate Sec­
tion 7 just because there is a possibility of reci­
procity. . . .
An FTC ruling that the acquisition violated Sec­
tion 7 since it put the wholesaler and retailer in a 
position to exercise reciprocal power . . . was sup­
ported by evidence that reciprocity was tried over 
and over again and it sometimes worked . . . and 
despite an inferior product and a rapidly expanding 
market, it was able to increase its share of the 
onion market by 7 per cent and held its losses in 
garlic to 12 per cent.
X 8
Trade Cases, 1964, par. 71,054,
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Post acquisition evidence should be considered but 
it should not override all probabilities since the 
force of Section 7 is still on probabilities, not in 
what later transpires.
Post acquisition conduct may violate Section 7 even 
though there is no evidence to establish probability 
at the time of the merger, but a limitation on the 
weight to be given such evidence is necessary since, 
once the two companies have united, no one knows what 
the fate of the acquired company would have been but 
for the merger.
No group acquiring a company with reciprocal buying 
opportunities is entitled to a "free trial." To do 
such would distort the scheme of Section 7*^^
A case of a little different nature which not only 
involved the term "conglomerate merger" but a new term, 
"product extension," is also considered a landmark case 
in the annals of the Federal Trade Commission, since it 
too, resulted in a favorable Supreme Court ruling. The 
Procter and Gamble Company, the nation's leading producer 
of household cleansing agents, acquired the Clorox Co., 
the nation's leading producer of household bleach, on 
August 1, 1957* On September 30, 1957> the Commission 
filed a complaint against Procter and Gamble alleging that 
the acquisition "may" substantially lessen competition or 
tend to a monopoly in the household liquid bleach indus- 
try.20
Briefly the complaint alleged that:
l^Trade Cases, I965, par. 71,432 (85 US 1220).
20Trade Regulation Reporter, Transfer Binder, 
Federal Trade Commission Complaints, Orders, Stipulations, 
1957-1959, In the Matter of Procter and Gamble Co., FTC 
Docket 6901, par. 26,737*
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At the time of the acquisition, Procter and Gamble
was one of the 50 largest industries with sales in
excess of $ one billion annually.
At the time of the acquisition, liquid bleach was 
basically a small firm industry.
At the time of the acquisition, Clorox' sales were
50 per cent of the national market with Purex, the
chief competitor accounting for only I5 per cent.
At the time of the acquisition, there was a crucial 
fight for store shelf space and Procter and Gamble 
could obtain advantages not available to a single 
unit producer.
Despite Clorox' growth in the industry, it had always 
been competitive, and substitution of Procter and 
Gamble for Clorox would lead to further rigidities in 
an oligopolistic market which could eliminate the 
remaining competition.
The entry of one of the largest firms into a rela­
tively small market could inhibit entry. The public 
being more accustomed to Procter's brands would proba­
bly prefer it over others.
Procter and Gamble would be in a position to strengthen 
its aggregate market position such as using Clorox 
products as a loss leader in promoting its other 
products.
During the hearing, the Commission described the 
merger as a "product extension." Household cleaning agents 
produced and marketed by Procter and Gamble, particularly 
their packaged detergents, were used along with Clorox' 
liquid household bleach. Since both were related in the 
consumer's mind, the term "product extension" was coined. 
The two products were also related by the manner of mar­
keting, which was usually through grocery stores and 
accompanied by mass advertising. Because of this
2^ Ibid.
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relationship there were significant possibilities for mar-
22keting and distribution integration. An initial recom­
mendation of divestiture accompanied by a consent decree
was furnished the Commission by the Hearing Examiner on 
2 3June 30, i960. The Commission ruled that the evidence 
was not sufficient to render an informed decision and 
remanded the case to hearing examiner for additional evi­
dence. A second recommendation of the same magnitude was 
made by the Hearing Examiner on June 11, I962. On July 11, 
1962, in the midst of a new appeal to the Commission, a 
question was brought up as to whether all evidence should 
be considered, or just that part developed in the subse­
quent re-hearing. On November 30, I962, the Commission
24ruled that in the public interest all should be heard. 
During the travesty of errors and indecision, Procter and 
Gamble-Clorox continued to operate as one firm.
In the 1963 re-hearing it was ruled that post­
acquisition data should not have been accepted unless it 
indicated that the market share had dwindled to insig­
nificance. In rejecting the argument of "efficiencies" or 
economies of scale, the Commission said that the only
00
Ibid., 1963-1965, par. l6,6?3.
2 3Federal Trade Commission Decisions, FTC Docket 
6901, V. 56, July 1, 1959 to June 30, I960, pp. I623-I626,
24Trade Regulation Reporter, Transfer Binder, 
Federal Trade Commission Complaints, Orders, Deputations, 
1963-1965, par. 16,673.
147
economy was a saving in the cost of sales promotion which 
did not contribute a social benefit. The Commission issued 
its final order of divestiture on December I5 , 1963 with 
only a slight modification of the divestiture order recom­
mended in the second instance by the hearing examiner.
Over seven years had elapsed since the initial com­
plaint but the Commission's order was appealed and the 
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the order of the Commis­
sion in 1966.^^
The Federal Trade Commission appealed to the Supreme 
Court and on April 11, I967 that body reversed and remanded 
the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals with instructions 
to affirm and enforce Federal Trade Commission order in 
Docket No. 69OI. The Court said:
A product-extension acquisition of the nation's 
leading manufacturer of household bleach, nearly 
50 per cent of the industry, by a large ($1 billion 
sales) diversified manufacturer of low cost, high 
turnover household products sold through grocery, 
drug, and department stores violated the Clayton Act 
since it had the following anticompetitive effects: 
the substitution of the powerful acquiring firm for 
the smaller but already dominant firm may substan­
tially reduce the competitive structure of the house­
hold bleach industry by raising entry barriers and 
by dissuading small firms from aggressively competing; 
and second, the acquisition eliminates the potential 
competition of the acquiring firm.
87 set 124‘¥TT
2^Ibid.
^^Trade Cases, I966, par. 71,713.
^^Trade Cases, I967, par. 72,06l (386 US 568,
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The Court further reasoned that the liquid bleach industry 
was oligopolistic before the acquisition and it was 
probable that the acquirer would become a price leader 
causing the oligopoly to become more rigid. The Court 
also said that Procter with its much larger advertising 
budget and its ability to divert funds to meet short term 
competitive threats would discourage new entrants. In 
concluding the Court explained that Procter had been the 
most-likely entrant into the liquid bleach market, and 
that its existence on the fringe of the bleach industry
28had exerted considerable influence on the market.
The Consolidated Foods and the Procter cases are 
representative of the complexities involved in the appli­
cation of the Celler-Kefauver amendment to Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act.
Even though the Federal Trade Commission has the 
primary responsibility for enforcing Section 7, the Depart­
ment of Justice has concurrent authority under Section I5 
of the Clayton Act. The Justice Department has one weapon 
with which the Federal Trade Commission does not possess. 
The Department has the authority under Section I5 of the 
Clayton Act to request a District Court to enjoin merger 
negotiations pending presentation of evidence to the 
Court. The efforts of the Federal Trade Commission to
^®Ibid.
149
secure injunctive authority comparable to the Justice 
Department will be discussed later.
Section 7 Cases Filed by the Department 
of Justice, 1956-1960
A total of 32 Section 7 complaints were filed in
1956-1960 by the Justice Department, and of these I5 were
settled by consent decrees, while six cases were dismissed
in district court proceedings, and 3 are pending in I968.
Nine cases were decided in favor of the government, and
2 97 of these 9 reached the Supreme Court. Two of the 
latter will be discussed; however, one case not brought 
under the Celler-Kefauver amendment will be mentioned as 
background.
In a case brought against duPont in 1949, the 
Department of Justice charged the company with violations 
of Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act in acquiring 23 per 
cent of the shares of General Motors (US v. E. I. duPont 
de Nemours, et al., 353 US 386). The primary issue was 
whether through ownership of the shares, duPont had secured 
control of General Motors and whether it had used that 
control to insure a protected market for its automobile 
finishes, and other products. Even though the lower court 
found that no such control existed, the Supreme Court 
reversed the decision in 1957 and unexpectedly relied on 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act as it existed prior to 1950.
^^Bock, pp. 230-243
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That reliance was based on the reasonable probability that 
the acquisition of the stock would likely result in the 
proscribed restraints. The Court also narrowed the product 
line to be considered as the "relevant market" in a Sec­
tion 7 case. The Court held that automobile finishes and 
fabrics had enough peculiar characteristics to make them 
a line of commerce within the meaning of the Clayton Act. 
The Court also ruled that the legality of the stock acqui­
sition would be tested "at a time whenever the reasonable 
likelihood appeared that the acquisition will result in a
restraint, or the creation of a monopoly on any kind of 
30commerce." The latter concept meant that Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act could be used against previously accom­
plished mergers 5 even back to 1914, as well as against 
current mergers.
In 1956, the Department of Justice brought its 
first major case under the Celler-Kefauver amendment to 
Section 7 (US v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.). The Bethlehem 
Steel Corporation had entered into an agreement with the 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company under which Bethlehem 
would acquire all the assets of Youngstown. At the time, 
Bethlehem was the second largest steel producer in the 
nation and Youngstown the sixth. The government sought 
to enjoin the proposed merger as a violation of Section 7 5
^^Trade Cases, 1957, par. 68,723 (353 US 586).
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but the Court denied the request. The ruling was based
upon the size of the industry and the effect an injunction
could have had on the economy as a whole. The presiding
judge also reasoned in his January 13, 1958 denial that
pre-trial conferences would hasten a decision in a trial
31to commence on April 7, 1958.
On November 20, 1958, the District Court held that 
the proposed merger would violate Section 7. The opinion 
stated that there would be a reasonable probability that 
the merger would substantially lessen competition; and the 
proposed merger would eliminate Youngstown as a substan­
tial buyer of certain steel products from other suppliers.
The defendant first argued that the merger would 
permit a more vigorous competition with the largest steel 
producer. The Court answered by asserting that if a merger 
offended the statute in any relevant market, good motives 
or even demonstrable effects would be irrelevant, and no 
defense. The lower court also stated that the merger pre­
sented an incipient threat that could provoke a chain 
reaction of mergers among the other 12 major steel pro­
ducers. Second, the defendant argued that a broad defini­
tion of the relevant market should be accepted as in the
32duPont-Cellophane case --which would tend to show that
^^Trade Cases, 1958, par. 68,914 (157 Fed Supp
877).
^^Trade Cases, 1956, par. 68,369 (351 US 377).
The court broadened the definition of product, or "line 
of commerce" by separating cellophane from other wrapping 
material.
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the total market for steel products would not be adversely- 
effected. The Court rejected that contention when it indi­
cated its preference for the narrower definition of "line 
of commerce," or product as set forth in the duPont-General 
Motors case. The Court also ruled that the "section of 
the country" phrase in Section 7, or the geographic market 
in this particular case would be nationwide. The "sec­
tion of the country," according to the Court, would also 
include that section of the northeastern United States 
where Youngstown primarily operated. The Court explained 
that under the Clayton Act the government's burden was met 
if it established a reasonable probability that competi­
tion would be substantially lessened. The opinion also 
said that a requirement of certainty and actuality of 
injury to competition would be incompatible with Section
7's purpose of supplementing the Sherman Act by reaching
3 3incipient restraints.
On October l6 , 1958j the Department of Justice 
filed a complaint in which it alleged that the Maryland 
and Virginia Milk Producers Association, an agricultural 
cooperative, had violated both the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts. This case was the first test of the exemptions to 
antitrust as spelled out in Section 6 of the Clayton Act.
The complaint alleged that the agricultural cooperative had:
^^Trade Cases, 1958, par. 69,189 (168 Fed Supp
576) .
153
Attempted to monopolize interstate trading in the 
supply of milk in the District of Columbia and areas 
of Maryland and Virginia in violation of Section 2 
of the Sherman Act.
Created a combination which had conspired to eliminate 
competition in the metropolitan Washington area by 
making and carrying out a contract for the transfer 
of substantially all of the assets of Embassy Dairy, 
a retail outlet in Washington, in violation of Sec­
tion 3 of the Sherman Act.
On July 26, 195^ purchased and acquired substantially 
all the assets of Embassy, and that the effects had 
been to substantially lessen competition or to tend 
to create a monopoly in the production and sale of 
milk in the Washington metropolitan area; and on 
December 6 , 1957 had purchased and acquired all the 
outstanding stock of Richfield Dairy Corporation and 
Simpson Brothers, Inc., both acquisitions being in 
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.3^
The agricultural cooperative pleaded an exemption 
from antitrust actions under Section 6 of the Clayton Act 
which placed it under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of 
Agriculture. The Court did not accept that plea. The 
Court ruled that when a firm subject to one of those agen­
cies listed in Section 6 transgressed and conspired with 
persons who were not in the agricultural pursuits, its 
actions were subject to both the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
The Court explained that under the permissive portion of 
Section 6 as it pertained to agricultural cooperatives-- 
the Capper-Volstead Act--the cooperative could monopolize 
food production and restrain commerce to the detriment of 
the public. On that basis, the Court dismissed the charge
45).
^^Trade Cases, 1958, par. 69,l6l (167 Fed Supp
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of monopoly as specified in Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The case was then tried on the conspiracy charge, Section 3
3 Sof the Sherman Act, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The government argued that the acquisition of 
Embassy, a "cut rate" dairy concern, by the cooperative 
was primarily for economic gain. The cooperative acquired 
Embassy's nearly $1 million government market. The govern­
ment's case was that (1 ) the acquisition eliminated a 
"cut rate" competitor; (2) the acquisition diminished 
competition since it eliminated a significant competitor;
(3 ) it reduced competition for the government market; and
(4) the acquisition increased concentration of the milk 
market in the Washington metropolitan area. The defendant 
contended that it did not achieve complete control of the 
market since a few strong independents remained in competi­
tion; that prices had not risen; and that the cooperative 
should be exempted from prosecution under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. The Court did not accept the defense argu-
36ment, and ordered a dissolution on November 21, 1958.
The Court had previously ruled that the Section 3, Sherman 
Act violation would be tried concurrently but separately. 
There the Court found that the transaction was entered
799) .
35lbid.
^^Trade Cases, 1958, par, 69,197 (167 Fed Supp
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37into with the intent and purpose of restraining trade »
The government appealed the case to the Supreme 
Court alleging that Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the 
monopoly allegation, should not have been dismissed by the 
lower court. The government also claimed that the dissolu­
tion order should have been more stringent. The defendant 
appealed for a review of the dissolution order. On May 2, 
i960, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court in its 
decision on Section 3, Sherman Act; the violation of Sec­
tion 7s Clayton Act; and it also upheld the dissolution 
order. The decision reversed the lower court on its dis­
missal of the Section 2, monopoly violation, and remanded
O Û
that portion of the case to the lower court for retrial.
In summary, the period I956-I96O saw the courts 
giving broader dimensions to antitrust law, but all of 
the contributions came from Department of Justice cases.
The significant cases of the Federal Trade Commission were 
still in the process of litigation.
The duPont-General Motors case, even though not 
filed as a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, was 
significant. The decision illustrated that any stock 
acquisition which occurred after the 1914 enactment of 
the original law--if there were a reasonable probability 
that competition would be lessened--would be in
^^Ibid., par. 69,24$.
^^Trade Cases, I96O, par. 69,694 (36O US 927).
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contravention of the statute. The same case narrowed the 
definition of line of commerce in a relevant market. In 
the Bethlehem case, the claim that a merger would make a 
firm better able to compete with its larger rivals was 
held invalid. In the same case it was held that a geo­
graphic market or section of the country could be con­
sidered as nationwide, regional, or both. The Court also 
held that the elimination of a significant competitor in 
both the buying and selling markets would be weighed 
heavily. In the Maryland-Virginia case, the Court held 
that Section 6 of the Clayton Act did not grant absolute 
immunity to concerns under jurisdiction of the Secretary 
of Agriculture. There could be antitrust action if there 
were a reasonable possibility that anticompetitive effects 
would result from a merger.
The application of the limited guide lines during 
the period I96I-I965 will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VI
EFFECTS OF AMENDED SECTION 7, CLAYTON ACT 
ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, I96I-I965
During the period I96I-I965, the Federal Trade 
Commission reported that over 4,500 mergers-acquisitions 
occurred in the manufacturing-mining sector of the economy, 
with over 1,000 occurring in 1965»^ The annual average 
of more than 9OO as compared to less than 8OO annually the 
preceding five year period would lend further support to 
a previous statement--the threat of Section 7 action had 
had no significant effect even when there was a more 
vigorous enforcement by the responsible agencies. A total 
of 90 Section 7 complaints were filed by the two enforce­
ment agencies in the period I96I-I965 as compared to 69
2
the preceding five year period. There were some landmark 
court decisions which will be discussed later, but even 
with the emergence of some anti-merger guide lines, the 
pace of mergers and acquisitions continued unabated.
Of the 90 Section 7 complaints, the Federal Trade





Commission filed only 22, as compared to 37 the preceding
3
five year period. The Commission continued its industry 
wide approach to the problem. Four complaints were filed 
against the cement industry; four against the grocery 
industry, and two were filed against department store 
chains. The increased use of consent decrees rather than 
court litigation continued as the operational procedure.
Of the 22 cases filed, 13 were settled by consent, 6 cases 
filed in 1964 and I965 were still pending, and divestiture 
was ordered by the Commission in two. In one case, divesti­
ture was delayed but an order of the Supreme Court enjoined
4
the co-mingling of assets. The record would indicate 
that the Commission had been more selective in its choice 
of cases since of the 13 consent decrees, nine were 
effected the same year the complaint was filed. Contrary 
to the previous five year period, the Commission had no 
cases in the federal court as a result of complaints filed 
in the I96I-I965 period.^
An explanation of the decrease in the number of 
complaints filed for Section ? violations can be found in 
the new procedures adopted by the Commission during the 
period. The increasing emphasis on the industry wide 
approach adopted in the preceding five year period would 
of itself result in a decline in numbers. In addition two
^Ibid. ^Ibid, ^Ibid.
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new procedures were adopted in I962 which were designed to 
forestall illegal business practices. One was the issu­
ance of Trade Regulation Rules which spelled out clearly 
what the Commission believed would be illegal about a par­
ticular business practice. The second was for the Com­
mission itself to give businessmen advisory opinions when­
ever requested as to whether a proposed merger would 
likely be challenged,^ Briefly, the latter course was 
adopted wherein the agency would accept a mere assurance 
of business that a particular practice would be discon­
tinued. That too, had its part in the declining number 
of formal complaints. The Commission cited statistics 
showing that in 1964, 4l6 assurances of discontinuance had 
been accepted compared with 239 in I963. (The majority 
were of Section 2 or price discrimination type complaints.) 
In any event the "assurance of discontinuance," though 
initially provided some 50 years before had never been 
used to any extent. The Commission adopted that approach
four times more frequently in the period I96I-I965 than it
■7
did in the preceding five year period.
In its 1965 report, the Commission emphasized that 
its policy of helping business comply with the law was 
much less costly and a happier alternative than filing a
^Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report, 1962,
p. 1.
7Ibid., Annual Report, 1964, pp. 1-2,
l6o
complaint. According to the agency, mere statistics would 
not truly reflect the accomplishments,, and the number of 
cases filed should be discounted. The FTC said the effect 
of Trade Regulation Rules and the advisory approach was 
manifested by a record of a declining number of case 
investigations, and a declining number of cases in liti-
g
gation. If the foregoing is a plausible explanation for 
the declining number of formal complaints, there is a sug­
gestion of an increased though unpublicized effectiveness 
of the Federal Trade Commission,
A further explanation of the decrease in number 
of complaints filed during the I96I-I965 period could be 
attributed to increased work placed on the Commission,
The work load received no more than passing mention in the 
FTC Annual Report for I962, but the increased work was the 
result of an entirely new approach by the Department of 
Justice to the anti-merger problem. Soon after the new 
national administration took office in I96I, Attorney 
General Robert F. Kennedy evidenced an interest in the 
progress of anti-merger work. He resorted to the seldom 
used Section 6(c) of the Clayton Act which provided that 
the Attorney General could call upon the Federal Trade 
Commission to investigate the degree of compliance with 
Department of Justice judgments and decrees obtained in
g
Ibid,, Annual Report, I966, pp, 1-5
I6l
9
district and higher courts.
The complexities incident to complying with the 
request necessitated additional manpower and funds for the 
Federal Trade Commission and a supplemental appropriation 
was g ra nt ed.Unque st io nably the voluminous amount of 
paper work and research attendant to each case added to 
the load of an already overburdened staff. The additional 
investigative work could have resulted in the Commission 
unconsciously de-emphasizing the importance of its own 
anti-merger work--the investigations consumed the better 
part of three years. Congressional observations and 
criticisms of the "Attorney General work burden" have 
been described in Chapter IV.
To sum up, there were three reasons for the 
declining number of Section 7 complaints. First, the 
industry wide approach would tend to eliminate filing of 
isolated complaints unless related to an industry; second, 
the use of Trade Regulation Rules and the business Ad­
visory Conferences; and third, the additional burden of 
work imposed by the Department of Justice request may 
have resulted in a de-emphasizing of Section ? inquiries.
9
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 
Appropriations, Hearings, 8?th Cong., 1st Sess., April 20.
1961, pp. 313-3l"51
^^U.S. The Budget, Fiscal Year Ending June 30,
1963 ° Appendix^ p. 8l4 explains the situation including 
the supplemental appropriation.
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The period I96I-I965 was significant in the number 
of Section 7 cases decided by the Supreme Court. Most of 
the cases will be discussed later since the majority were 
filed prior to 196I, and this immediate section deals with 
the filing of cases in the I96I-I965 period.
Four Section 7 Cases, 1961-I965
Two representative cases filed by the Federal 
Trade Commission during that period will be discussed.
One against a cement company is unique because of a juris­
dictional dispute. The second represents the Commission's 
drive against concentration in the food industry, and 
brings out both conglomerate and product extension aspects. 
Two cases filed by the Department of Justice during that 
period will also be discussed. One concerns the applica­
bility of Section 7 to joint ventures, and one concerns 
the applicability of Section 7 to bank mergers.
On July 15, 1963, the Federal Trade Commission 
filed a complaint against the Lone Star Cement Corporation, 
New York, charging a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act.^^ It was alleged that Lone Star's acquisitions of 
Pioneer Sand and Gravel Co., Seattle, Washington and 
Southern Materials Co., Inc., of Norfolk, Virginia, "may 
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
11Trade Regulation Reporter, Transfer Binder, 
Federal Trade Commission Complaints, Orders, Stipulations, 
1963-1965, FTC Docket 8585, par. 16,490.
163
monopoly" in the manufacture and sale of either portland 
cement or ready mix concrete; or, in both "lines of com­
merce" in the relevant "section of the country." Specifi­
cally it was charged that:
Lone Star was one of the three largest producers of 
Portland cement, an essential ingredient in the manu­
facture of ready mix concrete.
Pioneer was the largest supplier of ready mix concrete 
and one of the larger consumers of portland cement in 
the Seattle area. Lone Star was the principal sup­
plier.
Lone Star acquired Pioneer December 1, 1959 by pur­
chasing all of the capital stock of the Seattle con­
cern for #3.9 million.
Southern Materials was the largest supplier of ready 
mix concrete and the largest purchaser of portland 
cement in the Norfolk-Richmond, Virginia area; and 
the area of Jacksonville, Florida. Lone Star was the 
largest supplier of portland cement in Virginia and 
sold in Florida.
Lone Star acquired Southern August 153 1962 by ex­
changing about 750,000 shares of its stock valued at 
$l4 million for all Southern's assets.
Southern also manufactured concrete products and both 
Southern and Pioneer produced sand and gravel for 
their own use and for outside s a l e . 12
During the initial phases of the hearing, the Federal
Trade Commission listed specific adverse effects of the
acquisitions ;
Lone Star's present and future competitors have been 
and may be precluded from selling portland cement to 
a substantial consumer.
Lone Star's competitors have been or may be fore­
closed from a substantial share of the market for
l^ibid.
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Portland cement ; and Lone Star may be assured of a 
substantial share of that market.
Entry of new sellers of portland cement, ready mix 
concrete or concrete products may be inhibited or pre­
vented.
Further integration of suppliers and consumers of 
Portland cement may result.
As an integrated manufacturer and seller of portland 
cement, ready mix concrete, and concrete products,
Lone Star has achieved or may achieve a decisive com­
petitive advantage over non-integrated competition.
Prior to its acquisition of Pioneer and Southern 
Materials, Lone Star had, it now has, and after the 
divestiture sought in this proceeding, it will con­
tinue to have, such a significant position in the sale 
of Portland cement in the four areas in question, and 
in every other section where it sells that any acqui­
sition of it of a corporate seller of ready mix con­
crete or concrete products in any of these sections 
may result in a substantial lessening of competition 
or tendency toward monopoly.^3
After limited pre-trial proceedings, the respondent moved
for a dismissal of that portion regarding the Seattle
area. Lone Star argued that business in that area was
strictly local and therefore not subject to Federal Trade
Commission jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. The Hearing Examiner denied the motion for dismissal.
The examiner observed that since the proceedings were
incomplete, there was no evidence upon which to judge the
l4intra or interstate character of the acquisition.
^^Ibid.
^^Trade Cases, 1964, par. 71j322. History of 
initial hearing taken from case record of the Court of 
Appeals, 9th Circuit.
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In the course of further pre-trial procedures, 
the Commission on January 24, 1964 authorized the taking 
of testimony from witnesses in Seattle. A list of those 
witnesses, all in the concrete and cement business, was 
furnished the respondent. It was explained that the wit­
nesses would furnish information showing that the acquisi­
tion of the Virginia firm (Pioneer) would have the pro­
scribed anti-competitive effects. On February ?, 1964, 
the Commission upheld the Hearing Examiner's denial to 
dismiss the Seattle acquisition from the complaint on the 
basis that the hearing had not been completed.
Even though the Commission's announced intent was 
to have Seattle expert witnesses testify only on the proba­
ble anticompetitive effect of the Virginia acquisition, 
Lone Star speculated that testimony in the Seattle issue 
would be taken concurrently. Lone Star therefore assumed 
that the Commission would then base its final action on 
both aspects. Lone Star appealed to the proper federal 
court for injunctive relief
Lone Star pleaded for injunctive relief on the 
ground that the Federal Trade Commission had exceeded its 
jurisdiction as provided by Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
The respondent again contended that the Act embraced only 
interstate transactions. Lone Star also pleaded that
l^Ibid.
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irreparable injury would be caused by the proceeding. The
latter plea was based on injury to its reputation among
its customers, and that preparation for defense against an
allegation without foundation would be costly and time 
16consuming.
The District Court denied the relief sought. The 
denial of the jurisdictional matter was on the same basis 
used by the Commission--that facts as developed in the 
hearing did not enable anyone to decide on a determination 
of jurisdiction. The Court explained it could set aside a 
determination made by an administrative agency, but in the 
case at hand, the case had not been tried by the adminis­
trative agency as provided by statute. The Court relied 
on the earlier Brown Shoe decision in specifying that 
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, an inquiry could be 
made into a local matter where the acquisition of such a 
local firm by an interstate firm could lessen competition. 
In overruling Lone Star's allegation that it would suffer 
irreparable injury because of the proceeding, the Court 
stated that burden and inconvenience of preparing for a 
Commission hearing was not in itself enough to show a 
necessity for invoking the equity powers of the Court.
The Court added that the respondent always had the right 
to appeal any final Federal Trade Commission order to a
^^Trade Cases, 1964, par. 71,158. District Court 
proceedings,
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higher court in an effort to secure relief. The Commis­
sion moved for dismissal of the matter which the Court 
granted. Lone Star filed a cross motion for a summary 
judgment which was denied on June 1?, 1964.^^
Lone Star appealed the decision of the lower court. 
On December 8, 1964, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the decision of the lower Court, The Court specified that 
the Federal Trade Commission had not had the opportunity 
to develop facts on which to base jurisdictional findings. 
The Court also indicated there was no evidence reflecting 
on the competency of the Commission to make a factual 
jurisdictional decision. Concerning the allegation of 
irreparable injury, the Court ruled that neither incon­
venience nor the burden of preparation would be the types
JL 8of injury which would be protected by an injunction.
The foregoing demonstrates some of the complexi­
ties, pitfalls, and delaying tactics possible in anti­
merger litigation. The Federal Court's injection into a 
matter which by statute was still under the jurisdiction 
of the Federal Trade Commission further confused the issue 
and prevented an earlier decision,
A consent order to cease and desist was approved 
by the Commission on January 13, 1965. Lone Star was
^^Ibid.
18Trade Cases, 1964, par. 71,322,
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ordered to divest itself of 25 of 31 ready mix concrete
19plants in Virginia, Florida, and in Seattle, Washington.
The Federal Trade Commission won its jurisdictional battle 
along with further support--mergers with vertical aspects 
and acquisitions of purely local concerns by an interstate 
firm could be a violation of Section 7 as amended.
Another case of interest was filed by the Federal 
Trade Commission during the 196I-I965 period. It was 
against General Foods Corporation (GF) of White Plains,
New York, one of the largest manufacturers and distributors 
of packaged grocery products. The complaint issued on 
September 30, I963 alleged that the acquisition of the 
S.O.S. Company (SOS), Chicago, Illinois, a dominant pro­
ducer of household steel wool, by General Foods was in
20violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The complaint set forth that the acquisition "may
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly" in the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of household steel
wool products in the following ways:
Other producers as well as potential producers have 
been or may be precluded from competing with GF due 
to one or more of these factors:
GF's dominant market position.
GF's financial resources.
GF's economic power.
19Trade Regulation Reporter, Transfer Binder, 
Federal Trade Commission Complaints, Orders, Stipulations, 
1963-1965, par. 17,183.
on
Ibid., par. l6 ,6l2.
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GF's advertising abilities and experience in 
marketing.
GF's merchandising and promotional abilities.
GF's comprehensive line of packaged grocery 
products.
GF's ability to command consumer acceptance, and 
its ability to command prime grocery shelf 
space.
GF's ability to concentrate on one of its 
products, or one selected section of the 
country, the full impact of its advertising, 
promotional, and merchandising experience.
The already high concentration in the industry has 
been or may be further increased.
Entry in the household steel wool industry has been 
or may be discouraged and inhibited.
A dominant producer of household steel wool has been 
absorbed into, and combined with one of the nation's 
largest producers and marketers of packaged grocery 
products which is also one of the nation's largest 
advertisers.^1
The complaint further alleged that GF acquired all 
the assets of SOS plus a subsidiary on December 1, 1957 
for about $17*5 million of GF common stock. At the time 
SOS was the largest marketer of household steel wool (soap 
pads) accounting for 51 per cent of the national market 
with only one major competitor (Brillo) accounting for 
46.7 per cent. There were two smaller firms accounting 
for about 1 per cent each in the national market.
The Commission explained that GF had entered a 
market in which it was not a customer, supplier, or com­
petitor and replaced the largest producer in that market. 
General Foods, according to the Commission, had sales in
^^Ibid.
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excess of #1 billion annually, and GF had entered into an 
industry having only four small firms, none of whom had 
sales in excess of $17 million annually. The Commission 
claimed that the acquisition had upset and realigned the 
basic competitive structure in the household steel wool 
industry--SOS's share of the national market increased 
from 51 per cent to 57 per cent in four years. The Com­
mission further charged that the SOS brand on household 
steel wool when backed by GF, the nation's third largest 
advertiser, received substantial advertising discounts. 
Finally, the FTC claimed that SOS, through its affiliation 
with GF, was able to acquire valuable grocery store shelf 
space to the disadvantage of other marketers--other house­
hold steel wool producers did not have the expansive line
22of packaged grocery products marketed by General Foods.
During the extensive pre-trial hearings common to 
such a complaint. General Foods on March 31» 1964 filed a 
motion with the Commission requesting that the trial attor­
neys supply GF with an identification of all documentary 
evidence upon which official notice would probably be taken. 
The respondent also asked that the Commission enter an 
order directing that official notice not be taken of such 
documentary evidence until GF had had the opportunity to 
present rebuttal through oral argument. In denying the 
motion on April 3» 1964, the Commission explained that
B^Ibid.
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under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, no such
order would be necessary, and quoted:
. . . where any agency decision rests on official 
notice of a material fact not appearing in the evi­
dence on record, any party on timely request shall 
be afforded an opportunity to show the contrary. . . .
The Act, according to the Commission, did not preclude 
administrative agencies from relying upon pertinent refer­
ence material in their file to the same extent as the
23Supreme Court and other federal tribunals. The case,
U.S. V. Philadelphia National Bank, to be discussed later, 
was cited as the authority.
In the hearings which lasted nine months, an ini­
tial recommendation for divestiture, and cease and desist
24was made by the Hearing Examiner on December 30, 1964.
The Hearing Examiner in his findings stated that Commission 
attorneys had presented evidentiary support for all the 
allegations. The findings also emphasized that Brillo, 
the second largest producer of household steel wool at the 
time of the acquisition, had been gradually losing its 
market share since GF had entered.
As a result of that declining market share, accord­
ing to the evidence as outlined by the Hearing Examiner, 
Brillo had been forced into a 1963 merger with Purex, a 
much larger firm. In ruling that household steel wool 
(soap pads) was a separate "line of commerce" from other
^^Ibid., par. 16,482. ^^Ibid., par. 17,l6l.
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type soap pads sold by GF and others, the market was 
defined as one of "product extension." The finding con­
cluded that the merger fell within the proscription of 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Hearing Examiner cited 
as his authority, the favorable court decision in another 
"product extension" case, that of Procter and Gamble. 
(Procter and Gamble discussed in Chapter V.) The Federal 
Trade Commission upheld the findings of the Hearing 
Examiner.
General Foods petitioned the Federal Court to 
review and set aside the order of the Commission. On 
November 9, 1967, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 3rd 
Circuit, affirmed the order of the Commission.
In its findings the Court pointed out several
factors :
The fact that the Commission did not make a special 
finding with regard to whether a product was sold by 
special vendors, or to special customers did not indi­
cate that the relevant market had been incorrectly 
determined. There was no requirement that each of 
seven criteria for determining relevant markets 
enumerated in Brown Shoe must be present in each 
merger case.
There was evidence to support an industry recognition 
of the household steel wool submarket as a separate 
economic entity in the household soap pad business.
There was evidence to support the contention of the 
Commission that household steel wool soap pads sold at 
distinct prices when compared to other soap pads.
25ibid.
^^Trade Cases, 1967, par, 72,269, CA3 (386 F . 2d. 
936).
173
The Commission correctly determined that steel wool 
required unique production facilities, comparatively 
large and expensive machinery not available on the 
open market, and that it cannot be used for other than 
steel wool production.
The Commission correctly determined that the acquisi­
tion raised already high entry barriers.
The Commission correctly determined that through 
extensive advertising and promotional ventures, GF 
was able to induce potential customers to buy soap 
pads at a discount based on pooled purchases from 
other GF divisions.
That concentration, by eliminating competition, dis­
turbed the previous balance between the dominant firms. 
While not the aim of antitrust policy merely to pre­
serve competitive balance it assuredly is the aim of 
such policy to preserve whatever competition exists 
even though it is of an oligopolistic nature.^7
The Court recognized that General Foods was not a 
potential competitor in the household steel wool soap pad 
market. Further the Court said it was not necessary to 
show that the acquisition of one of two dominant firms 
was unlawful because the Supreme Court had already declared 
that a "product extension" merger was illegal in the Proc-
28ter and Gamble case.
The Penn-Olin and Philadelphia National Bank cases 
were as significant as any of the 68 Section 7 cases filed 
by the Department of Justice during I96I-I965. Both can 
be considered landmark cases in the development of anti­
merger law as decided by the Supreme Court.
The status of joint ventures was the issue in the
^^Ibid. ^®Ibid.
174
1961 case U.S. v. Penn-Olin Chemical C o m p a n y . T h e  
Pennsalt Chemicals Company, and the Olin-Mathieson Chemi­
cal Company, a multi million dollar firm, jointly formed 
the Penn-Olin Chemical Company to produce and sell sodium 
chlorate in the southeastern market of the United States. 
Each was to own 5O per cent of the stock and a plant was 
to be built in Kentucky to supply the intended market. 
Sodium chlorate was used in the pulp and paper industry 
in a relatively new process. Although the market was 
burgeoning, Olin-Mathieson had never produced and marketed 
the chemical in any area. Pennsalt had an insignificant 
sodium chlorate market in the southeast because of the 
location of its plant in western United States. Olin- 
Mathieson and Pennsalt had an agreement, which had been 
in existence for several years whereby Olin-Mathieson 
would sell Pennsalt's production of sodium chlorate in 
the southeastern market. This arrangement was superseded 
by the joint venture. The government charged that the 
joint venture firm, Penn-Olin Chemical Company, would sub­
stantially lessen competition in both the sodium chlorate 
market and non-chlorate market in violation of Section 7* 
In an amended complaint the government also charged that 
the sales and production agreements previously entered 
into by the two firms were in contravention to Section 1
^^Trade Cases, 19&3, par. 70,762 (217 Fed. Supp.
110).
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of the Sherman Act.^^
During the trial it was disclosed that prior to 
the joint venture arrangement, two firms, Hooker Chemical 
Company and the American Potash Company, both multimillion 
dollar concerns, were dominant in the southeastern market 
and had supplied 91*3 per cent of that market. The govern­
ment centered its attack upon the various aspects of poten­
tial competition which the joint venture would negate.
The government argued that either or both firms could have 
individually entered the market. Only passive attention 
was given to the adverse effects of the joint venture on 
existent competition. The plaintiff also argued that the 
financial resources of the joint venture would, in time, 
make it dominant in the sodium chlorate market. The govern­
ment seemingly discounted the resources of Hooker and 
American. The government maintained that entry into the 
market would be foreclosed after Penn-Olin reached peak 
operation despite the fact that the Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
Corporation had entered that market after Penn-Olin came 
into being in I96O. The government insisted that there was 
a reasonable probability that both Olin-Mathieson and 
Pennsalt would build plants in the southeast, but the 
Court rejected this assumption since neither firm had 
built in that area at the time of the suit. The Court
3°lbid,
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observed that since Penn-Olin had entered the southeastern 
market both the dominant firms, Hooker and American Potash, 
had made very substantial efforts to hold their customers, 
and some of the two firms' efforts had even preceded the 
actual operational status of the joint venture. That evi­
dence, according to the Court, would indicate an even more 
vigorous competition in the relevant market. The Court 
concluded that all combinations were not per se anticom- 
petitive--some could even stimulate competition, and Penn- 
Olin could be such a combination. On May 1, 1963, the
case was dismissed as not being violative of the pro-
31scribing statutes.
The government appealed to the Supreme Court and
on June 22, 1964 the Court remanded the proceedings to the
32District Court for further considerations. The Court 
took the position that if the parent companies were in 
competition, or might have competed without the joint 
venture, it would be assumed that neither parent would 
compete with its "progeny" in its line of commerce. The 
Court added that basically the same consideration should 
apply to a joint venture as would be applicable to a 
merger. According to the Court, the joint venture ended 
any threat of one or the other firm being on the outer 
limits of the market and continually threatening to enter.
^^Ibid<
3^Trade Cases, 1964, par, 71,14? (375 US 938).
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The Court differed substantially with the lower court's 
negative assessment of a lessening of competition. In 
its remand, several suggestions were made in that area 
which were:
Number and power of competitors in the relevant 
market.
The background of growth, and the power of joint ven­
tures .
The relationship of their lines of commerce.
The competition existing between them and the power 
of each in dealing with the competitors of the other,
The setting in which the joint venture was created.
The reasons and necessities for its existence.
The joint venture's line of commerce and relation­
ship thereof to that of its parents.
The adaptability of its line of commerce to non­
competitive practices.
The potential power of the joint venture in the 
relevant market.
An appraisal of what the competition in the relevant 
market would have been if one of the joint venturers 
had entered it alone instead of through Penn-Olin.
The effect in the event of that occurrence of the 
other joint venturer's potential competition.
Any other factors that might indicate potential risk 
to competition in the relevant market.
In its remand, the Court also reminded the lower
Court that the mandate of Congress was in terms of a
probable lessening of competition as distinguished from
a "present restraint." Mr. Justice Douglas dissented
33ibid.
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stating that the agreement between competitors was a 
per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and 
that such an agreement would have the effect of lessening 
competition. On that basis, Justice Douglas favored a 
reversal rather than the remand for additional considera­
tion. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. He said that the 
decision of the lower court should have been affirmed, 
and in his opinion the remand was merely giving the
government an opportunity to retrieve a lost antitrust 
34case.
The District Court dismissed the suit on 
October 12, 1965.^^ In its comments on the independent 
entry hypothesis the Court reasoned that the government 
had been unable to establish a preponderance of evidence 
that either party individually would have entered the 
relevant market without the joint venture. That reason­
ing was based on the evidence of probable unprofitability 
of an independent operation as presented by Penn-Olin.
The Court for the most part repeated its reasons for 
dismissal as set forth originally such as:
It was impossible to conclude as a matter of rea­
sonable probability that each of the parties would 
have built chlorate plants.
It was reasonable to assume that Penn-Olin would 
be a more effective competitor than either
3^ibid.
^^Trade Cases, I965, par. 71,571 (246 Fed. Supp.
917).
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Olin-Mathieson or Pennsalt individually, if one had 
built in the southeast.
Even assuming either Pennsalt or Olin-Mathieson would 
have entered absent the joint venture, the government 
had been unable to prove that the effect might be to 
substantially lessen competition.36
The Court concluded that it had given both parties an 
opportunity to submit additional evidence. The govern­
ment had not seen fit to add additional facts, and the
decision to dismiss had been based upon the remand evidence
37plus the evidence presented in the first trial.
Justice Harlan's dissent may have ended with a
proper conclusion--the government had a chance to retrieve
a lost cause. The dissent is further borne out in the
District Court's findings in the remand which were the
same as in the initial dismissal. As Pegrum stated,
. . . the prolonging of litigation in this fashion
would seem to call for either a clarification of the 
respective roles of the trial courts and the Supreme 
Court or a more definitive statement of the tests of 
law that can be understood by both.3°
A 1961 case, U.S. v. Philadelphia National Bank
and Girard Corn Exchange Bank involved the first test of
39the Bank Merger Act of i960. The Department of Justice 
filed a complaint on February 25, 196I charging the 




^^Trade Cases, 1962, par. 70,197 (201 Fed. Supp.
l8o
and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The complaint alleged
that the merger would:
Increase concentration unreasonably in the Philadelphia 
area thereby lessening competition, since commercial 
banking with its integral parts fulfilled a unique 
role unduplicated by other services.
Destroy the foundation of the banking system which 
rested upon a number of independently owned banks.
Increase costs and interest rates to depositors and 
borrowers due to the undue concentration.^®
During the trial, the respondents challenged the applica­
bility of either the Sherman or Clayton Acts. The banks 
maintained that the Bank Merger Act of I96O exempted 
them from antitrust actions since the merger had been 
approved by the Comptroller of Currency. The approval,
according to the banks, had been received the day before
4lthe Department of Justice filed its action.
The question of jurisdiction was likewise involved 
in the Maryland-Virginia Milk Producers case, previously 
discussed. In that action the respondents plead that 
the Clayton Act itself exempted the firm since they were 
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agriculture.
The Court however rejected that plea» The respondents 
in the Philadelphia Bank case conjectured that the Bank 
Merger Act of i960 had been conceived in a different 




Both parties to the action had a history of pre­
vious acquisitions and both had been extensively engaged 
in the "unique" commercial banking business in the Phila­
delphia area. Each bank had assets in the $ one billion 
range, and each bank had loans of about $.5 billion of
which about half were in the commercial and industrial
, 42category.
It was stipulated early in the trial that the 
Comptroller of Currency had approved the merger despite 
the admonitions of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Attorney General. 
Each commented that the merger could possibly violate 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act since the merged firm would 
control about half the deposits in the Philadelphia area. 
Early testimony indicated that the Comptroller of Currency 
had tested the validity of the merger by use of a "public 
interest" yard stick rather than the broader anti-trust 
or anti-monopoly standards. The Court stated that it 
could find statements in the legislative history of the 
Bank Merger Act which indicated an intention to preclude 
anti-trust application. On the other hand the Court 
observed, there were specific references in both Senate 
and House debates on the bank bill which stated unequivo­
cally that the act would not circumvent the applicability
43of either the Clayton or the Sherman Acts.
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid.
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On January 15, 19^2 the Court entered judgment in 
favor of the defendants. The Court reasoned about as fol­
lows :
The approval of the merger by the Comptroller of Cur­
rency did not preclude Department of Justice challenge.
But amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act applied to 
only an illegal acquisition of stock or assets by a 
corporation under the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Trade Commission. The bank merger was not in that 
category. The banks merged to form a new association 
with each contributing all their assets. The fact 
that certificates representing shares of stock were 
exchanged for new ones was only incidental to the 
transaction.
Interchangeability and "peculiar characteristics" 
have the same rule for testing except in a different 
language.
The relevant market is commercial banking in general 
rather than specific services.
The conglomeration of services offered by a bank 
sets it off from other financial institutions.
Commercial banking viewed collectively had sufficient 
peculiar characteristics which negated reasonable 
interchangeability.
The relevant geographic market for testing the com­
petitive effects of the merger was a greater part of 
the northeastern United States and not the four 
county area defined by the government. (The court 
considered the origin of the bank's business and 
also alternatives available to customers, and found 
neither were limited to political boundaries. The 
banks competed in international, national, regional, 
and local markets dependent upon the particular service 
and the customer involved.)
The qualitative substantiality test was distinguished 
from quantitative substantiality was rejected on the 
basis that all relevant factors should be approached, 
not merely the probable market share,
^^Ibid.
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The Court made further observations as a result of its
interpretation of other evidence offered during the trial.
Some of the more significant postulations were:
The proposed merger would not even violate the pro­
scribing statutes if only the four county area were 
considered. Concentration in commercial banking would 
increase but the new bank would not have the power to 
control the price and supply of credit. A substantial 
competitor would be eliminated however competition 
would be more vigorous.
Though entry in the banking field in the area would 
be difficult it would be only conjecture that a new 
firm would not enter.
The history of mergers-acquisitions in which the two 
banks had engaged reflected only valid business rea­
sons .
Anti-competitive effects in the area would be minimal 
and the merged banks could better compete with other 
cities that had been draining the area of banking 
business.
There was no reasonable probability that the merger 
would create a monopoly, and there would be no unrea­
sonable restraint of trade even in the four county 
area.
Since it had been found that the merger was reasonable 
under the law and not in violation of Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act, therefore it could not have violated 
the more stringent standards of the Sherman Act.’5
The government had won only one point--an action under
the Bank Merger Act of I960 could be challenged by the
Department of Justice.
The Department of Justice appealed the case to
the Supreme Court. On June 17, 1963 that body reversed
the decision of the lower court and remanded the case
^^Ibid.
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46for appropriate disposition. The Court reasoned that
amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act was applicable to
bank mergers by explaining that:
Section 7 applied to bank mergers through an exchange 
of stock even though the proposed merger is neither 
an acquisition of corporate stock or an acquisition 
of corporate assets by a corporation subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission.
The proposed merger was neither a pure assets acquisi­
tion nor an acquisition of pure stock but something 
in between. Prior to 1950 it had been held that Sec­
tion 7 of the Clayton Act did not apply to mergers 
which did not involve a stock purchase. Then that 
assets loophole was closed to include assets as well 
as a reenactment of the stock proviso. On that basis 
it must be deemed to have been expanded to include
at the very least all acquisitions by merger of con­
solidation which involved a transfer of stock of the 
parties.
Congress' objective in including the language "cor­
porations subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Trade Commission" in Section 7 was not to limit the 
scope but to counteract adverse court decisions which 
had limited the Commission's divestiture power.’7
In its comment on the applicability of the Bank
Merger Act of I960, the Court held:
The Act of i960 which directed banking agencies to 
consider anti-competitive effects did not immunize 
approved bank mergers from an anti-trust challenge.
The Comptroller of Currency is not required to give 
any considerable weight to such effects, to hold 
hearings, or to provide for judicial review. The 
House and Senate both have stated that the Act would 
not affect the applicability to the antitrust laws.’®
The Court held that the relevant line of commerce 
for purposes of testing the legality of the Clayton Act
^^Trade Cases, 1963, par. 70,812 (369 US 883). 
^^Ibid. ^®Ibid.
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were products and services. Products were found to be the 
various kinds of credit made available by the bank. Ser­
vices were found to be checking accounts, and administration 
of trusts, and the like. The Court rejected the lower 
Court's definition of the relevant geographic area as 
being the entire northeastern tier of states. The Court 
held that the relevant area would be the four county 
area as argued by the government since it was in that
area that the majority of the merged bank's business 
49originated.
In outlining the effects on competition as a
result of the merger, the Court held that:
The merger would result in a single bank controlling 
30 per cent of the commercial banking business in 
the relevant four county area. It would result in 
the merged bank plus one other controlling 50 per cent 
of all commercial banking in the area, and that would 
substantially lessen competition.
The fact that dissatisfied customers had 40 other 
banks in the area, other than the merged bank, with 
which to transact business did not offset the demon­
strated anti-competitive effects. The Clayton Act 
was designed to arrest the trend toward concentration 
before consumer alternatives disappeared through 
merger.50
In rejecting the lower court's assumption that
the merged bank would be better able to compete with out
of state banks, the Court referred to countervailing
powers as "defense," reasoning that:
The fact that the merged bank could better compete 
with New York banks for very large loans would not
^^Ibid. ^°Ibid<
186
justify the merger. If anti-competitive effects in 
one market could be justified by pro-competitive 
effects in another, then every firm in the industry 
could, without violating the Clayton Act, embark on 
a series of mergers that would make it as large as 
the industry leader.51
It had been argued in the lower court that as a
result of the merger, social and economic benefits would
accrue to the community. The Court rejected that argument
by stating that:
The fact that an otherwise illegal merger of two 
banks might give such benefits to the community in 
which the banks were located such as a stimulation 
to the area's social and economic development could 
not save the merger. Not only is a value choice 
beyond the limits of the judicial competence, but 
Congress had made the choice by choosing to presume
a competitive e c o n o m y . 52
With the exception of the Penn-Olin case, the 
litigations described have been favorable to the govern­
ment. For the first time since the enactment of the 
Celler-Kefauver Act (Amended Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act) there were some definitive Court interpretations 
upon which to base future procedures in anti-merger liti­
gation. By the same token, those same decisions could 
act as guides to business when it considered external 
expansion.
Several other cases considered to be landmark 
in the anti-merger field have also been decided in the 
1960's. With one exception however, all were initiated 
in the 1950's. Because of their added significance in
S^Ibid. 5^Ibid.
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the emergence of anti-merger guide lines, they will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VIII
EMERGING GUIDE LINES FROM OTHER SUPREME COURT
INTERPRETATIONS OF AMENDED SECTION 7
The Brown Shoe case decided in I962 is probably 
the best known of all the anti-merger cases decided by 
the Supreme Court.^ It is considered a landmark case 
since it was the first higher court determinative interpre­
tation of amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Section 7 
had been utilized in the Bethlehem case though not in the 
detail as in the Brown case.
The application of Section 7 to vertical and hori­
zontal aspects was clarified as well as the meaning of 
"line of commerce" and "any section of the country."
Martin said that the policy pronounced in this case would
have prevented the development of the oligopoly structure 
in American industry had it been adopted in 1895 when the
problem of regulating corporate mergers was temporarily
2
relegated to the states in the E. C. Knight case.
^Trade Cases, I962, par. 70,366. (370 US 294)
2
David D. Martin, "The Brown Shoe Case and the 




On July 25» 1955i the directors of the Brown Shoe 
Company, predominantly a shoe manufacturer, and the 
G. R. Kinney Company, predominantly a shoe retailer, 
voted to submit a stock exchange plan to their stock­
holders. If adopted, it would have resulted in Brown 
acquiring control of Kinney by placing the combined assets 
in a separate subsidiary corporation. On November 28,
1955> the Department of Justice charged that the proposed 
merger was in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 
and the department moved for injunctive relief under Sec­
tion 15 of that Act. A temporary restraining order was 
granted by the District Court without argument. Ironi­
cally, the Department of Justice made its move just 2 days 
before the stockholders of Brown and Kinney were to vote
3
on the proposed merger.
On January 13, 1956, the Court dissolved the 
temporary restraining order based upon the equities of 
the case. (Both firms suffered under the restraints) As 
an alternative the Court ordered the issuance of a tem­
porary conditional injunction which would not prevent the 
consummation of the merger. The conditions were that 
title to all assets would be held by the subsidiary cor­
poration which was to operate independently of Brown or 
Kinney directors, and that the subsidiary would retain all
^Trade Cases, 1956, par. 68,244,
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k
earnings as a completely independent operation.
During the hearing, the government described a 
trend toward concentration in the shoe business. It was 
explained that Brown, primarily a manufacturer of shoes 
since its incorporation in 1913» had sold men’s, women's, 
and children’s shoes under a number of brands. There was 
trend, according to the government, toward favoring chain 
store retailing, and with a sharp decline in the number 
of independents to whom Brown sold. Brown had entered 
retailing in a substantial way as did other manufacturers. 
Brown’s number of franchised dealers, according to the 
government, had increased from 449 in 1950 to 587 by 1955= 
The government was further stated in the support of the 
"trend" argument that Brown had acquired Wohl Shoe Com­
pany, in 1951 which had 250 retail outlets in 125 store 
locations, and that this number had increased to 350 out­
lets in 193 locations by 1955= Further, in 1954, Brown 
acquired the Regal Shoe Company with 110 retail outlets 
and that this number had decreased to 98 by 1955= The 
government asserted that the two acquisitions, and Brown’s 
originally franchised dealers each handled Brown manu­
factured shoes. Wohl and Regal, however, were allowed 
the handling of other brands as well. Testimony was to 
the effect that Brown was responsible for more than 4 per 




third in the industry. Evidence also showed that Brown, 
plus each of its acquisitions, controlled less than 1 
per cent of all retail outlets.
Kinney, according to the government, was primarily 
a retailer and wholesaler of men's, women's, and children's 
shoes and sold about one half of one per cent of the 
national shoe production through 36O retail outlets in 
325 cities, towns, and shopping centers in 44 states.^
The shoe industry, both manufacturing and retail, was 
manifestly a fragmented industry and the government 
sought to prove that acquisitions in such a market con­
dition would tend to lessen competition.
In support of its fragmentation theory, the gov­
ernment cited Bureau of Census reports which reported that 
the estimated total shoe production for the four largest 
firms which included Brown amounted to 23 per cent in 1939 
and only a little more than 22 per cent in 1954. The 
largest eight companies produced 28 per cent of total 
production in both 1939 and 1954, and the largest 50 shoe 
manufacturers produced about 51 per cent of the total in 
1939 but that percentage had declined to 46 per cent by
1954.G
Brown contended that the merger with Kinney would 
give Kinney financial resources for plant improvement ;
^Ibid. ^Ibidc
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that it would permit Kinney to handle a more complete line 
of shoes with the addition of the Brown line and thereby 
keep pace with changing conditions; and lastly, the merger
7
would make Kinney more competitive»
In the description of the subsequent proceedings, 
it should be explained that the judge to whom the Brown 
case was initially assigned, died in July 1956, and no 
further action was taken until August 1957» Because of 
the lengthy pre-trial conferences, it was not until the 
following August that the case was finally called for 
trial. After testimony was completed in January 1959, 
the matter was set aside for the filing of briefs and the 
case was not taken under advisement until August 1, 1959° 
The final decision was handed down by the District Court 
on December l4, 1959° The decision declared that the 
Brown-Kinney merger was in violation of Section 7 of the
g
Clayton Act.
The case had been in litigation over four years. 
Some of the delay could be explained by the death of the 
judge. Additional delay could conceivably be attributed 
to a very cautious approach by the District Court. The 
Court had no higher court precedent or guideline as to 
what would constitute a "substantial lessening of
^Ibid,
o
Trade Cases, 1959, par. 69,532. (179 Fed. Supp
721) .
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competition" as proscribed by the amended Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act.
The Court selected three issues for determination: 
(l) the effect of the merger on competition; (2) the rele­
vant "line of commerce;" and (3) the relevant market, or 
"section of the country." In its decision that the merger 
violated Section 7, the Court reasoned that the effect on 
competition would be:
Concentration in the shoe industry would be increased 
in both manufacturing and retailing. The combination 
would be the largest retailer in the nation with a 
market share of 5’7 per cent.
Other manufacturers would be affected since the 
acquired chain (Kinney) would be a smaller market 
for their products.
Other retailers would be adversely affected since 
advantages would inure to the chain from its affinity 
with the manufacturer.
In the retailing field, the chain (Kinney) would be 
eliminated as a substantial competitor of B r o w n , 9
The Court said that the relevant "line of com­
merce" was men's, women's, and children's shoes, each 
considered separately. Each had its peculiar character­
istics to make it distinguishable from all other products. 
The Court's rationale was that men's, women's and chil­
dren's shoes were manufactured separately, and were dif­
ferent in style, quality and price. The classification, 
according to the Court, was recognized by the industry and
^Ibid,
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by the p u b l i c . T h e  Court held that the relevant market 
(section of the country) was the whole nation as far; as . , 
manufacturing was concerned since both Brown and Kinney 
had operated nationwide.
The retail market conversely would be a city of a 
population of 10,000 and over, and its immediate surround­
ing area in which both firms had stores. The government 
had contended that the retail market should be nationwide 
just as the manufacturing market. The respondent con­
tended that the retail market should be a standard metro­
politan area which it defined as an economic unit normally 
the result of a consolidation of political units delineated 
by the flow of commerce. The Court reasoned that the 
10,000 population figure was proper because:
Kinney, a family type store, operated primarily in 
cities of that size or larger. Brown had stores, and 
leased stores in such size cities. There were l4l 
such cities in which both firms had stores, and their 
competition was the dealer in the "downtown area."^^
The Court withheld its divestiture order explaining
that the disposition of stock and assets of the acquired
12firms could have had a far reaching economic effect.
The respondent appealed the case to the Supreme
Court and in June 1962, the decision of the District Court 
13was affirmed. The Supreme Court first discussed the
l°Ibid. l^Ibid. ^^Ibid.
l^Trade Cases, 1962, par. 70,366. (370 US 294)
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legislative history of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and
concluded that the intent of Congress was to arrest undue
concentration in its incipiency. The Court listed eight
factors which would be considered in its evaluation of the
validity of a merger, and they were:
Congress intended to "plug the loophole" and to
include the acquisition of assets no less than the 
acquisition of stocks.
Section 7 applied not only to mergers between actual 
competitors but also to vertical and conglomerate 
mergers whose actual effect "may be to lessen competi­
tion in any line of commerce in any section of the 
country."
A keystone in the erection of a barrier to the rising 
tide of concentration was the provision for arresting 
mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of
competition in any line of commerce was still in its
incipiency.
Congress rejected as inappropriate the application to 
Section 7 cases, the standards for judging the legality 
of business combinations adopted by the courts in cases 
arising under the Sherman Act.
While Congress sought to create an effective tool for 
preventing all mergers having demonstrable anti­
competitive effects it did not intend to impede a 
merger between two companies which would enable the 
combination to compete more effectively with larger 
corporations dominating a relevant market. It did 
not intend to prevent a merger between a corporation 
that is financially healthy and a "failing one." The 
purpose was to protect competition, not competitors.
Congress neither adopted nor rejected specifically 
any particular tests for measuring the relevant mar­
ket, nor did it adopt a definition of the word "sub­
stantially. "
Congress provided no definite quantitative or quali­
tative tests, but it indicated plainly that a merger 
was to be functionally viewed in the context of a 
particular industry.
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Congress used the words "may be substantially to 
lessen competition" to indicate that its concern was 
with probabilities, not certaintieso
The Court then dealt separately with the hori­
zontal and vertical aspects of the merger in terms of the 
product market, the geographic market, and the probable 
competitive effect of the merger. The Court accepted the 
lower court's definition of "line of commerce" as being 
men's, women's, and children's shoes. The Court found 
that in owning Kinney, Brown could force its shoes into 
Kinney's retail outlets. A vertical restraint would have 
operated throughout the Kinney chain, so the Court held 
that the relevant geographic market for manufactured shoes 
would have been the entire nation. The Court construed 
that a vertical acquisition operated just as a tying 
contract, proscribed by Section 3 of the Clayton Actu In 
the case at bar, the Court explained that Kinney would be 
required to buy Brown shoes usually to the exclusion of 
other manufacturers. Even though the vertical fore­
closure amounted to only 2 per cent of the retail market, 
the Court said that there was a tendency for acquiring 
manufacturers to become increasingly important sources 
of supply for their acquired outlets. The Court found 
that the trend in the shoe industry was toward further 
oligopoly, and that such a trend would adversely affect 
local control of business which would lessen competition.^^
^^Ibido ^^Ibid.
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The District Court had held that the merger had 
resulted in horizontal restraints at the manufacturing 
and retail levels. According to that Court, the merger 
of the Brown and Kinney manufacturing facilities did not 
involve a significant restraint, but the rivalry of sell­
ers that took place at the retail level was where compe­
tition could be substantially lessened. The Supreme Court 
accepted that conclusion. The relevant retail market as 
outlined by the District Court--cities of 10,000 or more 
where both Brown and Kinney had outlets--was likewise 
accepted by the higher court. It was explained by the 
Supreme Court that the absence of future competition 
between the two firms in those areas constituted a hori­
zontal restraint on competition.^^
To determine the impact of the acquisition on 
competition, the Court relied on concentration statistics. 
The Court concluded that as a result of the merger, com­
bined sales in ll8 cities were over 5 per cent of the 
total market. The rationale was that if such a merger 
were approved, it could trigger similar actions in the 
shoe industry which would further the oligopolistic trend 
which Congress had sought to avoid.
The Court looked particularly long at features of 
the market structure. The Kinney acquisition, according 
to the Court 5 had reshaped the structure from one of
l^Ibid.
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fragmentation toward one of concentration which could have
an adverse effect on competition.
The Court also commented on the social benefits
of an internal expansion as opposed to an expansion by-
merger. Internal expansion, reasoned the Court, would
more nearly reflect consumer demand which would result in
increased investment, more jobs, and greater output.
The Court in concluding its affirmation of the
District Court's order of divestiture said that the
appellant had presented no mitigating factors such as an
imminent business failure or inadequate resources which
17would have made one or the other less competitive.
The first definitive interpretation of amended 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was made nearly 12 years 
after the late 1950 enactment. Although guide lines had 
been established in this case it was not likely that the 
reasoning could or would apply to all mergers.
On July 22, 1957, the Department of Justice filed 
a suit in the District Court of Utah (US v El Paso Gas 
Company, 370 US 651)» The complaint alleged that El Paso 
Natural Gas Company had acquird the stock of Pacific North­
west Pipe Line Company, in violation of amended Section 7 
of the Clayton Act. The respondent filed a motion in the 
District Court to dismiss the action since the gas company
l^Ibid.
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was under the primary jurisdiction of the Federal Power 
Commission. As an alternative, the respondent requested 
the Court to stay the procedures until the Federal Power 
Commission (FPC) made a final determination on the 
respondent's merger application. The Court ruled that 
the application had been made after the Section 7 action 
had been filed. The Court further held that the FPC did 
not have jurisdiction to pass upon a stock acquisition, 
therefore the plea of primary jurisdiction was inappli­
cable. The Court explained that the filing of the appli­
cation with the FPC did not divest the Court of jurisdic­
tion to hear the Clayton Act proceeding. The petition
1 O
for dismissal was denied on October 21, 1957° The 
District Court was notified on a later date that the 
respondent had made an application to the Supreme Court 
in which it requested that body to order the file for 
review. The application was denied on March 3» 1958°^^
El Paso Natural Gas Company was a one billion 
dollar corporation, and a major supplier of natural gas 
in several western states; however, the firm had experi­
enced difficulty in maintaining the gas reserves required 
by the FPC. Pacific Northwest with relatively limited 
financial resources, was another supplier of natural gas 
in northwestern United States. It had ample gas reserves
T 0
Trade Cases, 1957, par. 68,772. 
l^lbid.
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and had sold large quantities of gas to El Paso but 
despite that source of revenue it had been unable to fully 
develop its own leases. Pacific Northwest (PN) had made 
several unsuccessful efforts to enter the rapidly expanding 
natural gas market in California. El Paso on the other 
hand had been the only successful out of state bidder in 
the California market and was furnishing 50 per cent of 
California's requirements.
El Paso had been interested in purchasing PN for
several years, presumably to obtain and develop PN's
reserves. By May 1957» El Paso had acquired 99*8 per cent
of PN's stock, and shortly thereafter the Department of
Justice filed suit. The District Court dismissed the suit
on November 20, 1962. The Court concluded that:
El Paso's acquisition of, and efforts to obtain 
reserves and supplies of natural gas did not result 
in substantial competition with Pacific Northwest.
The two firms had operated in different areas and 
95 per cent of the supplies acquired by each for 
distribution was without competition. Too, the 
Federal Power Commission had regulated sales and 
approved all prices.
El Paso did not violate Section 7 since it had no 
reasonable probability of substantially lessening 
competition or tend to a monopoly in the sale and 
transportation of natural gas for distribution or 
use. Both El Paso and Pacific Northwest were under 
long term supply contracts authorized by the Federal 
Power Commission, and there was little likelihood 
there would ever be competition between them.
The multi-state area served by the two firms did not 
constitute a relevant geographic market since there 
was no section or area in those states where the two 
firms competed.
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Natural gas was accepted as the product in the "line 
of commerce" but.so was electricity and fuel oil with 
the latter a particularly vigorous competitor.
The Court prepared no detailed opinion as was
customary but merely enumerated its findings of fact and
21its conclusions of law..
The Department of Justice appealed the case to the
Supreme Court. On April 6, 1964, the Court reversed the
decision of the District Court and remanded the case for
2 2the issue of an order of divestiture.
The primary issue according to the Supreme Court 
revolved around a question as to whether the acquisition 
substantially lessened competition in the sale of natural 
gas in the state of California. The Court asserted that 
because of Federal Power Commission regulations, FPC's 
grant of a supply authorization to a particular firm would 
withdraw that particular market from the area of competi­
tion. Therefore reasoned the Court, competition for new _ 
increments of demand caused by an expanding population 
would be all that remained. In that instance rationalized 
the Court, California was a booming market, and merely 
because PN had been an unsuccessful bidder, in the past 
it was still no less a competitor than successful El Paso. 
Accordingly, ruled the Court, the acquisition had the
20
Trade Cases, I962, par. 70,571»
^^Ibido
^^Trade Cases, 1964, par. 71,073» (373 US 930)
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23effect of substantially lessening competition.
The Supreme Court also noted that in I962 it had 
set aside the FPC order approving the El Paso-PN merger 
holding that the agency should have not acted until the 
District Court had passed on the Clayton Act issues.
In the reversal, the Supreme Court directed the 
District Court to proceed with an order of divestiture 
without delay. The Court explained that if El Paso could 
absorb Pacific Northwest without violating Section 7, then 
the statute had no meaning in the natural gas field. It 
was pronounced that even though PN had no pipe line in 
California, it had been young and vigorous, and had the 
only interstate pipe line west of the Rocky Mountains.
The Court reiterated its belief that the expanding Cali­
fornia market offered an opportunity for entry, and that 
PN could have eventually entered that market. Mr. Justice 
Harlan dissented only in the matter of "ordering divesti­
ture," He stated that that was the job of the lower
24court.
Some side issues were involved in the El Paso 
case. On January 22, 1965, the District Court in Utah 
dismissed a suit in which the public utility commissioners 
of seven states, the State of California, and twelve 
natural gas distributors had petitioned to intervene in
2^Ibid. ^^Ibid.
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the fashioning of a divestiture decree. The Court ruled 
that the public convenience and necessities of gas con­
sumers could not prevail over the anti-trust requirements 
of the suit. The Court said that there was no reason to 
believe that the interests of all parties would not be 
adequately represented, and further, that the distribu­
tion of the effected property would be subject to the
25
control of the Court.
A consent decree which required that El Paso 
divest itself of all properties acquired in violation 
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act was entered on June 24, 
1965.
Although the guide lines of the Brown Shoe case 
were not particularly important in the foregoing case, 
they did have applicability in the next case to be dis­
cussed. In the 1965 case. United States v. Aluminum 
Company of America and Rome Cable Corporation another 
significant ruling occurred. A brief history will pro­
vide a setting for the events to follow.
In early 1959, it was announced in the press 
that the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) would 
purchase the assets of the Rome Cable Corporation (Rome). 
Shortly after the announcement, the Department of Justice 
addressed inquiries to both firms 5 however, the merger
^^Trade Cases, 1963, par. 71,362
^^Ibid., par. 71,453 (37 FRD 330).
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was consummated on March 31, 1959i and the Rome assets 
were transferred to a wholly owned subsidiary of Alcoa.
It was one year later, April 1, I96O, that the Department 
of Justice filed an application for injunctive relief. 
Alcoa was described as the largest producer of aluminum 
and aluminum products, and was referred to as an inte­
grated producer--a self sufficiency in both production 
and distribution was implied. Rome was described as a 
manufacturer of electric wire and cable although the
company's principal raw materials use was copper, it
27had recently used some aluminum conduit.
The District Court denied the application on 
May 31» i960 in which the government had charged that 
the merger violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The 
government pleaded for injunctive restraint speculating 
that unless Alcoa was restrained until time of the trial, 
the large firm might feel constrained to strip Rome of 
its personnel which would leave Rome with only a shell 
of its former self. The shell, according to the govern­
ment, would be incapable of competing even if divesti­
ture and restoration of the firm were ordered. The 
Court in rejecting the application stated that no such 
stripping had occurred, and further that Alcoa had 
assured the Court that no such stripping would occur.
The Court also surmised that the action could probably
^^Trade Cases, I960, par. 69,227.
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be heard in three or four months, but in the meantime 
temporarily enjoined Alcoa from encumbering any of the 
Rome stock.
The case had the usual pre-trial complexities. 
Alcoa forwarded the government a number of interroga­
tories. The questionnaires were designed to obtain 
information about the details of production and distribu­
tion of the products which the government would claim 
as the "line of commerce," The government objected, 
but on November 8 , I96O, the Court ruled that the respond­
ent was entitled to test the validity of the majority
29
of the information which would be presented. In a 
further hearing on November I7 , I96O, the Court ruled 
specifically on the privileged nature of a portion of 
the information requested by Alcoa. There was little 
change from the Court's ruling the week before--merely
a clarification and expansion of its explanation on
—  ,30
"privileged communications,"
It was over two years before the case came before 
the Court. On January 28, I963, the District Court said 
that the acquisition would not substantially lessen 
competition. The Court held that the competitive impact 
of an integrated aluminum company's acquisition of a
^^Ibid.
^^Trade Cases, 1961, par. 69,910. 
^^Trade Cases, 196I , par. 69,911»
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copper wire and cable manufacturer could not be properly 
measured by comparing the relevant market shares held 
by an aluminum producer and fabricators of aluminum wire 
and cable while ignoring the competition between inte­
grated producers. The Court recalled that previous 
government actions against the acquiring integrated 
producer had been designed to facilitate the entry of 
competitors into the industry. According to the Court 
the existence of completely integrated producers could 
not be overlooked or distorted in the appraisal of the 
competitive market in the acquisition. The Court also 
said the evidence established that some non-integrated 
producers had either held or increased their market 
share since the challenged acquisition. The Court con­
cluded that the combined market share of the merger had 
decreased, and that fact with testimony by wire and 
cable purchasers that the Alcoa acquisition had not
adversely affected their businesses, precluded a finding
31of a substantial lessening of competition.
The Court in defining the relevant market in the 
aluminum industry as to "line of commerce" decided that 
aluminum wire and cable was not a "line of commerce" dis­
tinct from copper wire and cable within the meaning of 
Section 7» Also that aluminum wire and cable was deemed
^^Trade Cases, 1963, par, 70,563* (2l4 Fed Supp
501)
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interchangeable with copper wire and cable since it had
no distinct purchasers by specialized vendors--and there
was a cross elasticity of demand for the two types of
wire and cable. The Court accordingly concluded that
the "line of commerce" was the combination of aluminum
32wire and cable and copper wire and cable.
The Court ruled that the relevant geographic
market was the United States as a whole rather than an
11 state area where most of the products of the merger
were sold, as contended by the government. The Court
reasoned that the larger area was proper since there
had been substantial evidence presented in that respect.
Favorable freight rates, and commercial realities,
according to the Court, enabled purchasers even though
located in the narrower area to buy from anywhere in
the United States. In its ruling concerning market
shares, the Court reasoned that:
The comparatively small percentage of the aluminum 
wire and cable market held by a company primarily 
in copper wire and cable would not by itself condemn 
an acquisition of that competitor by an integrated 
aluminum company.
The copper wire and cable company held .3 percent 
(Alcoa held 32.5 per cent) of the market in aluminum 
conductor reinforced steel cable and competed with 
the aluminum company in smaller sized cable.
The combined market share for their production 




The evidence pointed out that the acquisition was 
an effort by Alcoa to overcome a market disadvantage 
(lack of know how in manufacturing insulated aluminum 
cable) rather than to obtain a captive market (.3 
per cent) or eliminate a competitor.
The Court used the Brown Shoe case freely in
considering factors such as ease of entry (there had
been five entries since World War II), anti-competitive
effects, and factual results of a declining market share.
The District Court may have tried to interpret
the Brown Shoe guidelines too freely. The government
appealed to the Supreme Court, and that body on June 1,
1964, reversed the lower court and remanded the case
3 5for divestiture.
The Supreme Court held that the "line of com­
merce" should not have been the combined copper-aluminum 
conductor market as held in the lower court. Even though 
the lower court had used Brown Shoe in its reasoning the 
Supreme Court interpreted it differently. The "new" 
interpretation explained that the degree of competition 
did not preclude a market division into separate sub- 
markets for purposes of Section 7 procedures, just as 
the existence of broad product markets in Brown Shoe did
o ^
not preclude lesser sub-markets. The Court further 
reasoned that aluminum conductor and copper conductor for
34
33lbid. 3^Tbid.
^^Trade Cases, 1964, par. 71,116 (375 US 808). 
^^Ibido
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the purpose of analyzing the competitive effects of a 
merger were separate, and on that basis aluminum con­
ductors were declared a sub-market for purposes of the 
Section 7 concept of a "line of commerce." Since it
was a "line of commerce" in that setting, the Court con-
37eluded that the merger violated Section 7»
The lower court had said that the "ease of 
entry" criteria had been met since there had been five 
new entries into the particular market since World War II. 
The Supreme Court observed that all five had been due to 
government intervention and not to normal competitive
o O
decentralization.
The Court in its explanation asserted that the 
objective of Section 7 was to prevent small accretions 
of power which were individually so minute as to make 
the Sherman Act ineffective. The Court reasoned that 
although the acquisition of Rome added only 1.3 per cent 
to Alcoa's control of the aluminum conductor market-- 
in Section 7 terms, it was likely that there would be 
a lessening of competition. The Court stated that it was 
a basic premise of Section 7 that competition would be 
most vigorous where there were many sellers, with none 
having a significant market share. The Court observed 
that the aluminum industry could well be more oligopolis­
tic, and as that phase developed, the greater the likelihood
3?Ibid. ^®Ibid.
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that more parallel policies of mutual oligopolistic
advantage would emerge. Such a tendency, according to
the Court, could possibly be thwarted by the pressures
of a small but significant competitor, and "Rome might
be the prototype that Congress had in mind." Justices
Goldberg, Harlan, and Stewart dissented. They believed
that the application of the Brown Shoe guide lines by
39the District Court had been proper.
With the Supreme Court disagreeing as to its 
own Brown Shoe guide lines in Section 7 cases, one last 
significant proceeding will be examined in an effort to 
determine a significant guide for business and the lower 
courts.
On September 13, 1956, the Continental Can Com­
pany, the second largest producer of metal containers 
in the nation, acquired all of the assets of Hazel-Atlas 
Glass Co., the third largest producer of glass containers 
in the United States. The government applied for a 
temporary restraining order. The request was denied on 
September 13, 195& on the ground that the complaint did 
not show by specific facts that immediate and irreparable
injury would be suffered if the temporary restraint was 
40not invoked. A previous effort to block the acquisition
39lbid.
4o
Trade Cases, 1956, US v. Continental Can Co., 
and Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., par. 68,8o6.
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had been made by invoking the terms of a consent decree 
which had been entered against Continental in 1950 in an 
anti-trust suit under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act, and Section 3 of the Clayton Act. On August 31»
1956, a District Court in California held that the con-
41sent decree was not applicable to the 1956 acquisition.
The next court appearance, nearly a year later, 
concerned the propriety of certain interrogatories served 
by the government upon Continental. The government asked 
that answers be given, as of the date of the interrogatory 
--while the respondent based its objection on a decision 
in U.S. V. duPont (353 US 586). In that case, the Court 
said that the test of a Section 7 violation was whether 
at the "time of the suit" there was a reasonable probabil­
ity that the acquisition would likely result in the 
condemned restraints. On August 21, 1957, the Court
held that the "time of the suit" was not restricted to
42the time of the commencement of the suit.
About a year after the 1957 ruling, the govern­
ment objected to interrogatories received from Continental 
and claimed that the answers would involve privileged 
information. On July l4, 1958, the Court held that since 
most of the information would necessarily be disclosed
^^Ibid., par. 68,476.
42
Trade Cases, 1957» par. 68,8o6
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during pre-trial examinations, there would be no necessity 
to withhold the answers. The Court did authorize the 
government to withhold answers to interrogatories if the 
answers would amount to an actual presentation of the 
case in advance of trial.
The preceding background has been outlined to 
again emphasize the complexities and the pre-trial delays 
attendant to Section 7 proceedings. Further pre-trial 
proceedings and many pages of testimony required an 
additional five years. On April 15, 1963, nearly seven 
years after the initial proceedings had begun, the 
District Court rendered a decision adverse to the gov- 
ernment.
The District Court established three products-- 
metal containers, glass containers, and part metal-glass 
containers. The issue was whether the admitted competi­
tion between metal and glass containers, for use other 
than packaging beer, was of the type and quality which 
would serve as the basis for defining the relevant market. 
The Court reasoned that the entire packaging industry was 
not a relevant market in which to test the legality of 
the acquisition of a glass container manufacturer by a 
manufacturer of metal cans. The reasoning was based on:
^^Trade Cases. 1958. par. 69,082 (22 FRD 235).
44
Trade Cases, 1963, par. 70,759 (217 Fed Supp
761).
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The broadest application of the product market test 
of reasonable interchangeability of use or cross 
elasticity of demand could not encompass the wide 
diversity of products used in packaging.
No evidence concerning industry or public recognition 
of the market, peculiar characteristics and uses of 
the products involved. No evidence of unique pro­
duction facilities, distinct customers, distinct 
prices, sensitivity to price changes, specialized 
vendors, or any other practical indicia by which the 
product market could be determined.
Metal closures for glass and metal containers, con­
tainers for the soft drink industry, containers for 
the canning industry, containers for toiletries and 
cosmetics, and containers for medicine and for the 
household and chemical industries were not relevant 
markets o
Metal cans and glass containers used in the beer 
industry were relevant markets to test the legality 
of the merger.^5
The Court held that the acquisition of a glass
container manufacturer by a manufacturer of metal cans
did not violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act because:
It was not shown that the acquisition would be to 
substantially lessen competition in the metal can or 
glass container industries, or in the beer container 
industry.
It was not shown that the can manufacturer obtained 
an advantage over its competitors because of its 
ability, after the acquisition, to offer glass con­
tainers to its customers.
Allegations that the acquisition made new entry into 
the industry more difficult or reduced the possi­
bility of new entry were not substantiated. Charges 
that the can manufacturer would be likely to lose 
incentive to push can sales at the expense of glass, 
or vice versa; or that the acquisition wôuld aggra­




It was not shown that the acquisition would effect 
competition in the beer container industry.
The glass manufacturer's share of the beer market 
was only .8 per cent before the acquisition, and 
only 1,1 per cent afterward. The manufacturer's 
share of the total container market, including metal 
cans, was 4j/l00 ths of one per cent before the acqui­
sition, and 17/100 ths of one percent afterward.
The potential of the glass manufacturer to become a 
competitor in the beer container field did not make 
the acquisition illegal since there was no showing 
of a reasonable probability that the glass manufac­
turer would become a significant producer of beer 
bottles.^"
In the Court's conclusions, it was specified
the failure to the government's case would be observed
when a comparison was made with the Brown Shoe findings.
In that case, according to the Court, both horizontal
and vertical aspects were present in a single well
recognized separate industry. In the Continental case,
the Court believed that the merging companies were in
different industries, and termed it more of a conglomerate
type merger. The Court admitted that the proof presented
in Brown Shoe which caused the Supreme Court to strike
down that merger went far beyond the proof developed in
the Continental Can case. In the case at bar, according
to the Court, the government attempted to artificially
contrive ten "lines of commerce" (Brown Shoe) which were
not generally recognized by industry, and neither did
47those "lines" conform to market reality.
^^Ibid. 4?Ibid.
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The government appealed the adverse decision to
the Supreme Court, and on June 22, 1964, that body
reversed the dismissal. The Supreme Court said that
metal and glass containers competed over a broad range.
The Court explained that :
Interchangeability of use and cross elasticity of 
demand should not be used to obscure competition, 
but to recognize competition where in fact competi­
tion exists.
Even though the interchangeability of use may not be 
so complete, and the cross elasticity of demand so 
immediate as in most intraindustry mergers, there 
would be over the long run, the kind of customer 
response to innovation and other competitive stimuli 
that brought competition between the glass and metal 
container industries within Section 7 *s competition 
preserving proscriptions.
Inter-industry competition between the two industries 
was sufficient to warrant treating the combined metal- 
glass container industry as being competitive since 
they competed in the end use of their products.
Complete inter-industry competitive overlap need not 
be shown. The existence of noncompetitive segments 
within a proposed market area would not preclude that 
market area from being treated as a "line of com­
merce, "48
In considering the competitive effects of the mer­
ger as measured by market shares, the Court reasoned that:
Even though the market shares are the primary indicia 
of market power, a judgment under Section 7 should 
not be made by any single qualitative or quantitative 
test,
The merger must be viewed in the context of the par­
ticular market involved. That would be its struc­
ture, its history, and its probable future.
4ft
Trade Cases, 1964, par. 71,146 (375 US 893).
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Where a merger is of such size as to be inherently 
suspect, elaborate proof of market structure, market 
behavior, and the probable anti-competitive effects 
may (could) be dispensed with in view of Section 7's 
design to prevent undue concentration. °
In its comment that the size of a resulting firm 
may be presumed to be unlawful, the Court explained that 
a merger between two of the six dominant firms in the 
combined glass-metal container industry was unlawful 
under Section 7» It was specified that the acquiring 
company had not only increased its share of the combined 
market from 21.9 per cent to 25 per cent, but that the 
merger had also reduced from five to four, the most sig­
nificant competitors who might have threatened its domi­
nant position. The Court also said that the resulting 
market share of the combined firm approached that held 
presumably unlawful in U.S. v. Philadelphia Bank which 
was 30 per cent.^^
Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented strongly. 
They contended that the Court majority had substituted 
a meaningless figure, i.e. the merged company's share 
of a non-existent market, for the sound and factual 
findings of the District Court. Justice Harlan argued 
that in effect the Court had declared a per se rule which 
would hold that mergers between two large companies in 




A meaningful body of anti-merger law has emerged 
during the I960*s. The issues or guide lines enunciated 
in the eight significant Supreme Court decisions will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
The emergence of the guide lines however has 
brought forth varied reactions. The first of the diverse 
opinions were described in the Congressional hearings.
The opinions of academician and business men some of which 
were given minus any of their inhibitions prevalent in 
official hearings are interesting.
Other Voices on Anti-Merger
Professor Derek C. Bok, a law professor, commented 
upon the contribution of economic theory to the world of 
mergers. Bok freely used the writings of economists 
Bain, Martin, Ruggles, and Weston in describing the 
theoretical shortcomings of trying to forecast the 
economic effects of a merger. He agreed with Weston 
that the writings on the issue had been primarily descrip­
tive and that very little progress had been made toward 
finding answers to the basic theoretical issues. Bok 
added that studies of monopoly and oligopoly as well as 
pure competition had all been helpful but all had dealt 
with changes in magnitude which he believed were rarely 
present in merger cases. He quoted from Bain when he 
said that at best, the economist might conclude, long after 
the fact, that competitive behavior in an industry had
2i8
deteriorated substantially. Bok said that such a late 
determination would preclude the relief intended by Sec­
tion 7 -^^
Bok also agreed with Bain that any decision as to 
whether the vigor of competition had been or would be sig­
nificantly reduced would depend upon a weighing process 
based upon a value judgment. Bok suggested that it would 
appear appropriate, and in the public interest, to frame a 
rule which would prohibit any acquisition which would 
appreciably enhance the acquirer's marginal market position 
over that which he had enjoyed prior to the merger. Bok 
concluded however that there was a general unwillingness 
to recognize the limits of our understanding, hence there 
was a hardened resistance to simple rules. Such resistance 
according to Bok was based upon a false hope that more 
information could somehow dispel any doubts about the con­
sequences of a disputed merger. "In striving to be flexi­
ble, we may be obscure; in seeming up to date, we will be
merely indiscriminate; in seeking expertness, we may end
53only in extravagance."
Adelman, in a I961 article on anti-merger, briefly 
examined several Federal Trade Commission decisions. Even 
though concentration ratios were not to be equated with
Derek C „ Bok, "Section 7 of the Clayton Act and 
the Merging of Law and Economics," Harvard Law Review,
V. 74 (December I96O), pp. 226-355»
5^Ibid., p. 349.
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monopoly according to Adelman, inquiries into that area 
had been accorded heavy weight. The character of competi­
tion in the market involved had been considered in several 
cases, and according to Adelman, it had been implied that 
the law should guard any competition that remained. That 
protectionist influence, Adelman observed, had been invoked 
in uses involving both vertical and conglomerate mergers. 
Adelman concluded that the enforcement of the Anti-Merger 
Act had demonstrated the same three sided conflict--among 
competition, protectionism, and laissez-faire or business 
statesmanship--that had prevailed throughout the history 
of the anti-trust laws.
A popular national magazine editorialized that the 
Supreme Court decision in the Brown case had apparently 
extended Section 7 of the Clayton Act to growth of concen­
tration in fragmented industries. That broader defini­
tion of a geographic market, it was feared, would pose a 
threat to retail chain operations.
An article which appeared in the Yale Law Review 
was critical of the manner in which Section 7 had been 
applied in the Procter and Gamble case and in the Reynolds 
Metals case (FTC Docket 7009» 1956). In the Procter case, 
the trial examiner had emphasized that the criterion to
^^M, A. Adelman, "The AntiMerger Act, 1950-1960," 
American Economic Review, v. 51 (May 196I), pp. 236-244o
5  5
"Less Room Than Ever for Mergers," Business Week, 
June 30, 1962, p. 98.
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invalidate conglomerate mergers under Section 7 would be 
the economic power of the acquiring firm that could be used 
to drive out competition. The same guide, according to 
the author of the article, had been used in the Reynolds 
case even though the products of the acquiring company were 
not complementary to those of the acquired company as had 
been prevalent in the Procter case. The article continued 
by observing that if that interpretation were permitted 
to prevail, any merger could be invalidated. Those two 
decisions, according to the Review, represented a per se 
rule of protecting competitors which was contrary to the 
"protection of competition" proviso in Section 7* It was 
further observed that the decisions had not relied on any 
economic analysis to determine the effects on competition 
with that feature of Section 7 apparently ignored. It 
was concluded that such broad interpretations, definitely 
not intended by Congress, could have adverse effects on 
economic growth. The adverse effects would be demon­
strated, according to the author, by a restriction in the 
flow of investment capital "which would bring with it a 
frozen industrial structure and lessening of capital inno­
vation.
The restriction of economic growth would be a 
rational assumption, if all mergers were declared illegal.
^^"Conglomerate Mergers under Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act," Yale Law Review, v. 72, No. 6 (May I963)
pp. 1265-1281.
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But would it be rational for reasonable men to permit 
interpretations of a law to become so broad that all the 
public would eventually suffer?
In 1964, a nationally circulated business publica­
tion reported that the number of mergers was still 
increasing despite restrictions. It was indicated that 
the merger figures utilized were obtained from a private 
financial reporting firm which had obtained the informa­
tion from many sources--just like the Federal Trade Com­
mission and the Department of Justice had to operate. The 
editors commented on that manner of procuring merger infor­
mation. They concluded that there had been very little 
enthusiasm for pre-merger notification bills which had 
been introduced so often in the past by the late Senator 
Kefauver. In the editors' opinion, the two enforcement
agencies would find a pre-merger notification administra-
57tively unfeasible.
William H. Orrick was interviewed by a national 
magazine in 1964. Orrick declared that the antitrust 
philosophy of the Johnson administration was based on the 
premise that competition provided the lowest prices, 
highest quality, and was the best allocator of resources. 
Orrick said that the philosophy was the same that had pre­
vailed in both the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations.
57^'"Mergers Keep Growing with a Difference," Busi­
ness Week, March 21, 1964, p. 64.
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Orrick freely admitted that the prosecution of merger cases 
was most difficult since the decisions, for the most part, 
had to be made in an area of uncertainty. Orrick stated 
that he believed that vigorous enforcement of anti-merger 
laws would not hamper economic growth as some critics had 
speculated, but if enough were of that opinion, then 
Congress would have to change the laws which protected 
competition. Orrick affirmed that competition was a part 
of our way of life, just as the Constitution had been for
58so many years,
Milton Handler, law professor, was critical of 
Supreme Court decisions in anti-merger litigations during 
the 1962-1964 period. In the Brown Shoe case, according 
to Handler, the factors to be probed had been enumerated 
but the Court had indicated that the market could be 
sliced as thin or thick as the government desired. Handler 
was particularly critical of the decision made in the 
Philadelphia Bank case, which had departed from the Brown 
guide lines. The opinion in the bank case stressed the 
importance of preventing even a slight increase in concen­
tration. Handler said that the word "slight" was not the 
same as "significant," and the use of the lesser magnitude 
would not, in his opinion, produce a firm which would con­
trol an undue market share. Handler observed that the
^^"What’s Next for Antitrust," Dun's Review, June
1964, pp. 35-36+.
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term "slight" was also utilized in the Court opinions in 
two subsequent cases, the Alcoa-Rome and Continental Can 
cases. In those two, according to Handler, the Court had 
even fashioned a market which had been contrary to well 
documented findings of the respective trial judges who 
had based their decisions on Brown Shoe guide lines. 
Handler was critical of economists who insisted that there 
was no competition in a market populated by few sellers. 
Handler explained that he could not visualize where a 
line could be drawn under a certain number of competitors, 
and decree that above or below that line, there would, or 
would not be, competition. Handler was particularly 
critical of the opinion in the Continental Can case in 
which it was stated that "an economic analysis of market 
behavior, performance, and ease of entry would be too com­
plex or elusive to be evaluated." By that disregard, and 
supported by the Brown opinion. Handler said that the 
Court had been dealing with "ephemeral possibilities." 
There was nothing too complex. Handler argued, for the 
Court to reject post-acquisition losses after the Alcoa- 
Rome merger. Neither was there anything too complex when 
the Court rejected defense witnesses testimony who stated 
that the merger had not lessened competition. By such 
inconsistencies, Handler said the courts had created a 
modicum of uncertainty. To provide a certainty, the 
courts could hold that all mergers would be held illegal
22k
unless they had been previously cleared by an enforcement
agency, or according to Handler, a ceiling could be placed
on the number of permissible mergers.
It hardly seems too much to ask the Court that it 
refrain from inventing imaginary markets which do 
not correspond to economic realities, and from 
nullifying mergers on the basis of imaginary possi­
bilities rather than reasonable probabilities.59
Business Week was also critical of the 1962-1964
Supreme Court decisions. As to the preservation of the
small business, the editors pointed out, a small company
locked into its own market because its only potential
buyers are forbidden to act by antitrust laws, would not
be in an enviable position.
The small company isn't prone to experiment in new 
fields when the chances of liquidating mistakes are 
lessened by an active antitrust enforcement policy 
. . . there is no legal remedy for many. They are a
part of the 'costs' that court has assumed must be 
paid as part of the price for maintaining small com­
petitors in the market, frequently against the tide 
of economic change. Congress alone can decide whether 
the costs to society and the business structure are 
excessive.GO
Leonard Weiss published a study in 1965 in which 
he evaluated the role of mergers in six industries:
Steel, Petroleum, Auto, Cement, Flo\^, and Brewing. Weiss 
found that internal growth and exit, traditionally at­
tributed to economies of scale, were much more closely
Milton Handler and Stanley D. Robinson, "The 
Supreme Court vs. Corporate Mergers," Fortune, v. ?1 
(January 1965)5 PP« l64+.
Anti-trust Turns Tougher," Business Week, 
September 12, 1964, pp. 98-112.
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related to a change in concentration at the four firm
level than was merger.
There were mergers at that level, but they were dis­
tributed among industries eind periods in a fairly 
random way and offered little explanation of the net 
change in concentration. Merger did become important 
in concentration changes when more majors were con­
sidered but at the 8-20 firm level, they were more 
likely to represent rationalization rather than 
attempts to create monopoly.
Weiss concluded that most mergers since the 1920's could
be defended as harmless and probably socially useful.
In mid-1965, Donald F. Turner, Harvard Law School, 
was appointed to head the Antitrust Division of the Depart­
ment of Justice. Turner promised to spell out guide lines 
on mergers, and to prosecute only cases with "rational" 
grounds instead of enforcing the letter of the law. The 
announcement paralleled the thinking of Justice Abe Portas, 
President Johnson's first appointment to the Supreme Court. 
Portas declared that the antitrust agencies had an obliga­
tion to determine whether the public interest would be 
served by attacking an acquisition.^^ About three years 
later. Turner did spell out guide lines, but they appeared 
in June I968 shortly before his resignation from the Depart­
ment of Justice in order to return to the law school. See 
Appendix I for the guide lines as presently in effect in
Leonard W. Weiss, "An Evaluation of Mergers in 
Six Industries," Review of Economics and Statistics,
V, 47, May 1965, pp. I72-I8I.
^^"Antitrust Gets a New Gospel," Business Week, 
August l4, 1965» p. 27.
226
the Department of Justice.
In 1966, the Supreme Court issued two more "land 
mark" decisions. In thç Dean Foods Case (1966 Trade 
Cases, par. 71,788) the Court held that the Federal Trade 
Commission had the authority to seek an injunction barring 
consummation of merger, pending a decision on the legality 
of the merger. The FTC had sought such legislation for 
years, or even a court decision which would serve the same 
purpose, however any positive effect would be questionable. 
The Department of Justice had the authority for years, but 
had been successful in less than a third of its attempts 
to obtain restraining orders. A threat to use that power 
could enhance the Commission's bargaining position with
proposed merger participants--to the extent of foregoing
6 3a mingling of assets during a litigation.
During the same sitting, the Court broadened the 
government's power to overturn mergers between direct com­
petitors, In the Pabst Brewing Case (1966 Trade Cases, 
par. 71,790), the Court held that Pabst's merger with 
Blatz Brewing Company was illegal when the merger created 
a firm that controlled 4.5 per cent of a market, if there 
were a trend toward concentration in the industry. Just 
three years earlier, the Court had declared in the Phila­
delphia Bank case that if a merged firm were to control
^^"High Courts Tighten the Antitrust Reins," 
Business Week, June I8 , I966, pp. ,40-4l.
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30 per cent of a market, with a trend toward concentration
in that industry, it would be illegal. Since that deci-
64
sion, the percentages have decreased case by case.
The courts have continued to broaden the interpre­
tation given to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. By the same 
token there has been a considerable amount of erudite 
opposition since the early 1960's but it has been in the 
minority.
The rationale behind the anti-merger policy will 
be discussed in the next chapter. In addition, a brief 
examination of the "new" law will be reviewed relative to 
its impact on the business world--and remarks by qualified 
observers will receive attention.
G^ibid.
CHAPTER VIII
EFFECTIVENESS OF AMENDED SECTION 7,
CLAYTON ACT AS A PUBLIC POLICY
Anti-merger Today Versus 
Anti-monopoly, I89O
Public policy today is reminiscent of the late 
1800's. A body of anti-merger law has emerged that indi­
cates public policy toward monopoly has made the complete 
circle. In I89O, the public reacted and the Sherman Act 
was passed. With spasmodic enforcement, it was relatively 
ineffective as an anti-merger instrument. In 1914, the 
Clayton Act was passed to strengthen the Sherman Act. It 
was designed to stop an offender before the fact instead 
of after the fact as in Sherman Act violation. The Clayton 
Act was rendered ineffective by court interpretations.
In the late 1940's, the public demanded more 
enforcement, so the Clayton Act was amended in 1950.
Public clamor for enforcement of the amended Act apparently 
reached a peak in the 1960's and as a consequence the most 
significant Supreme Court decisions have been made since
1962,
The editors of Business Week commented that it
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took twelve years for the amended Clayton Act to cross the 
street from the Capitol to the Supreme Court, and during 
that twelve years changes also occurred in the Court. 
Justices Black and Douglas were the minority in the Columbia 
Steel case and now they were the majority. Justice Harlan 
was the only remaining member of the Court that represented 
the old majority opinion, and in about half the cases, he 
was being joined by Justice Stewart, the last appointee of 
former President Eisenhower. Justices White and Goldberg 
(later in the United Nations) usually voted with the 
majority as the late President Kennedy's appointees.
Justice Clark (since resigned) joined with Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice Brennan in forming the majority opin­
ions.^ There is definitely a bi-partisan flavor to the 
Supreme Court, but with the exceptions of Justices Harlan 
and Stewart, all are generally favorable to an anti-trust 
policy regardless of their political affiliations.
The Office of the Attorney General has changed 
with the administrations. With the exception of the first 
five years after enactment of the Celler-Kefauver amend­
ment in 1950, all have given anti-merger policy a primary
role in their operations.
The top personnel of the Federal Trade Commission
has changed over the years. The Commissioners' success
1""Antitrust Turns Tougher," Business Week, 
September 12, 1964, pp. 106-107.
230
since I962 cannot all be attributed to sporadic successes 
on the part of past Commissioners, or the comparative 
leadership qualities of the respective Chairmen. The FTC 
filed about as many complaints during the five years prior 
to 1962 as it has since. A review of congressional hear­
ings indicated that the present Chairman, Paul R. Dixon, 
may be of a more outgoing personality than his prede­
cessors, and placed more emphasis on anti-merger work.
But the anti-merger climate, too, improved and conditions 
were more favorable in which to emphasize that phase of 
the Commission's work.
It can be concluded that the successes of anti­
merger work in the 1960's have been due to changes in 
people rather than changes in the statute.
Rationale Behind Anti-merger Policy 
The tenor of Federal Trade Commission consent 
orders, and the Supreme Court and lower court decisions 
have not been based on any pre-set formulae. The deci­
sions have presented a highly variegated pattern, tailored
2
to fit differing market situations. As a consequence, 
there has been a variance as well as a variety of eco­
nomic factors that have been considered.
While oligopoly is freely mentioned as the target 
for anti-merger policy, there has been no concrete evidence
^Bock, No. 93-
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that the theory of oligopolistic behavior has been accepted 
by the courts. However, lengthy discussions on what was, 
and is, generally accepted as oligopolistic behavior have 
formed a part of the arguments during most litigations.
The element of economic or industrial concentra­
tion in a particular industry, or market, has focused on 
two possibilities generally accepted as being extant in 
an oligopolistic market. The increased concentration, or 
increased market share of a firm could place it in a posi­
tion of being a virtual monopolist, or at least as a 
dominant firm, or a price leader in its market. In that 
position, the dominant firm could set a price at or near 
the monopolistic level. Generally, a monopolistic price 
is higher, does not respond to consumer demand, and 
involves a restricted output. If prices are set "admin­
istratively" by such a firm and output is restricted, it 
would cause a misallocation of resources, a higher rate 
of return on capital investment, and would aggravate a 
mal-distribution of income. Thus traditionally, exces­
sive or superconcentration in an industry has been thought 
to lead to a situation detrimental to the public--hence 
the reasoning behind the invocation of an anti-merger or 
anti-concentration policy.
A second argument, used sparingly however, con­
cerned the market behavior and price behavior where a 
small number of firms populated an industry. Each firm
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would have a price sensitivity to the price actions of any 
other. This would lead to what is called a "kinked" 
demand situation. A price normally above a competitive 
price would be set by one price leader firm at a level to 
realize a satisfactory rate of return. That price then 
would not be disturbed or changed frequently in order to 
maintain an industry-wide price equilibrium. Such a 
stable price is largely insensitive to consumer demand. 
This pricing behavior may be beneficial to some firms, 
probably most, but is detrimental to the firms which are 
unable to achieve economies of scale. In other instances, 
this administered price is harmful to the ultimate con­
sumer because it is higher than a competitive price and 
is relatively inflexible.
Arguments have been advanced that present oligopo­
listic industries are being made more so by an increased 
concentration of economic and industrial power brought 
about through mergers and acquisitions. Further it has 
been maintained that the increased power of a firm in an 
industry would tend to restrict entry of new firms, and 
additionally, the merger-acquisition would also eliminate 
a competitor.
In summary, the increase of market power through 
concentration causes oligopolistic pricing policies to 
the detriment of the consumer and the nation. The in­
creased market share resulting from a merger-acquisition
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would restrict entry into an industry and eliminate compe­
tition. These two premises form the backbone of anti­
merger policy. In essence, the policy pursued has been to 
prevent a lessening of competition by the preservation of 
small independent firms- Since mergers and acquisitions, 
or so it has been philosophied, are contrary to public 
policy, almost any type of business consolidation has been 
found to be in contravention to Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act. The critical issues have centered around the ques­
tion of who may be affected, how, and how seriously.
Impact of Amended Section 7
Case Pattern
Between January 1, 1951 and June 30, I967, the 
Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice issued 
a total of 202 complaints which charged violations of 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Most of the enforcement 
activities centered in the manufacturing-mining segment 
of the economy, roughly 75 per cent, and most of the com­
plaints were filed where the acquired company had assets 
of $10 million or more. In that category there were 921 
mergers, and 9^ were challenged.
These figures of course represent but a fraction 
of total merger activity. In a preceding chapter, it was
Willard F. Mueller, "The Celler-Kefauver Act: 
Sixteen Years of Enforcement" (unpublished and undated). 
Mueller is an economist with the Federal Trade Commission.
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Indicated that total activity in the manufacturing-mining 
sector had averaged about 700-800 per year in that period, 
Since I965, the number has increased rather sharply. In 
1966 about 1,200 were recorded, and in I967, about 1,500
4
more were recorded by the Journal of Corporate Ventures. 
The latter year resulted in the highest number of mergers- 
acquisitions ever recorded.
Analysis of Developments through 
Court Interpretations
Aims
The Supreme Court said in the Brown Shoe case 
that competition in general was to be protected, not an 
individual competitor. In the Alcoa-Rome case, the Court 
said that it was the intent of the law that a small busi­
ness, if healthy, should be preserved.
Scope of Applicability
The Supreme Court held in the El Paso Natural Gas 
case that firms under the jurisdiction of regulatory agen­
cies other than the Federal Trade Commission are subject 
to antitrust challenges. In the Philadelphia National 
Bank case, the Supreme Court said that the Bank Merger 
Act of i960 did not prevent an antitrust challenge even 
if a merger had previously been approved by the banking 
regulatory agency.
ary 21, I968,
^Times-Herald, Dallas, Texas (Business), Janu-
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Tests
Product Definition--"Line of Commerce" (product) 
could be viewed either broadly or narrowly in the context 
of the particular industry, i. e. if it were recognized 
by the industry or the public (Brown Shoe). The Couri 
said that end uses of a product determined substituta- 
bility--that competition among products, not technical 
characteristics, would prevail in the showing of a lessening 
of competition. The Court added that a complete industry 
or product overlap was not necessary in proving that a 
merger was violative of Section 7 (Continental Can).
Product Extension--In the General Foods case, the 
Court held that a merger involving an extension of the 
acquiring firm's product line was illegal. In the Procter 
and Gamble case, the Court explained that a "product 
extension" acquisition was anti-competitive and lessened 
competition and was therefore illegal under Section ?•
Market Share--In the Brown Shoe case, the Court 
declared that a merger with horizontal aspects would be 
declared illegal on the basis of a smaller market share 
than had formerly been presumed.
The Court held in the Alcoa-Rome case that the 
acquisition of eVen a smaller percentage of the product 
market than had prevailed in the Brown Shoe case would 
tend to lessen competition.
In Continental Can the Court said that complete
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inter-industry overlap need not be shown to render a 
merger violative of Section 7* In the same case, the 
Court said that size of the market share of the resulting 
firm, if approaching a certain percentage share of the 
market, would render the merger invalid.
In the Philadelphia National Bank case the Court 
held that if a merger resulted in a new firm controlling 
30 per cent of a market, it would be undue concentration, 
and in violation of Section 7*
Market Area--The Court said in Brown Shoe that 
"section of the country" could be viewed as nationwide 
or citywide or both; and that boundaries were drawn with 
sufficient breadth to include the competing products of 
each merging firm.
In the Philadelphia Bank case, the Court said 
that a "section of the country" would be an area in which 
the majority of the business originated.
Miscellaneous— The Court held in Brown Shoe that 
a vertical integration was like a tying contract which was 
illegal under Section 3 of the Clayton Act; and therefore 
a vertical integration would be anticompetitive in contra­
vention of Section 7* In the same case, it was declared 
that qualitative and quantitative tests of monopoly power 
would be viewed functionally in context of the particular 
industry; and the tests took into account the market 
structure and conditions of entry.
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In the Alcoa-Rome case, it was said that in an 
oligopolistic industry, an acquisition could make it more 
oligopolistic.
The Court in the General Foods case affirmed that 
the financial power (deep pocket) of an acquiring company 
could be used to inhibit entry by obtaining customer 
advantage through advertising and inducements to purchase 
other products from the acquiring company.
In the Penn-Olin case, the Court explained in its 
remand to the lower court, that the legality of a joint 
venture could not be based upon the assumption that one or 
the other partners could have entered a market without 
benefit of a joint venture.
The Court in the Philadelphia Bank case stated 
that a history of past acquisitions would be given sub­
stantial weight; and that any acquisition involving a 
scheme of stock or asset exchange would contravene Sec­
tion 7 •
In the Consolidated Foods case, the Court held 
that the possibility of an acquiring firm being able to 
enforce reciprocal buying of the acquired firm's products 
would be anti-competitive and in violation of Section 7»
In the same case, the Court declared that post-acquisition 
conduct should be carefully evaluated since no one could 
forecast what the fate of the acquired would have been if 
there had not been a merger.
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Defense
The Court said in the Brown Shoe case that econo­
mies of scale were recognized but would not normally 
constitute a defense sufficient to offset anti-competitive 
effects.
In the El Paso Natural Gas case, the Court held 
that if there were a reasonable probability that a firm 
could have entered a market other than by merger-acquisi­
tion, the acquiring firm would be in violation of Sec­
tion 7» In the same case, the Court said that public 
convenience and necessity could not prevail over anti­
trust requirements.
The Court stated in the Lone Star Cement case that 
where vertical aspects were present, the acquisition of a 
purely local firm (underlining mine) by an interstate firm 
would not be an acceptable defense to a violation of 
Section 7- 
Proof
In the Alcoa-Rome case, the Court held that com­
plete interindustry overlap need not be shown to render a 
merger invalid.
The Court in the Continental Can case affirmed 
that where a merger is of such size as to be inherently 
suspect, elaborate proof of market structure behavior need 
not be shown because undue concentration was proscribed 
by Section 7»
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The Court held in the General Foods case that all 
possible requirements for determining a relevant market 
need not be present in all merger cases.
Comments
The decision rendered in the Consolidated Foods 
case could well be the forerunner of the Court's defini­
tion of a conglomerate merger and its anti-competitive 
effects. In that case, there had been no pre-merger com­
petition and there had been no customer-supplier relation­
ship.
As far as the FTC is concerned, probably as sig­
nificant a decision as any occurred in the Dean Foods case 
in which the Court upheld the Commission's power to obtain 
a restraining order in Section 7 cases.
The very brief summarization of court decisions, 
and explanations presently form the basis of existing anti­
merger law. The guide lines set forth should prove helpful 
to the enforcement agencies. On the other hand, the busi­
ness community will know what types of transactions are 
suspect or likely to be challenged by the government.
Evaluations by Observers
Professor Handler said that a definitive body of 
anti-merger had not emerged. He cited the Consolidated 
Foods case where illegality was based on a presumption 
that the acquisition could have placed Consolidated in a 
position where it could have exerted reciprocal power
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(underlining mine). Handler was critical of the Supreme 
Court's reasoning in "share the risk" or joint venture 
operations. He explained that such transactions had here­
tofore rarely been challenged--if so the rule of reason 
prevailed rather than a presumption as to what might occur 
at some future date (underlining mine).^ In essence, 
Handler opposes economic theory; however, he has not gone 
so far as to declare that theory should be disregarded in 
its entirety.
Professor James Rahl caustically criticizes the 
inconsistencies in Supreme Court decisions and said that 
almost any horizontal merger could be invalidated. He 
said that in the Philadelphia Bank case, the merger was 
defined as "bad" because there was an undue market share 
in a concentrated industry. Rahl declared that if neither 
concentration nor undue market share were present, the 
merger would be dangerous if it were part of a trend 
toward concentration as in the Brown Shoe case. Or if 
none of those criteria were met, Rahl asserted that a 
merger would be illegal if the acquired firm were a sig­
nificant factor or a small independent which "Congress 
desired to protect" as in Alcoa-Rome.^
^Milton Handler, "Emerging Anti-trust Issues: 
Reciprocity, Diversification, and Joint Ventures," Virginia 
Law Review, v. 49 (April I963), pp. 433-447.
^James A. Rahl, "Anti-merger Law in Search of a 
Policy," The Antitrust Bulletin, v. 11 (1966), pp. 325-
349.
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Rahl continued by stating that vertical mergers 
were "bad" if they "may" foreclose competition from a sub­
stantial share of the market without producing any counter­
vailing advantage as in Brown Shoe. Rahl said that if 
that condition were not present, if the acquiring firm 
had a "deep pocket" (financial reserves) the merger would 
be illegal since the acquired firm would benefit or have 
an advantage over its non-integrated competitor as in the 
Reynolds-Arrow case (1962 Trade Cases, par. 70,471).
Rahl surmised that any conglomerate would have to bow to 
the "deep pocket" theory; or to reciprocity as it pre­
vailed in the Consolidated Foods case. Reciprocity, 
according to Rahl, could also be used in invalidating any 
vertical merger.^
Rahl believed that some vertical and conglomerate 
mergers might possibly escape censure, but none could 
circumvent the opinion in the Philadelphia Bank case. In 
that opinion it was suggested that Section 7 was premised 
on a social preference for internal growth as opposed to 
growth by acquisition. If that theory, according to Rahl, 
were to be combined with the "potential competition" con­
cept that emerged in Continental Can, then a merger would 
be condemned it were to forestall the possibility of aug- 
menting competition by a socially preferable means. (The
^Ibid, ®Ibid.
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potential concept that emerged in Continental Can, as 
well as Penn-Olin, held that entry into a new market could 
eliminate competition if one of the acquired might other­
wise have entered.)
Actually according to Rahl, the Court appeared 
ready to suppress any merger that the Justice Department 
or the FTC might decide to attack. Rahl said the lack 
of a clear policy was a real problem • , . "we have no
national policy on the meaning and application of Sec­
tion 7 that commands a sufficient consensus and has enough 
clarity to serve as a reliable guide." Rahl suggested a 
policy similar to that supported by Bok and Turner. They 
had suggested specific guide lines under which a merger 
would be invalidated--for example where 10 firms com­
prised an industry, and each had about the same market 
share, a merger between any two would be disapproved.
Rahl concluded that the two enforcement agencies should 
coordinate their efforts in evolving a coherent national
9
merger policy.
Professor Martin wrote at length on the decision 
made in the Brown Shoe case. He concluded that both 
vertical and horizontal mergers would likely be invali­
dated unless the firms could clearly demonstrate that 
competition would be increased. Martin continued that
^Ibid.
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the new policy enunciated in the Brown Shoe case could be 
applied to all mergers since 1950, and to inter-corporate 
relationships since 1914. Martin was uncertain what would 
happen to existing corporations which had operated in an 
oligopolistic market since 1900. Would it be fair, Martin 
questioned, to permit them to continue while currently 
striking down an attempt by "shoes" to create the same 
corporate structure? Martin at the time of his writing 
(1963) predicted that there would be strong pressures to 
repeal Section 7» Martin suggested that the Sherman Act 
could be utilized to reduce long standing centralization 
if its advantages to the public had not been clearly demon­
strated. "Maybe the time is ripe to bring a carefully 
chosen Sherman case designed to bring the law on existing 
corporations into line with the new anti-merger policy.
Professor John Narver in his book concluded that 
conglomerate mergers were not inherently pro-competitive 
or anti-competitive. In his study it was also observed 
that under some conditions, a conglomerate could very well 
promote competition, yet conversely, it could lessen com­
petition. Effects of conglomerate mergers, according to 
Narver, could only be determined by considering the probable 
changes in the characteristics of the particular market.
^^David D. Martin, "The Brown Shoe Case and the 




Donald Turner, who later became Assistant Attorney 
General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Depart­
ment of Justice, in I965 surveyed Supreme Court and Federal 
Trade Commission decisions in Section 7 cases. Turner 
belittled decisions which would protect the small and 
inefficient. He believed that such protection was at the 
expense of the consuming public who were not given the 
benefits inherent in economies of scale resulting from 
larger firms. Turner also said that there had been no 
evidence of a sharp decline in the number of small busi­
nesses , but he did recognize that there had been a slow 
rise in the concentration of assets, over a period of 
several decades. New entries had not been barred because 
of the alleged concentration, and Turner specified that 
Kaiser and Reynolds had both entered the aluminum field 
since World War II. Turner did not believe that Congress 
had given the courts and the FTC a mandate to campaign
against super-concentration in the absence of any evidence
12of harm to competition.
Professor Richard Heflebower discussed several 
court emd FTC decisions that were rendered in 1962 and
1963. He described inconsistencies in the decisions in 
much the same manner as Rahl. According to Heflebower, 
antitrust laws had no meaning until the Supreme Court
12Donald F . Turner, "Conglomerate Mergers and 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act," Harvard Law Review (May
1965), pp. 1313-1395.
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provided definitive decisions a He considered that the 
decision in the Brown Shoe case was "far from a model of 
economic analysis or legal interpretation, but its meaning 
was clear"--the government and the courts had a distinct 
anti-merger attitude. Heflebower proposed that a narrower 
definition of "market" be accepted in Section 7 cases, 
with the burden to be on the defendant rather than the 
government. Secondly, he proposed that in predicting the 
effects of a merger, a bench-mark percentage should be set 
up. He suggested that in any horizontal or vertical 
merger resulting in the merged firm having a market share 
of over 20 percent, it should be invalidated. Heflebower 
mentioned a similar criteria which had been suggested by 
George Stigler, who also implied that mergers should be 
opposed if doubtful. Heflebower explained that the courts 
have limited information upon which to base effects of a 
merger. He said that if a merger were permitted and the 
merger developed into a proscribed oligopolistic or 
monopolistic situation, the error would be difficult to 
erase. Heflebower contended that if a merger were invali­
dated that would have enhanced competition, or been 
neutral, the social loss would be minimal. Heflebower 
argued that the courts must be able to predict the effects 
of a merger by answering the question of "which way to 
lean in the presence of non-definitive theory and sketchy 
evidence." The question to be weighed in Heflebower's
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opinion would be whether the social cost of error from a
too easy merger policy would be more serious than from
13following a strict policy.
Markham analyzed several of the court decisions.
He believed that the new standards would impose new and 
significant restraints on the decision making processes 
of business. In each of the court decisions, according 
to Markham, there appeared to be a central thread running 
through them. That common denominator, according to 
Markham, was the claim by each of the defendants that its 
actions were merely the conventional means of economic 
growth. The fact is, according to Markham, that when one 
firm grows by merger, the relative size of its competi­
tors diminished unless they countered with mergers of 
their own. On that basis, most mergers could be found in 
contravention of Section 7« "The voices of those in 
Congress and public life who are in accord with the new 
doctrine are clearly more audible than the voices of those 
who oppose it." Markham continued that in 1963 there were 
"bills in Congress, and in State Legislatures designed to 
protect small business from the rigors of competition, but
few if any were designed to foster the competitive process 
l4itself." ^
13Richard B. Heflebower, "Policy and Economic 
Analysis," Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 77i No. 4 
(November 1963), pp. 537-556.
14Jesse W„ Markham, "Antitrust Trends and New 
Constraints," Harvard Business Review, v. XLI (May-June 
1963), pp. 90-JTo
247
John J. Scott, General Counsel, Socony Mobil Oil 
Corporation, addressed a gathering of business men in
1964. Scott said that he favored antitrust legislation 
that was to be administered with wisdom and fairness, but 
he expressed concern over an unrealistic enlargement of 
the application of Section ?• He believed- that the present 
policy was working at cross purposes with a concurrent 
goal of economic growth. Scott characterized the Brown 
Shoe decision as one that was close to an indictment of 
integration. Integrations, he contended, were but compe­
titive efforts to effect cost savings. He believed that 
the approach in the Brown case, would in the long run 
restrict competition, penalize the consumer, and "impose 
a strait jacket on the national economy.
Scott criticized the approach in the Procter and 
Gamble case. He was particularly upset over the Federal 
Trade Commission (and later the Supreme Court) minimizing 
the economies of scale claimed by the respondent. Scott 
indicated that he had lost faith in the "new policy" 
since he had always presumed that sensible business objec­
tives would be compatible with the antitrust laws.^^
Scott was critical of the government's approach 
in the Penn-Olin case. Scott believed that the government
^^John J. Scott, "Is Antitrust Hurting Growth?" 
Dun's Review, v. 83 (May 1964), pp. 55~56 and 78-86.
^^Ibid.
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had actually contended that a "share the risk" proposal 
which would lead to a chance of making a profit, was in 
contravention of Section 7* Scott pointed out that such 
a position would imply that any contributions joint ven­
tures might make in the expansion of the national economy 
would be unacceptable. Scott claimed that such a position
was ridiculous and should not be tolerated by rational 
1?men.
Scott was critical about the de cLsion made in the 
Consolidated Foods case. A merger which could have placed 
a firm in position where it could have engaged in recipro­
cal dealing--according to Scott, was contrary to past 
acceptable business practices. Trade relations, or reci­
procity, had been practiced since time immemorial, and if 
that were to be a future indictment, then all conglomerate 
mergers would be per se illegal. Scott believed such an
indictment went far beyond the scope or the intent of the 
18antitrust laws.
Scott argued that had the antitrust laws been 
strictly imposed over the past 100 years while the 
industrial capacity of the nation was being built, it 
would have been highly unlikely that the United States 
would have reached its present stature in the economic 
world. He contended that Section 7 should only be invoked 
where there was a real threat to competition as opposed 
to a theoretical probability that a merger would be
^^Ibid. l^Ibid.
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anti-competitive. Scott said that Section 7 should be
used sparingly, and not where the facts and the background
of an industry have revealed that the basic objectives
had been to achieve economies of scale. As to the latter,
Scott argued that it was on that basis that the United
States should be able to compete with foreign goods. He
advocated the dropping of trade barriers. Scott asserted
that such action would promote a genuinely competitive
19condition in the nation.
In 1966, John Blair pointed out to the Senate Sub­
committee on Antitrust and Monopoly that business concen­
tration had increased during the period 1947-1963° The 
increase had been concentrated in the top 30 of the 200 
largest manufacturers, but the average share of the top 
200 had increased less than 1 per cent a year. In 
general, according to Blair, the number of industries in 
which the four largest firms had increased their output
20but slightly exceeded those that had suffered a decrease. 
Blair also pointed out that:
(1 ) Four of the very large industries with ship­
ments in excess of $2.5 billion showed increases in con­
centration, but seven did not. Of the four, two were in
l^ibid.
20U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly, Hearings on Economic Concentration: Concentra­
tion and Divisional Reporting, Part 5, 89th Cong., 2d 
Sess., September I966.
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foods, one in textiles, and one in transportation equip­
ment. Impliedly, the groups selling to the consumer 
increased in concentration, while those selling industri­
ally, decreased in concentration.
(2) The share of the industries' man hours used
by the largest producers was less than their share of the
industries' shipments. Large industries were therefore
21apparently more efficient.
Professor Samuel R. Reid, University of Illinois, 
testified that large publicly held firms which tend to 
merge were firms that were oriented more toward managerial 
interests as opposed to the interests of the stock holder. 
Reid claimed that his study had revealed that a number of 
firms had objectives--or acted as if they had--which 
resulted in a socially suboptimal allocation of capital 
when they favored acquisition rather than internal growth.
Reid suggested that the tax structure be modified 
so as to increase the attractiveness of internal growth.
It was suggested that an increase of tax credits and an 
increased depreciation allowance on new investment and 
equipment could be used to promote internal growth. He 
also suggested that some incentive could be devised which 
would provide an incentive to dis-invest, such as the 
creation of tax debits on acquisitions, Reid contended
^^Ibid,, pp. 1892-1900,
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that the wave of mergers that had occurred since the
passage of the Celler-Kefauver bill in 1950 could have
actually been influenced by a favorable corporate tax
structure. He concluded that a change in the tax laws
could be a more pragmatic method of curbing mergers-
acquisitions which were not in the public interest than
22any application of Section ?•
Johann Bjorksten, Economic Consultant, pointed out
to the Sub-committee that the merger route to bigness was
almost a way of life. It was not always successful
according to Bjorksten since of the ^,^00 mergers in a
previous 10 year period, there had been a failure rate of
21l6 per cent in the 12 industries he had studied.
Willard Mueller contended that Congress drafted 
a statute that was designed to prevent only anti-competi­
tive mergers. It was not intended to prevent all mergers 
which might add to either market or aggregate concentration 
--some mergers might be in the public interest such as a 
merger which rescued a failing firm. The chief impact of 
anti-merger enforcement according to Mueller has appeared 
in the area of horizontal mergers where the numbers have 
steadily declined. The decision rendered in the Bethlehem 
Steel case (l68 Fed Supp 576) in late 1958, according to 
Mueller, marked the beginning of the end for horizontal
2^Ibid., pp. 1909-1927. ^^Ibid., pp. 1927-1968.
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24mergers.
Mueller pointed out five industries--shoe, steel, 
dairy, food, and cement in which anti-merger actions had 
affected the structure of the particular industries. 
Anti-merger activities in the food and dairy industries 
had illustrated the policies with respect to either non- ~ 
horizontal mergers or the so called "market extension" 
mergers. In the cement industry, vertical acquisitions 
were the focus of attention. Overall, according to 
Mueller, the most important impact of the anti-merger
2 R
policy has been its deterrent effect.
The highly diversified Food Machinery Corporation 
(PMC) proposed a 1963 merger with the American Viscose 
Corporation, The Department of Justice sought a pre­
liminary injunction which was denied; an appeal was later 
dismissed; and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal 
(U.S. V Food Machinery Corp. and American Viscose Corp,)^^ 
FMC contended that it merged only into areas where it had 
the expertise, and its mergers were motivated by profit 
alone. FMC pointed out an earlier merger with an armor 
manufacturer where by good management and a reduction of 
costs, the price of an amphibious tank sold to the govern­
ment was cut from $70,000 to $22,000.^^ Merger policy in
^^Mueller, pp. 31-59» ^^Ibid,
^^Trade Cases, I963, par, 70,865.
^^"Giant That Makes Most Anything," Business Week, 
March 9, 1963» pp. 58-64,
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1968 could very easily have invalidated the earlier FMC 
merger and the public would have been the loser. All 
mergers are not dangerous, nor should the policy be so 
inflexible that any anti-merger complaint would be tanta­
mount to the finding of a violation of Section 7*
In a concluding chapter, a summarization of the 
development of anti-merger policies will be given. The 
implications of a strict interpretation of present day 
policy will be discussed. A suggested anti-merger policy 
conceivably acceptable to either opponent or proponent of 
existing anti-merger thinking will conclude the research.
CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary
The concepts of anti-merger policy have undergone 
a transformation since the early days of the United States 
The passage of the Sherman Act in I89O was a public pro­
test against monopoly and big business. A sporadic 
enforcement did little to deter the continued increase in 
business concentration. The public aroused itself again 
and enough pressures were forthcoming on Congress to cause 
the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914. The majority of 
the mergers were being effected by the acquisitions of 
stock and it was that merger device that was made illegal 
under the Clayton Act. It was believed that the Sherman 
Act would care for other questionable devices that tended 
toward monopoly or acted as a restraint of trade. In 
1914, the Federal Trade Commission Act was enacted which 
created a Commission to administer the Clayton Act. One 
section of the Federal Trade Commission Act also made 
certain unfair business practices illegal, and that por­
tion was administered by the Federal Trade Commission,
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Neither the Clayton Act nor the Sherman Act as 
interpreted by the courts restricted a wave of mergers 
and acquisitions. Business evaded restrictions by pur­
chasing the assets of its desired acquisitions. That 
method of evasion was long recognized by the Federal Trade 
Commission and was brought to the attention of Congress 
as early as 1921. A series of unfavorable court decisions 
highlighted the problem, and public indignation trans­
mitted through Congress caused the Clayton Act to be 
amended in 1950. Section 7 of the Act was amended to 
include asset acquisitions along with stock acquisitions. 
The Federal Trade Commission believed that the law was all 
encompassing, and the threat of its use would restrict 
business concentration thereby permitting the free enter­
prise system to function as it was intended.
During the first five years after enactment of 
amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act, only eleven com­
plaints were filed by the two jurisdictional agencies. 
(Section 15 of the Clayton Act authorized the Department 
of Justice to also investigate Section 7 violations.)
The Commission and the Department of Justice used dif­
ferent approaches. The Commission tried for total dis­
solution of the merged firms which resulted in lengthy 
litigation. Justice conversely, used a consent decree as 
provided by the law. While that usage eliminated lengthy 
litigation, it did not provide the foundation for legal
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interpretations of Section 7*
The first problem area regarding interpretation 
of the amended act curiously enough was in the Commission 
itself. The Hearing Examiner used a Sherman Act test of 
legality of a merger and dismissed a complaint against 
Pillsbury Mills. The use of the more stringent Sherman 
Act tests was a common occurrence at the time. It was 
difficult without a higher court interpretation to differ­
entiate between a Clayton Act lessening of competition 
and a Sherman Act restraint of trade. Other problems also 
developed during the early years when application of the 
law was attempted. The Federal Trade Commission believed 
it was hampered in that mergers were consummated prior to 
its knowledge which made it difficult to effect a dissolu­
tion in the event of a successful prosecution. Accordingly, 
the Commission lobbied for a pre-merger notification 
requirement to be placed on all mergers. The Commission 
was not authorized to restrain a merger pending investi­
gation so it lobbied for authority to issue restraints.
The Commission complained that the issuance of cease and 
desist orders required lengthy court procedures so it 
lobbied for authority to make its own cease and desist 
orders final. The three proposals were supported by the 
Department of Justice which also proposed that it be 
authorized to subpoena business records in Section 7 cases.
The foregoing problems could have possibly
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accounted for an apparent lack of aggressiveness displayed 
by both enforcement agencies. Their protesting voices 
were heeded by Congress which in 1955 appointed committees 
in both houses to hear questions regarding antitrust and 
monopoly, and to consider proposed amendments to amended 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The House Subcommittee on 
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary 
offered the more significant observations. Witnesses 
before the committee were government officials, business 
executives, and scholars from the field of economics.
There were diverse opinions as to the effectiveness of 
amended Section ?• The proponents of a stronger Section 7 
were primarily representatives of small business and 
government officials who denounced a growing concentra­
tion of economic power which was weakening competition. 
Contrariwise, the opponents of a stronger Section 7 who 
were in the minority disregarded economic concentration 
as a threat and characterized it as a myth. There were 
only two amendments to Section 7 which were enacted into 
law. After lengthy debates, the finality of Commission 
cease and desist orders was provided. After less lengthy 
debates, the Department of Justice was given the authority 
to subpoena business records in Section 7 cases.
The matter of annual appropriations was closely 
examined by the Committees on Appropriations. Each 
agency, generally, received increases each year of the
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1956-1965 period; however, the requests for funds made by 
the Federal Trade Commission were subjected to penetrating 
scrutiny. Each year that agency received a lesser amount 
than requested, though increased somewhat from the pre­
ceding year. A review of the records of the hearings dis­
closed that most of the Committee were not convinced that 
the Commission was effectively utilizing its resources. 
Criticism was leveled at the apparent apathy displayed by 
the Commission in its pursuit of Section 7 actions. Con­
versely, the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice had its budget approved yearly. Despite criti­
cisms of the FTC, the appropriations provided the agency 
were sufficient to permit annual increases of personnel.
In the period I956-I965, total personnel in the FTC more 
than doubled. In the same period, total personnel nearly 
doubled in the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice.
Section 7 activity in the period I956-I96O 
increased markedly. That could have been caused by the 
thrust of congressional criticism. Too, both agencies 
had the benefit of five years experience in the adminis­
tration of the law and that could have contributed to the 
increased activities. But the experience in the adminis­
tration of the statute, and the threat posed by that law, 
had very little affect on the number of mergers and 
acquisitions. The pace was more rapid than during the
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preceding five year period.
Mere numbers of mergers and acquisitions does not 
necessarily connote undesirability, but some unwanted 
consolidation could have been disregarded. Undesirable 
transactions could have been overlooked by: (l) inability
to compile an all inclusive list of mergers-acquisitions; 
and (2 ) a manifestly haphazard method of selecting a 
"probable violation," for an in depth examination.
There was some emergence of anti-merger law during 
the period but it was all contributed by the Department of 
Justice. The Federal Trade Commission changed its 
approach to Section 7 cases during the period. Where 
formerly the FTC would file in isolated instances, the 
new approach called for an industry wide emphasis as evi­
denced by complaints against the dairy, food, and paper 
industries. The period also marked another milestone in 
the progress of the Federal Trade Commission. The Com­
mission had also switched to the negotiation of consent 
decrees in Section 7 violations. The Department of 
Justice had used that procedure for a decade. Several 
cases filed by the FTC which were in litigation were not 
decided until the period I96I-I965 which period also wit­
nessed the emergence of the majority of anti-merger law 
as we know it today.
The period I96I-I965 also was significant in that 
the Department of Justice filed three times as many cases
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as the FTC. The total number of complaints filed during 
the period was significantly higher than in any preceding 
five year period. The increase attributed to the Depart­
ment of Justice could have been aided by: (l) more than
a decade of Section 7 experience; (2) favorable court 
decisions which gave a broader applicability to Section 7» 
and (3 ) generally improved enforcement procedures. The 
FTC during the congressional hearings justified the 
decline in numbers of Section 7 cases it had filed as 
not a true reflection of the agency's contributions to 
anti-merger policy. The FTC stressed its increased 
emphasis on the industry wide approach which would cause 
a lesser number of cases, A decline in FTC filings could 
also be attributed to the agency's use of business advisory 
conferences in which business was told, in advance, the 
type of mergers that would be suspect, A number of Supreme 
Court decisions in Section 7 cases emerged during the 
196I-I965 period. In I962 the Brown Shoe case was decided 
in favor of the government--filed seven years earlier by 
the Department of Justice, The case was considered a 
landmark in Section 7 law, and Brown Shoe has been used 
as a reference by courts since that date. Other cases 
decided by the Supreme Court in .'.hat period served to 
broaden the application of Section 7 to mergers and 
acquisitions, but the number of mergers and acquisitions 
have continued to increase.
26i
Varied reactions have prevailed 'as— a consequence 
of the court decisions. Scholars have written at length 
on the possible future economic repercussions if the law 
as it exists today is too strictly applied. Others have 
been as positive that a strict application of Section 7 
will restrict economic concentration and permit free com­
petition to exist as it was intended by Congress as early 
as 1914.
Conclusions
As a result of this research, the following con­
clusions are reached:
1. It is recognized that economic concentration 
has increased in certain industries and has decreased in 
others. John Blair supports that thesis along with others 
who appeared before congressional committees. The increase 
in overall concentration is meaningless because of the 
variations between industries. Likewise the measurement 
is subject to different interpretations. As Senator 
Hruska suggested in one of the hearings--if 1930 were used 
as a base year for comparisons, then concentration would 
probably show a decrease when compared to I96O. There is 
further controversy over the value of the concentration 
statistics, though it is believed that they at least 
emphasize problem areas where monopoly could exist.
William Martin, an economist, supports that view, along 
with others.
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2. A representative of the United States Chamber 
of Commerce while testifying before a congressional 
hearing, emphasized that the number of firms employing 
fewer than 100 persons (defined as a small business) had 
increased since 194^0 If concentration is the enemy of 
anti-merger policy, then concentration has had little 
effect on the new entries.
3. Under the present policy it is conceivable 
that any type merger can be invalidated» That feature 
accents ambiguities in the law, and as a consequence there 
is a strong possibility that discriminatory treatment 
could result. That thesis is supported by Handler, David 
Martin, Rahl, and Scott.
4. Amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act as it is 
interpreted today is unfair. It will not permit present 
day firms to duplicate what others have done in the past. 
The "new" law accepts fait accompli because of the diffi­
culties inherent in an "unscrambling" process which was 
demonstrated in the Pillsbury case.
5. An unreasonably strict application of Sec­
tion 7 reduces the incentive to invest. If there were no 
opportunity for growth of an investment, there would be 
no incentive to invest. That thesis is supported by 
minority views in the congressional hearings, A decreased 
investment would aggravate the unemployment situation 
which in turn would adversely effect consumption and
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national income, That thesis is also supported by minority 
views expressed in the congressional hearings.
The "deep pocket" or threat of unused economic 
power which dissolved the Procter Gamble-Clorox merger, 
and others, could likewise reduce the incentive to invest, 
and that would restrict economic growth. Adelman and 
Scott subscribed to that theory.
60 Divestments have been ordered on the basis 
that small independent firms which were acquired by a 
larger firm, should be returned to their former position 
in the industrial world. Once an acquired firm has lost 
its identity in the industry, as in the Pillsbury case 
and others, the possibility of it ever occupying the same 
position in the industrial society is remote. That point 
was belabored by some witnesses in congressional hearings 
and by the legislative minority members of committees.
A so called "protectionist" thesis was announced by the 
Supreme Court when it stressed that the "social benefit 
of preserving small business would override economic 
benefits."
7. If social benefits are to override economic 
benefits, then one would have to disregard economies of 
scale. The benefits of economies of scale have been 
introduced in the majority of the cases, but the courts 
have been reluctant to accept these circumstances.
8 . The term "reduction in competition" as used
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in Section 7 proceedings is purely speculative. There is 
no way economists or anyone else can forecast the degree 
of competition before a merger, or what competition will 
likely be after a merger. Minority views in the congres­
sional hearings unequivocally supported that view. Bok 
said that the term "reduction of competition" was only a 
value judgment.
9 . The anti-trust philosophies of the past three 
administrations have been comparable. Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
and Johnson have each expressed a like interest in the 
pursuit of merger violations. That feature is implied 
throughout this writing and is supported by a recent 
statement of the Assistant Attorney General for Anti­
trust. Records will also reflect that the number of com­
plaints filed over the past 10 years have been relatively 
the same, and that period spans the three administrations.
10. Section 7 violations should be assigned to one 
agency. The Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are rivals in 
the field of anti-merger work. Both agencies have juris­
diction under the statute. Over the years the Department 
of Justice has been the most successful in prosecuting 
Section 7 violations as well as taking less time in the 
proceedings. The Commission has ample work in other areas 
and in the interest of efficiency and economy, all Sec­
tion 7 work should be assigned to the Justice Department,
265
The duplication of jurisdiction was discussed at length in 
the congressional hearings. One proposal was made that 
Section 7 cases be divided into economic cases or legal 
cases, with the Commission being assigned the economic 
cases.
11. If the present anti-merger policy is to be 
continued, a simple way to invalidate a merger-acquisition 
would be to set a concentration percentage goal, above 
which no merger would be permitted unless it could be 
shown that it would be in the public interest. Turner 
and others have suggested that approach, and prior to 
Turner's resignation from the Department of Justice he 
did set out such guide lines for that agency. The pro­
cedure utilized by the Antitrust Division of that depart­
ment is set out in Appendix I. If such a policy were to 
be adopted by the Federal Trade Commission and the courts, 
would concentrations which have occurred in previous 
years be decentralized by the same yard stick?
The older concentrated industries that made annual 
reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission could 
be the subject of challenge if they reported a capital- 
earnings ratio above a certain percentage. In that way 
Turner's yard stick would be confined to specific instances 
That feature was mentioned in the congressional hearings.
12. A change in the corporate tax structure, even 
with a strong anti-merger policy, could be compatible with
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majority desires. It would eliminate human frailty extant 
in value judgments as to what is and what is not concen­
tration. The tax would not be too steeply graduated to 
discourage internal growth yet it should be steep enough 
to discourage superconcentration. That feature, too, 
would go far in decentralizing existing concentration.
Reid and others supported a restructuring of the tax 
system as the most practical way to handle merger policy.
The application of Section 7 as an instrument of 
policy has not to date resulted in a decrease of the number 
of mergers. Neither has Section 7 necessarily been in the 
interests of public policy. The threat of a vigorous 
application of the present body of anti-merger law is 
real, and a judicious usage is of paramount importance.
APPENDIX
j^prtintnt wf lirütire
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
THURSDAY, MAY 30, 1968
Thè Department of Justice today released guidelines out­
lining its standards for determining whether to oppose corporate 
ac-quisitions or mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Attorney General Ramsey Clark said the purpose of the 
guidelines is to insure that the business community, the legal 
profession and other interested persons are informed of the 
Department's policy of enforcing Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Mr. Clark expressed hope that the guidelines would provide 
a basis for a continuing dialogue between government and business 
concerning the role and scope of anti-merger enforcement in the 
maintenance of a free competitive economy.
The Department anticipates that it will amend the guidelines 
from time to time, Mr. Clark said, to reflect changes in enforce­
ment policy that might result from subsequent court decisions, 
comments of interested parties, or Department réévaluations.
Because changes in enforcement policy will be made as the 
occasion demands and will usually precede the issuance of amended 
guidelines, the Department said that the existence of unamended 
guidelines should not be regarded as barring it from taking any 
action it deems necessary to achieve the purposes of Section 7.
A copy of the guidelines is attached.
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MERGER GUIDELINES
1. Purpose. The purpose of these guidelines is to 
acquaint the business community, the legal profession, and other 
interested groups and individuals with the standards currently 
being applied by the Department of Justice in determining 
whether to challenge corporate acquisitions and mergers under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. (Although mergers or acquisitions 
may also be challenged under the Sherman Act, commonly the 
challenge will be made under Section 7 of the Clayton Act and, 
accordingly, it is to this provision of law that the guidelines 
are directed.) The responsibilities of the Department of Justice 
under Section 7 are those of an enforcement agency, and these 
guidelines are announced solely as a statement of current Department 
policy, subject to change at any time without prior notice, for 
whatever assistance such statement may be in enabling interested 
persons to anticipate in a general way Department enforcement 
action under Section 7. Because the statements of enforcement 
policy contained in these guidelines must necessarily be framed 
in rather general terms, and because the critical factors in any 
particular guideline formulation may be evaluated differently by
the Department than by the parties, the guidelines should not 
be treated as a substitute for the Department's business review 
procedures, which make available statements of the Department's 
present enforcement intentions with regard to particular 
proposed mergers or acquisitions.
2. General Enforcement Policy. Within the over-all scheme 
of the Department's antitrust enforcement activity, the primary 
role of Section 7 enforcement is to preserve and promote market 
structures conducive to competition. Market structure is the 
focus of the Department's merger policy chiefly because the 
conduct of the individual firms in a market tends to be 
controlled by the structure of that market, ^e., by those 
market conditions which are fairly permanent or subject only 
to slow change (such as, principally, the number of substantial 
firms selling in the market, the relative sites of their 
respective market shares, and the substantiality of barriers 
to the entry of new firms into the market). Thus, for example, 
a concentrated market structure, where a few firms account for a 
large share of the sales, tends to discourage vigorous price 
competition by the firms in the market and to encourage other 
kinds of conduct, such as use of inefficient methods of production 
or excessive promotional expenditures, of an economically 
undesirable nature. Moreover, not only does emphasis on market 
structure generally produce economic predictions that are fully 
adequate for the purposes of a statute that requires only a
showing that the effect of a merger "may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly," but an 
enforcement policy emphasizing a limited number of structural 
factors also facilitates both enforcement decision-making and 
business planning which involves anticipation of the Depart­
ment's enforcement intent. Accordingly, the Department's 
enforcement activity under Section 7 is directed primarily 
toward the identification and prevention of those mergers 
which alter market structure in ways likely now or eventually 
to encourage or permit non-competitive conduct.
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the 
structural factors used in these guidelines will not alone 
be conclusive, and the Department's enforcement activity will 
necessarily be based on a more complex and inclusive evaluation. 
This is sometimes the case, for example, where basic technological 
changes are creating new industries, or are significantly trans­
forming older industries, in such fashion as to make current 
market boundaries and market structure of uncertain significance. 
In such unusual transitional situations application of the normal 
guideline standards may be inappropriate; and on assessing 
probable future developments, the Department may not sue despite 
nominal application of a particular guideline, or it may sue even 
though the guidelines, as normally applied, do not require the 
Department to challenge the merger. Similarly, in the area of
conglomerate merger activity, the present incomplete state of 
knowledge concerning strueture-conduct relationships may preclude 
sole reliance on the structural criteria used in these guidelines, 
as explained in paragraphs 17 and 20 below.
3. Market Definition. A rational appraisal of the probable 
competitive effects of a merger normally requires definition of 
one or more relevant markets. A market is any grouping of sales 
(or other commercial transactions) in which each of the firms 
whose sales are included enjoys some advantage in competing with 
those firms whose sales are not included. The advantage need 
not be great, for so long as it is significant it defines an 
area of effective competition among the included sellers in 
which the competition of the excluded sellers is, ex hypothesi. 
less effective. The process of market definition may result in 
identification of several appropriate markets in which to test 
the probable competitive effects of a particular merger.
A market is defined both in terms of its product dimension 
("line of commerce") and its geographic dimension ("section of 
the country").
(i) Line of commerce. The sales of any product or 
service which is distinguishable as a matter of commercial 
practice from other products or services will ordinarily 
constitute a relevant product market, even though, from 
the standpoint of most purchasers, other products may be
reasonably, but not perfectly, Interchangeable with it in 
terms of price, quality, and use. On the other hand, the 
sales of two distinct products to a particular group of 
purchasers can also appropriately be grouped into a 
single market where the two products are reasonably inter­
changeable for that group in terms of price, quality, and 
use. In this latter case, however, it may be necessary 
also to include in that market the sales of one or more 
other products which are equally interchangeable with the 
two products in terms of price, quality, and use from the 
standpoint of that group of purchasers for whom the two 
products are interchangeable.
The reasons for employing the foregoing definitions may 
be stated as follows. In enforcing Section 7 the Department 
seeks primarily to prevent mergers which change market 
structure in a direction likely to create a power to behave 
non-competitively in the production and sale of any particu­
lar product, even though that power will ultimately be 
limited, though not nullified, by the presence of other 
similar products that, while reasonably interchangeable, 
are less than perfect substitutes. It is in no way 
inconsistent with this effort also to pursue a policy 
designed to prohibit mergers between firms selling distinct 
■products where the result of the merger may be to create or
enhance Che companies' markec power due to Che face ChaC 
Che produces, Chough noc perfecCly subsCiCuCable by 
purchasers, are slgnlficanc enough alcernaclves Co 
consCiCuCe subscanclal compecicive Influences on Che 
producclon, developmenc or sale of each.
(11) Seccton of the Country. The total sales of a 
produce or service In any conmerclally significant section 
of the country (even as small as a single community), or 
aggregate of such sections, will ordinarily constitute a 
geographic market If firms engaged In selling the product 
make significant sales of the product to purchasers in 
the section or sections. The market need not be enlarged 
beyond any section meeting the foregoing test unless It 
clearly appears that there Is no economic barrier 
(e.g.. significant transportation costs, lack of distribu­
tion facilities, customer Inconvenience, or established 
consumer preference for existing products) that hinders 
the sale from outside the section to purchasers within the 
section; nor need the market be contracted to exclude some 
portion of the product sales made Inside any section meeting 
the foregoing test unless It clearly appears that the portion 
of sales In question Is made to a group of purchasers 
separated by a substantial economic barrier from the 
purchasers to whom the rest of the sales are made.
Because data limitations or other intrinsic 
difficulties will often make precise delineation of 
geographic markets impossible, there may often be two or 
more grouping^  of sales which may reasonably be treated 
as constituting a relevant geographic market. In such 
circumstances, the Department believes it to be ordinarily 
most consistent with the purposes of Section 7 to challenge 
any merger which appears to be illegal in any reasonable 
geographic market, even though in another reasonable 
market it would not appear to be illegal.
The market is ordinarily measured primarily by the dollar 
value of the sales or other transactions (e.g.. shipments, 
léases) for the most recent twelve month period for which the 
necessary figures for the merging firms and their competitors 
are generally available. Where such figures are clearly 
unrepresentative, a different period will be used. In some 
markets, such as commercial banking, it is more appropriate to 
measure the market by other indicia, such as total deposits.
I. HORIZmTAL MERGERS
4; Enforcement Policy. With respect to mergers between 
direct competitors (i.e.. horizontal mergers), the Department's 
enforcement activity under Section 7 of the Clayton Act has the 
following interrelated purposes: (1) preventing elimination as
an independent business entity o£ any company likely to have 
been a substantial competitive influence in a market; (ii) pre­
venting any company or small group of companies from obtaining 
a position of dominance in a market; (iii) preventing signifi­
cant increases in concentration in a market; and (iv) preserving 
significant possibilities for eventual déconcentration in a 
concentrated market.
In enforcing Section 7 against horizontal mergers, the 
Department accords primary significance to the size of the 
market share held by both the acquiring and the acquired 
firms. ("Acquiring firm" and "acquired firm" are used herein, 
in the case of. horizontal mergers, simply as convenient desig­
nations of the firm with the larger market share and the firm 
with the smaller share, respectively, and do not refer to the 
legal form of the merger transaction.) The larger the market 
share held by the acquired firm, the more likely it is that 
the firm has been a substantial competitive influence in the 
market or that concentration in the market will be significantly 
increased. The larger the market share held by the acquiring 
firm, the more likely it is that an acquisition will move it 
toward, or further entrench it in, a position of dominance or 
of shared market power. Accordingly, the standards most often 
applied by the Department in determining whether to challenge 
horizontal mergers can be stated in terms of the sizes of the 
merging firms' market shares.
5, Market Highly Concentrated. In a market in which the 
shares of the four largest firms amount to approximately 757, or 
more, the Department will ordinarily challenge mergers between 
firms accounting for, approximately, the following percentages 
of the market:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
4% 4% or more
10% 2% or more
15% or more 1% or more
(Percentages not shown in the above table should be interpolated
proportionately to the percentages that are shown.)
6, Market Less Highly Concentrated. In a market in which 
the shares of the four largest firms amount to less chan approxi­
mately 75%, the Department will ordinarily challenge mergers 
between firms accounting for, approximately, the following percent­
ages of Che market:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
5% 5% or more
10% 4% or more
15% 3% or more
20% 2% or more
25% or more 1% or more
(Percentages not shown in the above table should be interpolated
proportionately to the percentages that are shown.)
7, Market With Trend Toward Concentration. The Department 
applies an additional, stricter standard in determining whether 
to challenge mergers occurring in any market, not wholly
unconcenCracedy in which there is a significant trend toward 
increased concentration. Such a trend is considered to be 
present when the aggregate market share of any grouping of the 
Largest firms in the market from the two largest to the eight 
largest has increased by approximately 7% or more of the market 
over a period of time extending from any base year 5-10 years 
prior to the merger (excluding any year in which some abnormal 
fluctuation in market shares occurred) up to the time of the 
merger. The Department will ordinarily challenge any acquisi­
tion, by any firm in a grouping of such largest firms showing 
the requisite increase in market share, of any firm whose 
market share amounts to approximately 2% or more.
8. Non-Market Share Standards. Although in enforcing 
Section 7 against horizontal mergers the Department attaches 
primary importance to the market shares of the merging firms, 
achievement of the purposes of Section 7 occasionally requires 
the Department to challenge mergers which would not be chal­
lenged under the market share standards of Paragraphs 5, 6, 
and 7. The following are the two most common instances of 
this kind in which a challenge by the Department can ordinarily 
be anticipated:
(a) acquisition of a competitor which is a particularly 
"disturbing," "disruptive," or otherwise unusually conq>etitive 
factor in the market; and
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(b) a merger Involving a substantial firm and a firm which, 
despite an insubstantial market share, possesses an unusual 
competitive potential or has an asset that confers an unusual 
competitive advantage (for example, the acquisition by a lead­
ing firm of a newcomer having a patent on a significantly 
improved product or production process).
There may also be certain horizontal mergers between makers of 
distinct products regarded as in the same line of commerce for 
reasons expressed in Paragraph 3(i) where some modification in 
the minimum market shares subject to challenge may be appropriate 
to reflect the imperfect substitutability of the two products.
9. Failing Company. A merger which the Department would 
otherwise challenge will ordinarily not be challenged if (i) the 
resources of one of the merging firms are so depleted and its 
prospects for rehabilitation so remote that the firm faces the 
clear probability of a business failure, and (ii) good faith 
efforts by the failing firm have failed to elicit a reasonable 
offer of acquisition more consistent with the purposes of Section 
7 by a firm which intends to keep the failing firm in the market. 
The Department regards as failing only those firms with no 
reasonable prospect of remaining viable; it does not regard a 
firm as falling merely because the firm has been unprofitable 
for a period of time, has lost markec position or failed to 
maintain its competitive position in some other respect, has
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poor management, or has not fully explored the possibility of 
overcoming its difficulties through self-help.
In determining the applicability of the above standard to 
the acquisition of a failing division of a multi-market company, 
such factors as the difficulty in assessing the viability of a 
portion of a company, the possibility of arbitrary accounting 
practice's, and the likelihood that an otherwise healthy company 
can rehabilitate one of its parts, will lead the Department to 
apply this standard only in the clearest of circumstances.
10. Economies. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, 
the Department will not accept as a justification for an acquisi­
tion normally subject to challenge under its horizontal merger 
standards the claim that the merger will produce economies 
(i.e.. improvements in efficiency) because, among other reasons,
(i) the Department’s adherence to the standards will usually 
result in no challenge being made to mergers of the kind most 
likely to involve companies operating significantly below the 
size necessary to achieve significant economies of scale;
(ii) where substantial economies are potentially available to a 
firm, they can normally be realized through internal expansion; 
and (iii) there usually are severe difficulties in accurately 




II. Enforcement Policy. With respect to vertical mergers 
(i.e.. acquisitions "backward" into a supplying market or 
"forward" into a purchasing market), the Department's enforcement 
activity under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as in the merger 
field generally, is intended to prevent changes in market 
structure that are likely to lead over the course of time to 
significant anticompetitive consequences. In general, the 
Department believes that auch consequences can be expected to 
occur %#heneyer a particular vertical acquisition, or series of 
acquisitions, by one or more of the firms in a supplying or 
purchasing market, tends significantly to raise barriers to 
entry in either market or to disadvantage existing non-lntegrated 
or partly integrated firms in either market in ways unrelated 
to economic efficiency. (Barriers to entry are relatively 
stable market conditions which tend to increase the difficulty 
of potential competitors' entering the market as new sellers 
and which thus tend to limit the effectiveness of the potential 
competitors both as a restraint upon the behavior of firms in 
the market and as a source of additional actual competition.)
Barriers to entry resting on such factors as economies of 
scale in production and distribution are not questionable as such. 
But vertical mergers tend to raise barriers to entry in undesirable
13
ways, particularly the following: (i) by foreclosing equal
access to potential customers, thus reducing the ability of 
non-integrated firms to capture competitively the market share 
needed to achieve an efficient level of production, or imposing 
the burden of entry on an integrated basis (i.e.. at both the 
supplying and purchasing levels) even though entry at a single 
level would permit efficient operation; (ii) by foreclosing 
equal access to potential suppliers, thus either increasing the 
risk of a price or supply squeeze on the new entrant or imposing 
the additional burden of entry as an integrated firm; or (iii) 
by facilitating promotional product differentiation, \dien the 
merger involves a manufacturing firm's acquisition of firms at 
the retail level. Besides impeding the entry of new sellers, 
the foregoing consequences of vertical mergers, if present, 
also artificially inhibit the expansion of presently competing 
sellers by conferring on the merged firm competitive advantages, 
unrelated to real economies of production or distribution, over 
non-integrated or partly integrated firms. While it is true 
that in some instances vertical integration may raise barriers to 
entry or disadvantage existing competitors only as the result of 
the achievement of significant economies of production or 
distribution (as, for example, where the increase in barriers is 
due to achievement of economies of integrated production through 
an alteration of the structure of the plant as well as of the
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firm), integration accomplished by a large vertical merger will 
usually raise entry barriers or disadvantage competitors to an 
extent not accounted for by, and wholly disproportionate to, 
such economies as may result from the merger.
It is, of course, difficult to identify with precision all 
circumstances in which vertical mergers are likely to have 
adverse effects on market structure of the kinds indicated in 
the previous paragraph. The Department believes, however, that 
the most important aims of its enforcement policy on vertical 
mergers can be satisfactorily stated by guidelines framed 
primarily in terms of the market shares of the merging firms 
and the conditions of entry which already exist in the relevant 
markets. These factors will ordinarily serve to identify most 
of the situations in which any of the various possible adverse 
effects of vertical mergers may occur and be of substantial 
competitive significance. With all vertical mergers it is 
necessary to consider the probable competitive consequences of 
the merger in both the market in which the supplying firm sells 
and the market in which the purchasing firm sells, although a 
significant adverse effect in either market will ordinarily 
result in a challenge by the Department. ("Supplying firm" and 
"purchasing firm," as used herein, refer to the two parties to 
the vertical merger transaction, the former of which sells a 
product in a market in which the latter buys that product.)
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12. Supplying Firm's Market. In determining whether to 
challenge a vertical merger on the ground that it may signifi­
cantly lessen existing or potential competition in the supplying 
firm's market, the Department attaches primary significance to 
(i) the market share of the supplying firm, (ii) the market 
share of the purchasing firm or firms, and (iii) the conditions 
of entry in the purchasing firm's markec. Accordingly, the 
Department will ordinarily challenge a merger or series of 
mergers between a supplying firm, accounting for approximately 
10% or more of the sales in its market, and one or more pur­
chasing firms, accounting ^  toto for approximately 6% or more 
of Che total purchases in that market, unless it clearly appears 
that there are no significant barriers to entry into the business 
of the purchasing firm or firms.
13. Purchasing Firm's Market. Although the standard of 
paragraph 12 is designed to identify vertical mergers having 
likely anticompetitive effects in the supplying firm's market, 
adherence by the Department to that standard will also normally 
result in challenges being made to most of the vertical mergers 
which may have adverse effects in the purchasing firm's market 
(i.e.. that market comprised of the purchasing firm and its 
Competitors engaged in resale of the supplying firm's product 
or in the sale of a product whose manufacture requires the 
supplying firm's product) since adverse effects in the
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purchasing firm's market will normally occur only as the 
result of significant vertical mergers Involving supplying firms 
with market shares In excess of 10%. There remain, however, 
some Important situations In which vertical mergers which are 
not subject to challenge under paragraph 12 (ordinarily because 
Che purchasing firm accounts for less than 6% of the purchases 
In the.supplying firm's market) will nonetheless be challenged 
by the Department on the ground that they raise entry barriers 
In the purchasing firm's market, or disadvantage the purchasing 
firm's competitors, by conferring upon the purchasing firm a 
significant supply advantage over unintegrated or partly 
Integrated existing competitors or over potential competitors.
The following paragraph sets forth the enforcement standard 
governing the most common of these situations.
If the product sold by the supplying firm and Its competitors 
Is either a complex one In which Innovating changes by the various 
suppliers have been taking place, or Is a scarce raw material or 
other product whose supply cannot be readily expanded to meet 
Increased demand, the merged firm may have the power to use any 
temporary superiority, or any shortage. In the product of the 
supplying firm to put competitors of the purchasing firm at a 
disadvantage by refusing to sell the product to them (supply 
squeeze) or by narrowing the margin between the price at which 
It sells the product to the purchasing firm's competitors and
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the price at which the end-product is sold by the purchasing 
firm (price squeeze). Even where the merged firm has sufficient 
market power to impose a squeeze, it may well not always be 
economically rational for it actually to do so; but the 
Department believes that the increase in barriers to entry in 
Che purchasing firm's market arising simply from the increased 
risk of a possible squeeze is sufficient to warrant prohibition 
of any merger between a supplier possessing significant markec 
power and a substantial purchaser of any product meeting the 
above description. Accordingly, where such a product is a 
significant feature or ingredient of the end-product manufactured 
by the purchasing firm and its competitors, the Department will 
ordinarily challenge a merger or series of mergers between a 
supplying firm, accounting for approximately 20% or more of the 
sales in its market, and a purchasing firm or firms, accounting 
in toto for approximately 10% or more of the sales in the market 
in which it sells the product whose manufacture requires the 
supplying firm's product.
14. Kon-Market Share Standards.
(4) Although in enforcing Section 7 against vertical mergers 
the Department attaches primary importance to the market shares 
of the merging firms and the conditions of entry in the relevant 
markets, achievement of the purposes of Section 7 occasionally 
requires the Department to challenge mergers which would not be
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challenged under che markec share standard* of paragraphs 12 and
13. Clearly che mosc common Instances in which challenge by the 
Department can ordinarily be anticipated are acquisitions of 
suppliers or customers by major firms in an industry in which
(i) there has been, or is developing, a significant trend toward 
vertical integration by merger such that che trend, if unchal­
lenged, would probably raise barriers to entry or impose a 
competitive disadvantage on unintegrated or partly integrated 
firms, and (ii) it does not clearly appear that the particular 
acquisition will result in significant economies of production 
or distribution unrelated to advertising or other promotional 
economies.
(b) A less common special situation in which a challenge by 
the Department can ordinarily be anticipated is the acquisition 
by a firm of a customer or supplier for the purpose of increasing 
the difficulty of potential competitors in entering the market of 
either the acquiring or acquired firm, or for the purpose of 
putting competitors of either che acquiring or acquired firm at 
an unwarranted disadvantage.
15. Failing Company. The standards set forth in paragraph
9 are applied by the Department in determining whether to challenge 
a vertical merger.
16. Economies. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, 
and except as noted in paragraph 14(a), the Department will not
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accept as a Justification for an acquisition normally subject to 
challenge under Its vertical merger standards the claim that the 
merger will produce economies, because, among other reasons, (1) 
where substantial economies of vertical Integration are potentially 
available to a firm, they can normally be realized through Internal 
expansion Into the supplying or purchasing market, and (11) where 
barriers prevent entry Into the supplying or purchasing market by 
Internal expansion, the Department's adherence to the vertical 
merger standards will In any event usually result In no challenge 
being made to the acquisition of a firm or firms of sufficient 
size to overcome or adequately minimize the barriers to entry.
HI. CONGLmERATE MERGERS
17. Enforcement Policy. Conglomerate mergers are mergers 
that are neither horizontal nor vertical as those terms are used 
In sections I and II, respectively, of these guidelines. (It 
should be noted that a market extension merger. I.e.. one Involv­
ing two firms selling the same product, but In different geographic 
markets. Is classified as a conglomerate merger.) As with other 
kinds of mergers, the purpose of the Department's enforcement 
activity regarding conglomerate mergers Is to prevent changes 
In market structure that appear likely over the course of time 
to cause a substantial lessening of the competition that would 
otherwise exist or to create a tendency toward monopoly.
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At Che present time, the Department regards two categories 
of conglomerate mergers as having sufficiently identifiable 
anticompetitive effects as to be the subject of relatively 
specific structural guidelines: mergers involving potential
(entrants (Paragraph 18) and mergers creating a danger of 
reciprocal buying (Paragraph 19).
Another important category of conglomerate mergers that 
will frequently be the subject of enforcement action--mergers 
which for one or more of several reasons threaten to entrench 
or enhance the market power of the acquired firm--is described 
generally in Paragraph 20.
As Paragraph 20 makes clear, enforcement action will also 
be taken against still other types of conglomerate mergers 
that on specific analysis appear anticompetitive. The fact that, 
as yet, the Department does not believe it useful to describe 
such other types of mergers in terms of a few major elements 
of market structure should in no sense be regarded as indicating 
that enforcement action will not be taken. Nor is it to be 
assumed that mergers of the type described in Paragraphs 18 and 
19, but not covered by the specific rules thereof, may not be 
the subject of enforcement action if specific analysis indicates 
that they appear anticompetitive.
18. Mergers Involving Potential Entrants.
(a) Since potential competition (i.e.. the threat of entry, 
either through internal expansion or through acquisition and
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expansion of a small firm, by firms not already or only 
marginally in the market) may often be the most significant 
competitive limitation on the exercise of market power by 
leading firms, as well as the most likely source of additional 
actual competition, the Department will ordinarily challenge 
any merger between one of the most likely entrants into the 
market and:
(1) any firm with approximately 25% or more of the
market ;
(ii) one of the two largest firms in a market in which 
the shares of the two largest firms amount to approximately 50% 
or more;
(ill) one of the four largest firms in a market in 
which the shares of the eight largest firms amount to approxi­
mately 75% or more, provided the merging firm's share of the 
market amounts to approximately 10% or more; or
(iv) one of the eight largest firms in a market in 
which the shares of these firms amount to approximately 75% or 
more, provided either (A) the merging firm's share of the market 
is not insubstantial and there are no more than one or two 
likely entrants into the market, or (B) the merging firm is a 
rapidly growing firm.
In determining whether a firm is one of the most likely potential 
entrants into a market, the Department accords primary significance
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Co Che firm's capabiliCy of encering on a compeClcively signifi- 
canC scale relaclve Co che capabilicy of ocher firms (i.e.. che 
Cechnological and financial resources available co ic) and Co 
Che firm's economic incencive Co enCer (evidenced by, for example, 
che general actracciveness of Che markec in cerms of risk and 
profic; or any special relacionship of che firm co Che markec; 
or che firm's manifested interest in entry; or the natural expan­
sion pattern of che firm; or the like).
(b) The Department will also ordinarily challenge a merger 
between an existing competitor in a market and a likely entrant, 
undertaken for the purpose of preventing the competitive 
"disturbance" or "disruption" that such entry might create.
(c) Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the Depart­
ment will not accept as a justification for a merger inconsistent 
with Che standards of this paragraph 18 che claim that Che merger 
will produce economies, because, among other reasons, the Depart­
ment believes that equivalent economies can be normally achieved 
either through internal expansion or through a small firm acqui­
sition or ocher acquisition not inconsistent with the standards 
herein.
19. Mergers Creating Danger of Reciprocal Buying.
(a) Since reciprocal buying (i.e.. favoring one's customer 
when making purchases of a product which is sold by the customer) 
is an economically unjustified business practice which confers a
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competitive advantage on the favored firm unrelated to the merits 
of its product, the Department will ordinarily challenge any 
merger which creates a significant danger of reciprocal buying. 
Unless it clearly appears that some special market factor makes 
remote the possibility that reciprocal buying behavior will 
actually occur, the Department considers Chat a significant 
danger of reciprocal buying is present whenever approximately 
15% or more of the total purchases in a market in which one of 
the merging firms ("the selling firm") sells are accounted for 
by firms which also make substantial sales in markets where the 
other merging firm ("the buying firm") is both a substantial 
buyer and a more substantial buyer than all or most of the 
competitors of the selling firm.
(b) The Department will also ordinarily challenge (1) any 
merger undertaken for the purpose of facilitating the creation 
of reciprocal buying arrangements, and (ii) any merger creating 
the possibility of any substantial reciprocal buying where one 
(or both) of the merging firms has within the recent past, or 
the merged firm has after consummation of the merger, actually 
engaged in reciprocal buying, or attempted directly or indi­
rectly to induce firms with which it deals to engage in 
reciprocal buying, in the product markets in which the possi­
bility of reciprocal buying has been created.
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(c) Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the 
Department will not accept as a Justification for a merger 
creating a significant danger of reciprocal buying the claim 
that the merger will produce economies, because, among other 
reasons, the Department believes that in general equivalent 
economies can be achieved by the firms involved through other 
mergers not inconsistent with the standards of this paragraph 
19.
20. Mergers Which Entrench Market Power and Other 
Conglomerate Mergers.___________________
The Department will ordinarily investigate the possibility 
of anticompetitive consequences, and may in particular circum­
stances bring suit, where an acquisition of a leading firm in a 
relatively concentrated or rapidly concentrating market may serve 
to entrench or increase the market power of that firm or raise 
barriers to entry in that market. Exanq>les of this type of 
merger include; (i) a merger which produces a very large disparity 
in absolute sime between the merged firm and the largest remaining 
firms in the relevant markets, (ii) a merger of firms producing 
related products which may induce purchasers, concerned about 
the merged firm's possible use of leverage, to buy products 
of the merged firm rather than those of competitors, and (iii) 
a merger which may enhance the ability of the merged firm to 
increase product differentiation in the relevant markets.
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Generally speaking, the conglomerate merger area Involves 
novel problems that have not yet been subjected to as extensive 
or sustained analysis as those presented by horizontal and 
vertical mergers. It is for this reason that the Department's 
enforcement policy regarding the foregoing category of conglom­
erate mergers cannot be set forth with greater specificity. 
Moreover, the conglomerate merger field as a whole is one in 
which the Department considers it necessary, to a greater 
extent than with horizontal and vertical mergers, to carry on 
a continuous analysis and study of the ways in which mergers 
may have significant anticompetitive consequences in circum­
stances beyond those covered by these guidelines. For example, 
the Department has used Section 7 to prevent mergers which may 
diminish long-run possibilities of enhanced competition resulting 
from technological developments that may increase interproduct 
competition between industries whose products are presently 
relatively imperfect substitutes. Other areas where enforcement 
action will be deemed appropriate may also be identified on a 
case-by-case basis; and as the result of continuous analysis 
and study the Department may identify other categories of 
mergers that, can be the subject of specific guidelines.
21. Failing Company. The standards set forth in paragraph 9 
are normally applied by the Department in determining whether to 
challenge a conglomerate merger, except that in marginal cases
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Involving the application of Paragraph 18(a)(iii) and (iv)
the Department may deem it inappropriate to sue under Section 7
even though the acquired firm is not "failing" in the strict sense.
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